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CHAPTER I
TARIFF OVERHANG AND TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS: SUBSTITUTES OR
COMPLEMENTS?
Introduction
The WTO trade agreements provide two kinds of trade policy exibilities for countries when
there is shock to the demand for protection. One is most favored nation (MFN) tari¤ policy
exibility that results from the fact that countries set bound tari¤s. If the MFN tari¤ is less
than the bound tari¤, which is referred to as a case of tari¤ overhang, then the government
has the exibility to increase the MFN tari¤ to protect the import market. The other policy
exibility is temporary trade barriers (TTBs) which include anti dumping, countervailing
duties (CVD)and safeguards (SG). To impose TTBs, there is a process of investigation,
initiated by the local industry, by which the government determines whether the sector has
been injured by the other countriesunfair trade.1
The existing literature has emphasized the idea that TTBs are substitutes for
MFN tari¤ adjustment. For example, Busch and Pelc (2010) have shown that TTBs are
more likely to be used when there is less overhang level. This means that if the country
has less room for the MFN tari¤ adjustment, then the country use TTBs more to protect
1To complete this process, the government should make a law and institutions handling these issues. The
objective of AD is to protect import markets from unfair pricing by exporting countries. Article VI of the
The General Agreement of Tari¤ and Trade (GATT) provides for the right of contracting parties to apply
anti-dumping measures, i.e. measures against imports of a product at an export price below its normal
value(usually the price of the product in the domestic market of the exporting country) if such dumped
imports cause injury to a domestic industry in the territory of the importing contracting party. CVD has
similar motivation but can only be used in the presence of exporting countries subsidies. Finally, SG is
to protect the import market from serious injury. Article XIX of the General Agreement allows a GATT
member to take a safeguard action to protect a specic domestic industry from an unforeseen increase of
imports of any product which is causing, or which is likely to cause, serious injury to the industry.
1
the import market. They focus on the common factor in both policy exibilities that is
contingency for unexpected shock.
However, TTBs di¤er from MFN tari¤ adjustment because they allow discrim-
ination between exporting countries. This shoes that discrimination is one of important
reasons for TTBs. Since 1995, TTBs have been used extensively by developing countries
where tari¤ overhang is substantial. These facts suggest that there may be complementary
characteristics in two kinds of policy exibilities, meaning that two policy exibilities re-
sponse to di¤erent forms of shocks. A country specic import shock from di¤erent exporting
countries is more likely to generate a discriminative response.
My paper focuses on the relationship between the MFN and TTB exibilities.
Emphasizing the discrimination, I make simple model that shows that the incentive for
each policy exibility is di¤erent, and test this theoretical ndings using nine developing
countries panel data. My ndings provides the counter examples to the substitutability
argument and shows that there is a complementarity characteristics between two policy
exibilities.
In my paper, the complementarity is ex-post characteristic in the sense that the
bound tari¤ is xed when the country choose tari¤exibilities. This is di¤erent from several
researches focusing on the endogeneity of bound tari¤. Beshkar and Bond (2012) show that
contingent protection2 and tari¤ overhang are substitute and they may not coexist under
a certain condition. This argument is related to the ex-ante substitutability because the
availability of contingent protection make the bound tari¤ lower, which gives the country
less MFN exibility. Kucik and Reinhardt (2008) initiated the "exibility hypothesis" which
is closely related to the ex-ante substitutability. Their empirical study indicates that the
2They focus on the safeguard. Safeguard is di¤erent from other TTBs because the discrimination is not
allowed.
2
countries that the availability of TTBs more have lower bound and MFN tari¤s. This means
that the contingency motivates these two kinds of policy exibilities to protect the import
market.3 However, my paper assumes that the bound tari¤ was given when the country
choose any exibility, so it is treated as exogenous condition.
My paper was motivated from the observations of developing countriestari¤ poli-
cies after 1995. Since the WTO started in 1995, many developing countries rigorously
imposed anti dumping tari¤s (AD) on other trading partners. These developing countries
also have signicant level of tari¤ overhangs, which allow them to use MFN exibilities
during the same periods. Bown (2006) shows that 40% of anti dumping tari¤s are used
by nine developing countries during the period 1995-2004. This is a big change in the
trade policy of developing countries. Before 1995, the anti dumping tari¤ was mainly used
by developed countries, and developing countries rarely imposed AD but mainly used the
MFN tari¤ policy.4 If we only focus on the ex anti substitutability, then it is hard to ex-
plain the phenomenon that happened in developing countries after 1995. These facts show
that the MFN adjustment and TTBs may have complementarity characteristics rather than
substitutability.
Table 1. Characteristics of tari¤ policy exibility
Temporary Trade Barriers
Tari¤ Overhang Anti-Dumping, Safeguard
Counter-veiling Duty
How to implement? Increase MFN tari¤ Impose new tari¤ New tari¤, Quota
How much? Less than Bound tari¤ No limit No limit
Discrimination No Yes No
Cost No Prove injury and unfairness Prove injury
MFN means most favored nation tari¤. The country that impose tari¤ shou ld equally treat all WTO countries.
My study is based on the country specic tari¤ theory that is related to the dis-
3Bhagwatis (1988) "the law of constant protection theory", emphasized that the total protection of the
country is the same but the policy tool of protection changes. This theory is closely related to the exibility
hypothesis
4During the period 1985-1994, 73% of the total anti-dumping tari¤ was imposed by developed countries,
but this portion decreased to 33% during 1995-2004.
3
crimination issue. Gardner and Kimbrough (1990) show that the country specic tari¤ is
necessary to maximize the welfare of the country if there is a pretty big di¤erence between
exporting countries. This framework was applied to analyze anti-dumping duties. Saggi
(2004) provides more specic theoretical tool to analyze the discriminatory tari¤. He sug-
gests that under the Cournot-Nash competition, the optimal tari¤ policy is to impose higher
tari¤s on the goods that have lower costs. The implication of these papers is that if there
is a big di¤erence between exporting countries, then discriminatory tari¤ policy is better
than non-discriminatory (MFN) policy.
I developed these theories and made a simple three-country Cournot-Nash com-
petition model in which home country imports from two di¤erent foreign countries. In my
model, I clarify that TTBs are di¤erent from the MFN exibilities in two points. First, I in-
clude the cost factor in implementing TTBs. To impose TTBs, the country should make the
legal process and institutions that handle TTBs. initiation to imposition. Especially, if the
import country fails to prove injury of industry and unfairness of exporting countries, the
initiated TTBs cannot be imposed.5 These are treated as a cost when the country imposes
TTBs. However, there is no cost in adjusting MFN tari¤ if there is a tari¤ overhang.
Second, the model assumes that discrimination is allowed when the country im-
poses TTBs.6 The objective of AD and CVD is to protect the importing market from unfair
trade of any specic exporting country,7 but these are used to protect domestic producers
by many countries. Nelson (2006) emphasize the political economic aspect of anti dumping
which shows that the anti dumping policy is the result of direct or indirect lobbying of
5The common process of anti-dumping tari¤ is: the applicant submit petitions) government gives notice
to foreign exporters and investigates it ) if the petition is accepted then the government imposes anti-
dumping tari¤. The process of safeguard is similar.
6Discrimination is allowed when the country imposes ADs or CVDs, so they are called country specic
tari¤s
7The requirement of anti-dumping duty is to prove that the price from exporting country is below the
fair price.
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industries. This is one of the reasons why TTBs are considered as a tari¤ policy.8 Table 1
shows the di¤erences between policy exibilities.9.
The main implication of my model is that the economic shocks which trigger
specic tari¤ policy exibility are di¤erent from each other. If there is a big di¤erence in
market share between exporting countries, then the optimal tari¤ policy of home importing
country is discriminatory policy. However, if the shock is more general, not country specic
and the di¤erence of market share between exporting countries is small, then the MFN tari¤
adjustment is best response to the shock. Theoretical analysis shows that these two kinds
of exibilities are closely related to the di¤erent economic environments.
To test the hypothesis made by the model, I used nine developing countriespanel
data (1997-2011).10 The empirical part is distinguished from previous studies in several
points.
First, I made a theoretical foundation that shows the optimal policy choices are
functions of economic variables and make econometric model that matches with the the-
oretical motivation. Previous papers mainly focus on the direct relationship between the
MFN and TTBs. Busch and Pelc (2012) document the relationship between ADs, bound
tari¤s, and tari¤ overhangs.11 Moore and Zanardi (2007) analyze the e¤ects of ADs on the
8In the real world, it is relatively easy to show the price di¤erence between exporting price and fair price,
which is called the dumping margin. In addition to this, there are many cases in which ADs are initiated
but not imposed because the government could not prove injuries. The average success rate of ADs is 60%
(Bown,2006). However, empirical data shows the import market started to respond when AD (CVD) was
initiated. This is the reason why these ADs and CVDs are treated as trade policies instead of legal issue
in international trade. The WTO agreements do not allow discriminatory tari¤s when the country adjusts
MFN tari¤s or uses SGs.
9The duration of protection by the TTBs is xed before execution. The range of the tari¤ is also di¤erent
between the MFN and the TTBs. The TTBs are not restricted by the bound tari¤s, allowing an importing
countrys government to impose higher tari¤ rates than the bound tari¤ rates. More than 90% of TTBs
have greater tari¤ rate than the bound tari¤
10The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey
11They show that the sectors having bound tari¤s have a greater probability of using TTBs because the
bound tari¤s restrict the room for MFN exibility. Their empirical analysis supports the law of constant
protection theory. They used only AD data because AD is the most popular TTB, so most of empirical
studies focus on analyzing AD.
5
trade liberalization in developing countries.12 Prusa and Li (2012) analyze reverse causality.
They analyze the e¤ect of TTBs on the level of tari¤ overhang.13 These previous papers
focus direct relationship between the MFN and TTBs, in which one of them is independent
and the other is dependent variable. However, my theoretical motivation shows that both
policies are closely related to the specic economic environment change. In my study, I
made a multivariate probit model that includes both policy exibility as choice variables,
and then test the relationship between these choice variables and economic variables.
Second, I used highly disaggregated sectoral level data that is HS-6 digit level.14
Kucik and Reinhardt (2008) used country level data to provide the evidence for "exibility
hypothesis". I tested this hypothesis using sectoral level data and show the results are
di¤erent from this hypothesis.
Third, I also tested the classical optimal tari¤ theories, which shows that the MFN
tari¤ is closely related to the market power measure. The previous papers use cross section
data to support this argument, but I use panel data and show that the time variation of
market power is positively and signicantly correlated with the probability of MFN tari¤
increasing.15 My empirical study shows the dynamic aspects of the previous optimal tari¤
theory.
12They showed that ADs are negatively correlated with trade liberalization, which is measured by the
amount of decreasing MFN tari¤. This means that the sectors using ADs do not decrease tari¤s as much as
the other sectors that do not use AD. This is a counter example to the argument that TTBs contribute to
trade liberalization.
13Their main argument is that there is no consistent, and signicant relationship between TTBs and
tari¤ overhang level. This evidence is also counter example to the substitutability argument. Bown (2012)
analyzes Turkeys case where this country used these exibilities heavily after the 2008 nancial crisis. He
nds that these exibilities are closely related to economic variables, which indicates that the motivation of
tari¤ policy is to protect the import market from the unexpected change of economic environments.
14The WTO and UN provide HS-6 digit level tari¤ and trade data.
15Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2006) use export supply elasticity as a market power measure and they
show that there is a positive relationship between the market power and the optimal tari¤ level. Beshkar,
Bond, and Rho(2012) uses the import ratio as a market power measure and shows that the tari¤ bind-
ings and overhangs are negatively related with the market power. Bown(2007) analyzes the time variant
characteristics of anti-dumping tari¤s. He focuses on analyzing the determinants of anti-dumping tari¤s in
developing countries using political-economic variables and the WTO agreements evidentiary and macro-
economic variables. In this paper, these variables are closely related to the probability of imposing ADs.
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The theoretical and empirical studies show that the motivation of the MFN and
TTBs are di¤erent and these policies are used in di¤erent economic environments. If there
is an import surge in specic sectors, which is measured by the change of import share to
the world import, the probabilities of MFN increasing and TTBs increases.16 The import
surge is common factor that induce the government to protect the import market by using
any policy tools. If the import ratio increase by 1 standard deviation then the probabilities
of MFN increasing and TTBs increase by 3-6% if the other control variables are constant.
The import ratio change is used as a proxy for general shock to the sector of import country.
However, the changes of import market structure a¤ect only the probability of
TTBs, which means that TTBs are used to protect the import market if the import market
is monopolized by specic countries. The import market Herndahl index (HI) is made for
measuring the market structure change. If HI increases, which means that the exporting
share of a specic countries increase, then the probability of the TTBs also increases. The
prediction of MVP model indicates that if the HI increases by one standard deviation, then
the probability of TTBs initiated also increases by more than 10%. However, HI is not
signicantly correlated with the probability of the MFN increasing. In this study, I found
that the HI is a critical variable that a¤ects the decision of government about tari¤ policies.
I also found that the level of tari¤ overhang in previous year has an important role
in deciding optimal tari¤ policy. If the overhang is small, which means that the government
has a small room for increasing the MFN tari¤s, then the probability of MFN increasing
decrease by more than 30%. This shows that the role of bound tari¤ on the MFN tari¤
policy. The other variables, for example, inverse export elasticity and time average output
ratio, have di¤erent e¤ect on the probabilities of MFN and TTB choices.
16In the model, the di¤erence of marginal costs between exporting countries has one to one relationship
with the market share of exporting countries. The sum of marginal cost is also measured by the total import
of that sector.
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My empirical ndings show that the two exibilities have complementary charac-
teristics to each other in the sense that the economic shocks that induce the MFN and TTB
policies are di¤erent, so the country needs both polity exibilities to response to the diverse
economic shocks.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents the motivation
for the policy exibility. Section 3 is the data description and the empirical results. Section
4 is the conclusion and the discussion.
The Theoretical Motivation for Policy Flexibility
The policy exibilities are necessary to protect the import market from unexpected
shocks. This chapter examines the motivation of the discriminatory and contingent tari¤s
using simple a Cournot duopoly model17. I examine the optimal tari¤ theory under a bound
tari¤ constraint.18 This is because the bound tari¤ is xed when the government changes
the tari¤ policy.19
The rst part is related to the MFN tari¤ policy, which includes the MFN tari¤
variation and safeguard. These MFN policy exibilities are related to the overall exporting
countriesproductivity. The second part shows the motivation of discriminatory tari¤s (AD
and CVD). If there is a big di¤erence in productivity between exporting countries, then dis-
criminatory tari¤ policy is optimal under bound tari¤ constraint. The theoretical example
shows policy exibilities are the result of optimizing policy responses to unexpected shocks.
17The theoretical model is given by Saggi(2004)
18We can also think about the endogenous bound tari¤ decision model. This is out of the coverage of this
paper
19The data is from 1998 that is after the WTO starts. The bound tari¤ is given when the countries make
the MFN tari¤s.
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(1) MFN tari¤
This is a 3 country partial equilibrium model. Consumer preferences are repre-
sented by the quasi linear utility function, U(x0; x1:::xN ) =
PN
j=1 g(xj) + x0 and g(xj) =
xi   12x2i . Good x0 is the quantity of numeraire good and xi indicates other goods. From
this utility function, the demand function of good j is derived as pj = 1  dj . I focus only
one sector problem from now on.20 Each country has one rm in one sector and marginal
cost of the rm in country i is constant. MCi = ci
We also assume Cournot competition in the home country market. The politically weighted
social welfare function of sector i is 21
W = CS + PS + TR (I.1)
where CS is consumer surplus, PS is producer surplus, TR is tari¤ revenue and  is political
weight put on the producers surplus. I assume that domestic interest groups lobby to
protect their import market and government policy is a¤ected by these lobbies. In this case
 is greater than 1. There is a constraint of the bound tari¤ (tB) because bound tari¤ is
xed when the country decide optimal tari¤ policy. So the maximization problem is
MaxtW (t : ) = CS(t : ) + PS(t : ) + TR(t : )
s:t: t  tB
 = (c1; c2; c3; )
This welfare function is quadratic and concave in tari¤(t) so the optimal tari¤ that maxi-
20After this I do not use subscript j to represent sector.
21The subscript i is left out.
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mizes social welfare is
t =
1 + 5c1 + (2   3)C + 2   6c1
14  4 ; if t
  tB (I.2)
t = tB; if t > tB (I.3)
C = c2 + c3
If the home country imposes the MFN tari¤ on both exporting countries, then the optimal
MFN tari¤ is: tm = t if t  tB and tm = tB if t > tB.
From this formula, it is clear that if this problem has an interior solution then22
@tm
@
=
4(2  4c1 + C)
(7  2)2 > 0 (I.4)
The MFN tari¤ is an increasing function of political weight (( 1)). This formula
also shows that the MFN tari¤ only depends on the sum of foreign countriesmarginal cost
parameters (C = c2 + c3). The rst derivative to the sum of foreign countriesmarginal
cost parameters is:
@tm
@C
=
2   3
14  4 (I.5)
Under the assumption that  < 32 , t
m is a decreasing function of C. Under these settings,
the level of total imports of the home country is also a function of C.
IMm =
3 + c1   2 + 2c1   2C
7  2
@IMm
@C
=
 2
7  2 < 0
As the sum of the foreign countriesmarginal cost parameters decreases, then the imports
of the home country increase. This means the market power of the home country increases,
22This inequality is from the assumption that the home rm produces positive amounts of good after the
tari¤.
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and the optimal tari¤ also increases.23 This theoretical example shows that the MFN tari¤
is sensitive to the political weight of the sector and the sum of foreign countriesmarginal
cost parameters.
One of the TTBs is safeguard policy which allows the country to impose a tari¤
that is greater than the bound tari¤, but there is a cost in imposing it. If the optimal tari¤
which is induced by import surge (export countriesmarginal cost decrease) or political
shock is greater than the bound tari¤, then the government can impose a safeguard tari¤
after paying a cost. If the cost of imposing safeguard is xed as FS , then a necessary
condition for imposing the safeguard policy is
WS(tS ; ) WB(tB; )  FS (I.6)
This simple model can explain when the country use safeguard tari¤ policy. The safeguard
tari¤ has to follow the MFN principal.24 In this model, social welfare function is increasing
in t if t is less than the optimal tari¤ (t). There is an area that satises W (t) > W (tB)
butW (t) W (tB) < FS . In this case, the safeguard tari¤ is not optimal because its welfare
benets are exceeded by its costs. However, if W (t) W (tB) > FS , then the country tried
to impose safeguard tari¤.25 This is shown in gure 1.
(2) Discriminatory tari¤
With the same setting as the MFN tari¤ case, the optimal discriminatory tari¤
is also derived from the social welfare maximization problem. The WTO agreements allow
23The import countrys market power is measured by inverse export elasticity or import ratio to the world
import. See Beshkar, Bond and Rho (2012)
24Beshkar and Bond (2012) provide the theoretical model explaining the escape clause of the WTO agree-
ments.
25Safeguard includes not only tari¤ but also other trade barriers
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Figure 1. Safeguard and MFN tari¤
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the discriminatory tari¤ to lie above the bound tari¤, so there is no bound tari¤ constraint.
We also assume that there is a xed cost (FD) to imposing discriminatory tari¤s.
Maxt2;t3W (t2; t3 : ) = CS(t2; t3 : ) + PS(t2; t3 : ) + TR(t2; t3 : )  FD
The optimal discriminatory tari¤s on country 2 and 3 are: 26
t2 =
2 + 10c1   13c2 + c3 + 4   12c1 + 6c2 + 2c3
28  8 (I.7)
t3 =
2 + 10c1 + c2   13c3 + 4   12c1 + 2c2 + 6c3
28  8
It is clear to show that @t
i
@ > 0,
@ti
@ci
< 0, and @t
i
@cj
> 0. The marginal cost of country i (ci) is
also related to the imports from country i, so this formula shows that if the imports from
exporting country i increase (which has the same e¤ect as a decrease in ci), then the optimal
26I assume the cost of imposing discriminatory tari¤. But it is a xed cost, then the maximization problem
is the same as the MFN tari¤ case.
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tari¤ imposed on country i increases. The political e¤ect that occurs from the change of 
on the discriminatory tari¤ is the same as the MFN tari¤ case.
If the country can impose the optimal MFN tari¤, which means the optimal MFN
tari¤ is less than bound tari¤ (t < tB), then the relationship between discrimination and
the MFN tari¤ is
t2   tm = 1
4
( c2 + c3) (I.8)
t3   tm = 1
4
( c3 + c2)
tm =
t2 + t3
2
If c2 < c3, then t2 > tm and if c3 < c2, then t2 < tm. So if the exporting country has a
low marginal cost, it pays a higher tari¤. It is also clear that W d(t2; t3) > Wm(tm). The
di¤erence of welfare between two policies is
W d(t2; t3) Wm(tm) = 1
8
(c2   c3)2 (I.9)
As previously assumed, the home country must pay a cost when it imposes a discriminatory
tari¤. Considering this cost, the necessary condition for imposing a discriminatory tari¤ is
W d(t2; t3) Wm(tm) = 1
8
(c2   c3)2 > FD (I.10)
where FD is the xed cost of imposing a discriminatory tari¤. As the di¤erence in marginal
costs between exporting countries rises, there is more incentive to impose a discriminatory
tari¤. The su¢ cient condition for discrimination is that the di¤erence in marginal costs
between exporting countries is su¢ ciently high to cover the xed cost of implementing the
discriminatory tari¤.
The other case is that the optimal MFN tari¤ is greater than the bound tari¤
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(t > tB). If this is the case, the only alternative to imposing a discriminatory tari¤ is
imposing the bound tari¤. If the country imposes the bound tari¤, then welfare is less than
it would have been under the optimal tari¤ (e.q.,W (t) > W (tB)). The su¢ cient condition
for imposing a discriminatory tari¤ is
W d(t2; t3) WB(tB) > W d(t2; t3) W (t) (I.11)
This means that if there is a relatively small shock to the foreign exporting countries, the
home country prefers to impose a discriminatory tari¤ when the alternative policy is to
impose the bound tari¤. The level of the bound tari¤ has an important role in deciding
whether a discriminatory tari¤ is imposed.
The above formula shows that only the di¤erence of the marginal cost parameters
is important when an importing country government chooses discriminatory tari¤ policy.
The level of tari¤ is decided by the value of parameters and political weight () of the
sector, but only the di¤erence of MC between exporting countries matters when choosing
tari¤ policy.
The Cournot model suggests simple and clear implications about tari¤ policy. Al-
though it relies on the assumption that rms only compete on quantity, the theoretical
prediction and motivation for the use of discriminatory tari¤s are similar to those obtained
from the Cournot model when rms are allowed to competition in other dimensions. The
appendix provides theoretical results when the quantity competition assumption is relaxed.
(3) Policy Implication
Tari¤ policy is closely related to changes in the economic environment of domestic
14
or foreign countries. In the previous section, we showed that the sum of foreign export
countriesproductivity shock and the importing countrys market structure are important
determinants of tari¤ policy. Figure 2 illustrates the optimal tari¤ policies as responses to
economic shocks.27 In this graph, x and y axes are the marginal cost parameters of exporting
countries. Any point in this plane shows the marginal costs of exporting countries that are
directly related to the import levels from two countries. The total import of home country
depends only on the sum of marginal cost parameters of exporting countries, m shows the
total import level and if m is closer to to origin then the import of home country increases.
I assume that St is state in period t. St shows not only the total import level but
also the import share of each exporting country. At St, c2 is same as c3, so the market share
of each export country is same, which is 50%.
In period t + 1, the total import and market structure could change. As I show
in theory part, the optimal MFN tari¤ change depends on only the sum of the exporting
countries marginal cost (productivity) shock. If there is a change in the total sum of
exporting countriesmarginal costs, then there is an incentive to change the MFN tari¤.
If there is a downward shock on exporting countriessum of marginal costs, then there is
an incentive to increase MFN tari¤.28 However there is a downward marginal cost shock
only in one of the exporting countries, then the market share of that country increases.
The di¤erence of marginal cost shock between exporting countries is greater than a critical
point, then the incentive of discriminatory tari¤ increases.
These optimal tari¤ policies is shown in this graph. If the new point (St+1) is
outside of the lines GH and IJ , then the incentive to impose discriminatory tari¤ increases.
If the new point lies inside of the area of GH and IJ , then the MFN tari¤ is more attractive.
27In this part, we assume the political shock is not time variant.
28If c2 and c3 are independent random variable that has same distribution, then (c2 + c3) and (c2   c3)
are also independent. It is possible that c2 + c3 and c2   c3 be on any point on the graph.
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Figure 2. Optimal Tari¤ Policy
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If the point is close to the origin then the incentive to raise MFN tari¤ increases. If the total
productivity shocks of exporting countries are large enough to move the c2 + c3 line close
to the origin, then the optimal policy is SG. This is because mB shows the level of MFN
tari¤ that is equal to the bound tari¤. If the optimal MFN tari¤ is greater than the bound
tari¤, then the country can use SG to protect the importing sector. Figure 2 also shows
the policy mix case. If the marginal cost parameter decreases so fast and the di¤erence in
the marginal costs also grows, then the policy mix of the MFN and TTB would be optimal.
The data shows this kind of tari¤ policy mix. This graph can also illustrates that the cost
of implementing a TTB is important in deciding tari¤ policy. If the cost is big, then the
area for optimally imposing a TTB decreases and the policy mix area of the MFN and TTB
16
also decreases.29
Data and Empirical Strategy
The model in the previous section has prediction based on welfare changes. Using
this prediction, I made an empirical model and test it using nine countriespanel data. The
main hypothesis is that the policy choice depends on the economic environment change. To
test the hypothesis, I make econometric model and a proxies which are closely related to
the theoretical model and estimate the e¤ect of economic variables on the policy choices.
Data Description
I analyze data from nine counties between 1997 and 2011: Argentina, Brazil,
Columbia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and Turkey. There are several reasons
why these countries were chosen. First, these countries have large tari¤ overhang levels,
which means that they have room to use MFN policy exibility.30 Table 2 shows the
average bound and MFN applied tari¤s of these countries. The overhang, the gap between
bound and MFN tari¤, is more than 10%, which means that these countries can increase
MFN tari¤ by 10 percent points without paying any cost. Second, these nine countries
used TTB exibilities more often than other developing countries. Bown (2006) shows that
the portion of anti-dumping tari¤s which are used by these developing countries are about
40% of total number of anti-dumping tari¤s during the period 1995-2004. This portion is
greater than the number of ADs that are used by developed countries. By analyzing these
countries, I study the motivation of each policy exibility and the relationship between
29The cost of TTBs is related to the level of k in this graph. If k is big enough, then the area of TTB
policy become much smaller.
30Many developed countries, such as the US, Canada, have overhang levels which are close to 0. In this
case the country has no room for MFN exibility
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these two policies. Third, these countries provide consistently tari¤ data during the period
1999-2011.
Table 2. Countries Characteristics
Country number of bound tari¤ average of average of frequency of frequency of frequency of
sectors ratio(%) bound tari¤ MFN tari¤ MFN increase MFN decrease TTB use
Argentina 3518 100(%) 32.06 13.11 174 564 20
Brazil 3543 100 30.9 14.35 72 719 2
Columbia 3518 100 35.38 11.47 29 203 10
India 3302 85.3 34.28 19.38 361 1804 42
Indonesia 3500 96.1 35.92 6.89 80 193 6
Peru 3496 100 29.2 8.91 18 610 17
Turkey 3471 33.1 15.66 3.39 115 608 22
Mexico 3543 100 34.82 13.48 281 803 6
Ecuador 3476 100 21.19 11.11 93 431 17
GDP, per capita GDP, import, export is time average, average MFN is time and sector average
The sample captures disaggregated manufacturing sectors from all nine countries.31
The sectors are highly disaggregated into Harmonized System (HS) 6 digit categories. The
WTO provides MFN and bound tari¤ data at the HS6 digit level.32
The World Bank provides the TTB data. This data is more disaggregated than
the MFN or bound tari¤ data. TTB data is available at the HS-8 or HS-10 digit level
because AD and CVD are imposed on specic exporting countries at the HS-8 or HS-10
digit level. While TTB tari¤ rates are generally much greater than those of MFN tari¤s,
this does not mean that TTBs protect import-competing industries more than MFN tari¤s.
MFN tari¤s often a¤ect a broad set of traded goods, while TTBs are highly disaggregated
and target specic countries.33
The trade data is from the UN Comtrade data set. The UN provides annual
import and export data at the HS-6 digit industry level. It also identies import and
31The sectoral production data from the agriculture industry is not available. Further, agricultural tari¤s
are more a¤ected by political factors and TTBs are more popular in manufacturing sectors.
32The tari¤ is more disaggregated into HS-8 or HS-10 digit, then HS-6 digit tari¤ is the average of the
sectors that are categorized by HS-8 or 10 digit.
33The data set shows that the average number of countries in one sector of one import country is around
20. If the importing country imposes 100% AD on one specic country, then the average tari¤ rate of that
sector is simple average of the TTB divided by the number of exporting countries. (20). So it has the same
e¤ect as a 5% increase in the MFN tari¤ rate.
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export partners and trade volumes between those partners. Sectoral output data is from
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).34
Table 2 provides summary statistics for each country. All of these countries have
AD laws over this period. They can choose TTB policies when the domestic legal conditions
of each policy are satised. All countries set up bound tari¤s in 1995, but the WTO provides
these countries a phase-in period. Usually this period is 10 years after making WTO trade
agreements. This means that they can use any policy exibility even if the applied tari¤ is
greater than or equal to the bound tari¤. Most countries in my sample have a signicant
overhang level, so they can choose any of the policy exibilities whether they are in phase
in period or not.
Table 3. The probability of policy exibilities (probit)
Panel Cross section
Prob(tttbt > 0jX) Prob(tttb > 0jX)
Overt 1  :00064
(.00018)
Over  :00084
(0.0003)
Pseido R-square 0.055 0.0532
Num. of observation 389348 31364
Con.,year xed e¤ect Yes,Yes Yes, No
Table 3 is the result of simple test that shows the relationship between tari¤
overhang and TTB policy exibilities. I estimate the probability of TTB exibilities using
previous overhang level as a main independent variables. First two column is the result of
panel data. The dependent variable is binary variable that shows the sector use the TTB
exibility in year t. The independent variable is the overhang level in pervious year (t-1 ).35
The previous years overhang is negatively correlated with the probability of TTB exibility.
34The unit of output data is ISIC 4 digit categories. This is more aggregated than HS 6 digit level. We
matches the code and put the same output to the HS 6 digit industries which are in the same ISIC 4 digit
categories.
35If the sector has no bound tari¤, which is unbound sector, then I put the maximum bound tari¤ level
for that sector. The maximum bound tari¤ in my data set is 150.
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This result is consistent with Busch and Pelc (2010) in the sense that the probability of
TTB decreases if the overhang increases in previous year.
The second column in table 3 shows the result of similar estimation, but in this
case I used cross section data. The binary variable takes value 1 if the sector used TTB
exibility at least one time during the sample period (99-2010). The main independent
variable is the time average level of tari¤ overhang. The results of cross section estimation
have the same result as panel data case. The probabilities of TTB policy exibility is
negatively correlated with the average overhang level, which has the similar implication to
the previous panel data case.
Figures 3 shows the frequency of policy exibilities that are used during the sample
periods. The red solid line shows the number of TTBs that are initiated in each year. The
green dotted line is the number of TTBs imposed. The blue dotted line is the number of
sectors in which MFN increases. The variation of imposed TTBs is stable as this gure
shows. The number of TTBs initiated increased very quickly in 2004-2005. This period is
the time when the phase in periods end so it was hard to use MFN exibility to protect
import markets. Instead of using MFN exibility, many developing countries used TTB
exibilities for protection. Figure 3 shows that the number of MFN adjustments decreased
in this period. This gure supports the argument that TTBs are used as an escape from
the bound tari¤ commitments, as indicated by the "exibility hypothesis".36
Another interesting fact is that the number of MFN adjustment increased rapidly
in 2007-2008, which is the global nancial crisis period. However TTBs were not used much
in this period. The nancial crisis was a global shock. Figure 3 indicates that the MFN
exibility was used to protect the domestic market from a global shock.
36Kucik and Reinhardt (2008) test this hypothesis using country level tari¤ and AD data. They found
the negative causality between AD law and the level of bound tari¤.
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The most popular tool among TTBs is anti-dumping tari¤s. More than 85% of
TTBs are anti-dumping tari¤s. The second popular tool in TTB is China-specic counter-
vailing duties which accounts for 8.9% of TTBs. This indicates many developing countries
used TTBs to protect their market from Chinas rapidly increasing exports after 2000.
Many developed countries used countervailing duties but this tool is very rarely used in
developing countries, which is only 0.8% of this sample. The portion of safe guide is less
than 5%.37 This means more than 95% of TTBs are focused on a specic country, so most
TTBs were discriminatory when they were used. In the previous section, I focused on the
discriminatory issue to maximize social welfare. This approach can be justied by the TTB
data.
Table 10 shows the number of policy exibilities that are used from 1999 to 2011.
All countries used tari¤ policy exibilities during this period. This table also shows that
the frequency of increasing MFN tari¤ is concentrated in specic years, which means that
the country and year specic factors are important in explaining MFN tari¤ adjustment.
Table 7 shows the frequency of each policy combination. The total number of
observations between 1999-2011 is 306,242.38 In this sample, 17577 (4:47%) observations
used MFN policy exibilities. 0.5% of total observations used TTB policy exibilities.
A very small number of observations (0:03%) used both policy exibilities in the same
year. The number of observations that decrease tari¤s is 68562, which is 17.42% of total
observations. Table 8 shows similar facts but in this table, I use the the frequency of TTB
37If the country wants to increase the MFN tari¤ above the bound tari¤, they can also use a safeguard.
The safeguard is a tool of contingency protection in special cases. The country cannot discriminate against
any country and should apply MFN principle when it uses safeguards. When the countries use safeguards,
they use quotas or other restriction of imports instead of increasing tari¤ rate, so it is hard to get the
equivalent tari¤ rate for safeguard. The bound tari¤ rate is closely related to the MFN tari¤ policy because
the bound tari¤ is the upper bound of MFN tari¤. However, if the country is in the phase-in period, then
there is no restriction on imposing MFN tari¤. The phase-in period ends in 2004 or 2005 in our sample.
38The data for 1998 is missing because we cannot calculate a rst di¤erence.
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imposed. In this case, the number of sectors that use both exibilities are smaller (0.01%)
than that in previous table (0.05%).
Econometric Model
I assume several things to implement the empirical model. First, the country can
choose a policy exibility when they recognize an import shock from foreign exporting coun-
tries. There is a one period time lag between recognition and implementation.39 Second,
the import shock is time variant. Third, the shock is country and sector specic. Each sec-
tor of each country experiences specic shocks, and the tari¤ policy exibilities are related
to the characteristics of these shocks.
Basically I dene three kinds of policy choices to response the economic shocks:
MFN increases, MFN decreases, and TTB use. When the country initiates TTBs, they have
to x the duration of protection. This means that the TTB decrease40 case is not decided
by the economic environment change, so I do not consider about the TTB decreasing case.
The policy choice variables are made by rst di¤erence of the tari¤ rates. In our experiment,
the choice variable is the change of tari¤ policy in year t. If there is no change in tari¤
policy, then I assume the government does not choose any policy exibility.
Under these assumptions, I made a probit model to estimate the probability of
each policy which is chosen to protect the domestic market from economic shocks. The
39In theoretical model, I did not consider explicitly the time di¤erence between the time when the shock
happen and the time when the policy is implemented. In empirical model, I introduce the time lag.
40This means that the country decrease TTB, or the end of imposing TTB.
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basic equations of the probit model are
ymijt = 
m0Xmijt + "
m
ijt; m = 1; 2; 3 (I.12)
ymijt =
8>><>>:
1 if ymijt > 0
0 otherwise
The denition of the MFN exibility in this paper is that y1ijt = 1, if t
m
ijt tmijt 1 > 0,
where i is the HS-6 digit sector, j indicates country and t indexes years. The government is
choosing to use its upward MFN exibility if tijt > 0. In relation to another policy choice,
I dene y1ijt = 1 if the country initiate a TTB. I observe many cases in my data which
shows that after initiating a TTB the import of that sector responds to the policy change
even if TTB is not imposed. This is because once the TTB is initiated, the government
starts to investigate, which a¤ects the trade pattern in that sector. This is the reason why
I dene TTB exibility when it is initiated. In the main estimation, I used the binary
variable which is related to initiating TTBs. In the appendix, I add the results using the
binary variable that indicates imposing TTBs and compare the results. In addition to this,
if the government initiates TTBs on several countries or more highly disaggregated level of
sectors (HS8 or HS 10 digit) in year t, then I put the number tdijt = 1 and otherwise t
d
ijt = 0.
This means I do not consider the degree of protection when I dene the binary variable of
TTB.41
When a government uses a TTB, it has to x the duration of protection. Because
we focus on policy variation, the rst year of the TTB takes the value 1. The other periods
in which the TTB is imposed take the value 0 because no policy change has occurred in
those periods. This means the choice variable of TTBs is y2ijt = 1 if t
d
ijt   tdijt 1 > 0.
41The maximum number of anti-dumping initiated in one HS-6 digit sector is 55 in my sample. This
can happen when the country initiated AD in highly disaggregated level, i.e. HS 8 or HS 10, and on many
countries. In this empirical section I do not consider this case di¤erently from the other cases. The degree
of protection when TTB is initiated will be considered in future research.
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The other choice variable, an MFN tari¤ decrease, is similarly dened to the tari¤
increase. In this case, y3ijt = 1 if tijt < 0. This exibility only includes the case in which
MFN downward exibility is used. Table 10 shows the frequency of policy choices.
These choices are closely related to the social welfare maximization problem dened
in the previous section. If we observe that sector i in country j chooses policy 1 at time t,
then it must be that W 1ijt > W
2
ijt and W
1
ijt > W
3
ijt. We assume that the latent variable can
be written Wmijt = 
mXmijt + "
m
ijt, where Xijt are economic variables which determine the
choice variable.
With these specications, I estimate 3 kinds of estimations. First, I estimate the
probability of each policy using single probit model. In this case, I assume that the error
terms ("mijt) are independent in each policy case. Second, I focus on the MFN increases
and the TTB cases. In this case, I assume that there are common unobserved factors
that a¤ect both policies. The error terms have a bivariate normal distribution which have
correlation parameter ( 6= 0). Third, I use a multivariate probit model (MVP) to estimate
the relationship between the chosen policies and key economic variables. This case includes
MFN decrease policy choice. In this case, I assume that "mijt, error term, has a multivariate
normal distribution with 0 mean, and a symmetric variance-covariance matrix V (jk =
kj ; k 6= j), and takes the value 1 on the leading diagonal elements (ii = 1). ymijt is a binary
variable that indicates which kind of policy exibility is chosen. One of the advantages of
this model is that it allows the error terms to be correlated across choices. It also estimates
the correlation between error terms and tests the signicance.42
42The multi-nominal logit (MNL) model is simpler to calculate, but MNL assumes the independence if
irrelative alternatives (IIA). This is strict assumption in policy choice case. I also use the GHK (Geweke,
Hajivassiliou,Keane) estimation procedure when I use MVP. This procedure has two steps. First, the decom-
posed error term is drawn from the truncated distribution function, which is related to the choice variables.
The probability of each choice is calculated in each draw. After iterating this process R times, the average
of probability of that choice is calculated. Second, we calculate the parameters that maximize the log of the
likelihood function as standard maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) using the average probability of each
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Two explanatory variables are introduced to measure the economic shocks in the
import market. We measure each determinant in rst di¤erence under the hypothesis that
these variables determine policy change.
The rst explanatory variable is the di¤erence of the world import ratio in each
year. As we show in the previous section, this is the proxy of the total productivity shock
from all exporting countries.43 The world import ratio is dened as
RIijt =
IMijt
Jj=1IMijt
(I.13)
where IMijt is the import value of sector i, country j and year t. RIijt indicates the home
countrys relative import market size. I introduce the time variation of RI as a proxy
of shock that a¤ect total import variation.44 First, RI can control of the variation of
currency. Each countrys import values are measured in dollars. The change of dollars in
each country is canceled out by dividing by the world import value. Second, RI also captures
the variation from global shocks. If the global import volume increases or decreases, this
variation cannot a¤ect the relative market size of one country. In section 2, the import
shock arises from productivity shocks in foreign exporting countries. The relative import
size which is measured by RI can capture the variation of foreign exporting countries
productivity.
The second shock captures a change of import market structure, more precisely,
the degree of monopolization in a specic sector. In the previous section, the su¢ cient
condition for the discriminatory tari¤s is that the di¤erence in marginal costs between
choice. This process is simulated MLE (SMLE). In this estimation procedure, it is important to use a su¢ -
cient number of iteration to get the consistent estimate. The necessary condition for consistent estimation
is that R is greater than the square root of the sample size. In this paper, the sample size of estimation is
269,167, so minimum R is around 500. I use the Stata package by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003). In this
paper,we report R=500 case.
43Or the marginal cost shock
44Empirical evidence shows that sectors with greater market size have a smaller bound tari¤s.
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exporting countries must be greater than the xed cost of imposing TTBs. The bigger the
di¤erence in marginal cost between exporting countries, the greater the incentive to impose
TTBs. An import market Herndahl Index(HI) is introduced to measure the degree of
import concentration.
Hijt =
NX
k=1
s2ikjt (I.14)
The time di¤erence of Hijt is used to capture changes in import market structure.45 In this
formula s is the market share of exporting country k, in importing country j, in sector
i, at time t. If this index rises, then exporting countrys market share increases.
The current period imports are a¤ected by the tari¤ policy in the same period.
This means RIijt and Hijt are a function of tari¤ policy in year t, which introduces an
endogeneity problem. In this paper, I assume there is a time lag between the time in which
the shock occurs and the time in which the policy is implemented. Under this assumption,
I use the measure of these variables in the previous year as explanatory variables, RIijt 1
andHijt 1. Figure 4 plots the relationship between these two variables: RIijt andHijt.
This gure shows that both variables are very weakly correlated with each other. The
correlation is 0.06. My sample shows that these two explanatory variables are independent
of one another. In this case we can check the e¤ect of each variable on the dependent
variable separately because there does not appear to be multi-collinearity problem.
There are two time invariant variables to control sector specic political weight
and market power. The time average sectoral output ratio in each country is used as a
proxy for political weight, Oij =
OijPI
i=1 Oij
.46 The sector with large output ratios has more
lobbying power than the other sectors.47 Sectoral output data is available only at the ISIC
45Hijt is between 0 and 1.
46Bown(2007) uses output ratio and the employment ratio as a proxy of political power.
47If rm ownership is concentrated in one industry then lobbying power also increases, but we do not have
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4-digit industry level. The variation of the output ratio is much smaller than that for tari¤
and import data, so there is a clustering issue in using this variable.
The other variable is the inverse export elasticity which is measured in HS 3-digit
sectors. The classical optimal tari¤ theory shows that the optimal tari¤ and inverse export
elasticity have a positive relationship. This is because if the sectors have a less inelastic
export elasticity have more market power, which in turn a¤ects the world price, so the
optimal tari¤ is greater in these sectors. I use the Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2006)
elasticity data to measure the time invariant market power.
I also use country level variables to control for country-level shocks in each year.
These variables include growths of gross domestic production (GDP) and the trade bal-
ance.48 Table 10 shows that the tari¤ policy is closely related to the countrys time variant
variables.
I use two dummy variables. One of them is overhang dummy variable. The
overhang level indicates the room for the MFN exibility. In my sample, most of the
countries have a lot of overhang. The average overhang is about 20%. Instead of using
the overhang level, I made an overhang dummy variable, which is 1 when the overhang
in previous year is less than 10% and 0 otherwise. One hypothesis is that the probability
of MFN increases is greater if the overhang level is large. The another reason we can
use overhang dummy as an explanatory variable is because of the phase-in period of the
WTO trade agreements. Even in the phase-in period, I expect that the overhang coe¢ cient
shows the e¤ect of trade agreements on a sector. Bacchatta and Piermatini (2011) provide
empirical evidence that the existence of bound tari¤s has an e¤ect on tari¤ reductions.
data that shows the concentration of ownership. If the number of owner is smaller than other sectors that
have similar amounts of output then the sector with the smaller owner has more political power. This is
because the smaller number of owner can lobby more e¤ectively.
48The trade balance is the di¤erence between aggregate exports and imports.
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Similar arguments can be tested using the overhang dummy in this paper.
Another dummy variable captures the nancial crisis. After nancial crisis oc-
curred in 2007, the world trade volume fell rapidly, which is considered global economic
shock. This dummy variable takes the value 1 if the year is 2007 or later, and is 0 other-
wise.
To capture the e¤ect of previous tari¤ policy, I include the time lag of every
dependent variables, which are binary variables. I try to show the relationship between
previous and current policy choices.
Table 9 presents the correlation between explanatory variables. The maximum
correlation is 0.1, so these variables are relatively linearly independent. We use country and
time dummies to control for country and time specic factors. One country specic factor
is the xed cost of the TTBs. Each country has a di¤erent economic and political regime
to impose TTBs so we can expect that the xed cost of TTB policy is di¤erent by country.
A time dummy captures the phase-in period e¤ect. If the time is close to the end of the
phase-in period then the sectoral tari¤ should be less than or equal to the bound tari¤.49
To focus on comparing policy exibilities with each other, we only use the sectors that use
at least one of the exibilities during the period(1999-2011).
Results
In this section I present the results of the estimation using the probit model. The
multivariate probit model (MVP) with 3 choices (MFN increasing, decreasing, and TTB)
is the most generalized version of the probit model if there are multiple choices. I begin
by discussing the results from this model in Table 4. The rst three columns of Table 4
49When I use nancial crisis dummy, I do not use year dummies because there is a multi colinearity
problem.
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presents the results with the change of import ratio (RI) and and the Herndahl index (H)
in previous year as explanatory variables. The previous years RI change is signicantly
and positively correlated to the probability of increasing MFN tari¤s. This means that the
MFN exibility is sensitive to increases in RI. As it is shown in the rst three column, the
probability of decreasing MFN tari¤s is negatively correlated with positive import shocks.
The Herndahl index variation has no signicant e¤ect on the probability of in-
creasing MFN tari¤s but has highly signicant negative e¤ect on the probability of decreas-
ing MFN tari¤s. However, the increases in the import ratio and Herndahl index have
signicant and positive e¤ects on the probability of using TTBs. This shows that both poli-
cies are used to protect the domestic market if the import ratio surges, which is consistent
with the theoretical model in section 2. In particular, Herndahl index is an important
factor in determining TTB policies. The Herndahl index increases when the degree of
monopolization in the import market increases. TTBs are used not only for responses to
import surges but also for changes in import market structure.
To test the e¤ects of import market structural change on the probability of TTB
more directly, the cross term (HRI) is introduced in the second estimation. The result
is presented in column 2. The signs of other coe¢ cients are similar to the rst estimation.
In 4-6th columns, we introduce a dummy variable that captures the direction of
import shocks: dim = 1 if RI > 0 and dim = 0 otherwise. Under this specication,
the coe¢ cients have a similar sign and signicance to the previous case. Examining the
probability of using TTBs we nd that the variable (1  dim)H has a positive and sig-
nicant coe¢ cient. This means that TTBs are more sensitive to variation in the Herndahl
index when the import shock does not increase. This means that if the import market is
monopolized, the government prefers TTBs even if the total import decreases.
29
T
ab
le
4.
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
of
P
ol
ic
y
F
le
xi
bi
lit
y
m
v
p
ro
b
it
(1
)
m
v
p
ro
b
it
(2
)
m
v
p
ro
b
it
(
n
a
n
ce
cr
is
is
)
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
M
F
N
u
p
T
T
B
M
F
N
d
o
w
n
M
F
N
u
p
T
T
B
M
F
N
d
o
w
n
M
F
N
u
p
T
T
B
M
F
N
d
o
w
n

R
t
 
1
1
:3
8


1
:8
3

 
0
:7
9


1
:3
9


1
:8
3

 
0
:7
9


2
:3


1
:8
5


 
1
:1
7


(0
.3
8
)
(0
.7
2
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.3
7
)
(0
.7
2
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.3
2
)
(0
.7
2
)
(0
.2
3
)

H
t
 
1
0
:0
1
0
:1
9


 
0
:0
5


(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
1
)
(
H
)

d
R
I
0
:0
5

0
:2
2


 
0
:0
5

0
:0
4
0
:2
3


 
0
:0
5

(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
2
)
(
H
)

(1
 
d
R
I
)
 
0
:0
4
0
:1
6

 
0
:0
4
 
0
:0
4
0
:1
5

 
0
:0
5

(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
2
)
O
u
tp
u
t
R
a
ti
o
 
1
:2


4
:3
7

1
:4
8


 
1
:1
9


4
:3
7


1
:4
8


 
1
:2
6


4
:3
5


1
:4
2


(0
.1
9
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.1
2
)
In
v
.e
x
p
o
rt
el
a
st
ic
it
y
0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
0
2

0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
0
2

0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
0
1
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)

G
D
P
t
 
1
 
0
:0
5


0
:0
0
8

 
0
:1
6


 
0
:0
5


0
:0
0
8

 
0
:1
6


0
:0
6


0
:0
1


 
0
:0
8


(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)

c
G
D
P
t
 
1
 
0
:3
5


0
:4
1


2
:3
2


 
0
:3
5


0
:4
1


2
:3
2


 
1
:5
7


0
:0
6
1
:7
5


(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.0
3
)

B
a
la
n
c
e
t
 
1
0
:0
0
7


0
:0
0
1
 
0
:0
1


0
:0
0
7


0
:0
0
1
 
0
:0
1


0
:0
0
1


0
:0
0
3
 
0
:0
1


(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
O
v
e
r
t
 
1
 
0
:2


0
:2
8


 
0
:0
9


 
0
:2


0
:2
8


 
0
:0
9


 
0
:1
9


0
:2
6


 
0
:0
3


(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
L
a
g
o
f
M
F
N
u
p
 
0
:6
5


 
0
:0
3
1
:0
5


 
0
:6
5


 
0
:0
3
1
:0
5


 
0
:3
3


0
:0
0
6
0
:9
8


(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
1
)
L
a
g
o
f
T
T
B
 
0
:1
4

0
:9
2


 
0
:1
5


 
0
:1
5

0
:9
2


 
0
:1
5


 
0
:1
6

0
:8
5


 
0
:1
7


(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
3
)
L
a
g
o
f
M
F
N
d
o
w
n
0
:0
3

 
0
:0
7

0
:7
1


0
:0
3

 
0
:0
7

0
:7
1


 
0
:1
1


 
0
:0
8


0
:7
1


(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
cr
is
is
0
:0
4


 
0
:1
4


 
0
:1
7


(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
)

1
2
;

2
3
;

3
1
0
:0
2
 
0
:9
9


 
0
:0
2

0
:0
2
 
0
:9
9


 
0
:0
2

0
:0
3

 
0
:8
3


 
0
:0
6


(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
)
N
.
o
f
O
b
sr
ev
a
rt
io
n
2
6
9
1
6
7
2
6
9
1
6
7
2
6
9
1
6
7
Y
ea
r,
co
u
n
tr
y

x
ed
e¤
ec
t
Y
es
.
Y
es
.
N
o
.
30
T
ab
le
5.
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
of
P
ol
ic
y
F
le
xi
bi
lit
y-
co
nt
in
ue
d
m
v
p
ro
b
it
(T
T
B
im
p
o
se
d
)
m
v
p
ro
b
it
(w
/
o
S
G
)
m
v
p
ro
b
it
(w
/
o
S
G
)
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
M
F
N
u
p
T
T
B
M
F
N
d
o
w
n
M
F
N
u
p
T
T
B
M
F
N
d
o
w
n
M
F
N
u
p
T
T
B
M
F
N
d
o
w
n

R
t
 
1
1
:3
9


 
1
:8
4
 
0
:7
9


1
:3
7


1
:8

 
0
:8


1
:3
8


1
:8

 
0
:8


(0
.3
7
)
(1
.3
7
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.3
7
)
(0
.7
4
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.3
7
)
(0
.7
4
)
(0
.2
4
)

H
t
 
1
0
:0
0
9
0
:1
8


 
0
:0
4


(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
1
)
(
H
)

d
R
I
0
:0
5

0
:1
9
 
0
:0
5

0
:0
5

0
:1
8

 
0
:0
5

(0
.0
3
)
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
2
)
(
H
)

(1
 
d
R
I
)
 
0
:0
4
0
:2
1

 
0
:0
4

 
0
:0
5
0
:1
8


 
0
:0
4
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
2
)
O
u
tp
u
t
R
a
ti
o
 
1
:1
9


3
:1

1
:4
9


 
1
:1
9


4
:6
3


1
:4
6


 
1
:1
9


4
:6
3


1
:4
6


(0
.1
9
)
(0
.5
5
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.2
5
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.2
5
)
(0
.1
2
)
In
v
.e
x
p
o
rt
el
a
st
ic
it
y
0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
3


 
0
:0
0
0
0
2

0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
0
2

0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
1


 
0
:0
0
0
0
2

(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)

G
D
P
t
 
1
 
0
:0
5


 
0
:0
2


 
0
:1
6


 
0
:0
5


0
:0
0
2
 
0
:1
6


 
0
:0
5


0
:0
0
2
 
0
:1
6


(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)

c
G
D
P
t
 
1
 
0
:3
5


0
:1
4
2
:3
2


 
0
:3
5


0
:6
7


2
:3


 
0
:3
5


0
:6
7


2
:3


(0
.0
9
)
(0
.2
2
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
4
)

B
a
la
n
c
e
t
 
1
0
:0
0
7


 
0
:0
0
3

 
0
:0
1


0
:0
0
7


 
0
:0
0
0
3
 
0
:0
1


0
:0
0
7


 
0
:0
0
0
3
 
0
:0
1


(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
O
v
e
r
t
 
1
 
0
:2


 
0
:1
2


 
0
:0
9


 
0
:2


0
:3
2


 
0
:0
9


 
0
:2


0
:3
2


 
0
:0
9


(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
L
a
g
o
f
M
F
N
u
p
 
0
:6
5


0
:1
2
1
:0
5


 
0
:6
5


 
0
:1
3


1
:0
5


 
0
:6
5


 
0
:1
3


1
:0
5


(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
1
)
L
a
g
o
f
T
T
B
 
0
:1
4

2
:9
6


 
0
:1
5


 
0
:2
1

0
:9
3


 
0
:1
5


 
0
:2
1


0
:9
3


 
0
:1
5


(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
3
)
L
a
g
o
f
M
F
N
d
o
w
n
0
:0
3

0
:0
5
0
:7
1


0
:0
3

 
0
:0
2
0
:7
1


0
:0
3

 
0
:0
2
0
:7
1


(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
cr
is
is

1
2
;

2
3
;

3
1
0
:0
2
 
0
:9
9


 
0
:0
2

0
:0
2
 
0
:9
8


 
0
:0
3

0
:0
2
 
0
:9
8


 
0
:0
3

(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
)
N
.
o
f
O
b
sr
ev
a
rt
io
n
2
6
9
1
6
7
2
6
8
8
5
5
2
6
8
8
5
5
Y
ea
r,
co
u
n
tr
y

x
ed
e¤
ec
t
Y
es
.
Y
es
.
Y
es
.
31
This empirical result shows that the TTBs are closely related to changes in market
structure while the MFN policy is more sensitive to the total import surges. The objective
of both policies is to protect the import market, but each policy is used to protect the
market from di¤erent kinds of shocks. This empirical evidence indicates the MFN and
TTB exibilities having complementary characteristics because RI and H can be identied
as di¤erent kinds of economic shocks.
The inverse export elasticity and output ratio have opposite signs under this spec-
ication. The market power measure, the inverse export elasticity, has a positive e¤ect
on the probability of MFN increases but has a negative e¤ect on the probability of TTBs.
This result is consistent with optimal tari¤ theory. The e¤ect of tari¤ on the world price is
greater if the sector has greater market power, which means that the MFN tari¤ adjustment
is more e¢ cient to increase domestic countries welfare. However, TTBs are imposed only
specic countries, this policy would not e¤ect much on world prices. In addition to the
optimal tari¤ theory, Beshkar, Bond and Rho (2012) show that the market power measures
are closely correlated to the level of bound tari¤, using cross-sectional data. This paper
shows the market power e¤ects on the MFN tari¤ adjustment with panel data analysis.
The output ratio is negatively correlated with the probability of MFN tari¤ in-
creases but positively correlated with the probability of TTBs. The output ratio is used a
proxy of political power because the industry that produce more output have more lobbying
power, and can a¤ect government policy.50 This means that sectors that have greater po-
litical power have higher probability of TTBs rather than MFN tari¤ policy. This evidence
indicates that interest groups focus on the TTB policies to protect their domestic market.
Macro indicators also have di¤erent e¤ects on the probability of tari¤ policy. An
50The Output data is available in an ISIC 3 digit level. Every country has only 50-60 3 digit ISIC sectors.
The number of 3 digit ISIC sectors is much less than that of the HS6 digit sector in each country. There
could be a clustering issue a¤ecting the standard error.
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increasing growth rate of GDP has negative and highly signicant coe¢ cients in the case
of MFN increases. However, the GDP growth rate is not signicantly correlated with
the probability of TTBs. This shows that as a country develops, it uses less the MFN
exibility.51 The trade balance growth rate is positively correlated with the probability of
MFN increases and TTBs.
In the 7-9th columns of Table 4, the nancial crisis dummy variable takes opposite
signs across estimations. This dummy variable is highly signicant and takes a positive sign
in the MFN increase case but has a negative sign in the TTB case. This result is consistent
with the graph in Figure 3. After the nancial crisis, the countries in the sample increased
MFN tari¤s in many more sectors than before. However, they did not use TTBs to protect
their domestic markets. This evidence shows that the MFN tari¤ adjustment is a more
e¤ective response to global economic shocks.
The previous periods overhang level is positively related to the probability of
increasing MFN tari¤s. However, this dummy variable is negatively correlated with the
probability of TTBs. As mentioned above, the previous periods overhang measures the
room for increasing MFN tari¤s, so it is natural there is a positive relationship with MFN
tari¤ increases and a negative relationship with MFN tari¤ decreases. Overhang is also
negatively related to the probability of using TTBs. If tari¤ overhang is a strict standard
observed by WTO countries, then the probability of using TTBs should be negatively cor-
related with the previous overhang level. The empirical results are consistent with this
argument. This is the evidence of the argument that TTBs and MFN exibilities have
substitutable characteristics. In 1980s and early 1990s, countries with lower bound tari¤s
used TTBs more than the countries which had larger bound tari¤s. These facts are used
51I mainly focus on the sector level variation of economic variables, but this table shows that the macro
variables have strong e¤ects on overall tari¤ policies.
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as an evidence of the "Constant protection hypothesis" which focuses on the substitutable
characteristics of tari¤ policies. My sample shows a similar pattern if I focus on the rela-
tionship between overhang level and the probability of policy exibilities. However, there
is also evidence for the argument that emphasizes the complementary characteristics across
policies.52
The probability of MFN increases is negatively correlated with previous choice of
MFN increasing and TTB exibilities. This means the government increased MFN tari¤
or imposed TTBs in last year, then the probability of increasing MFN decreases in current
period. However, the probability of TTB is not correlated with MFN increasing in previous
period. This shows the previous years MFN increasing does not a¤ect the TTB policy
in current period. Overall, the MFN tari¤ policy is more sensitive to the trade policy in
previous year than TTB.
The last row in the table show the correlation of the error terms. The error terms
of the MFN tari¤ increases and TTB use have a positive and signicant correlation, and
the parameter of the covariance matrix is 0.04. This means there could be common factors
that a¤ect both exibilities. The correlations for the error terms between TTB use and
MFN decreases is negative and marginaly signicant. The correlation between the errors of
MFN tari¤ increases and MFN tari¤ decreases is highly signicant and positive.
The rst three columns in table 5 shows the result with a di¤erent measure of
TTB choices. In this case, we use the imposition of TTBs as the choice variable, which
means the binary TTB variable has the value 1 if TTB application is imposed, and has
the value 0 otherwise. In the previous regression, we used the initiation of TTBs as the
choice variable. To impose a TTB it needs to be initiated rst. After that, the government
52The overhang e¤ect on the probability of the MFN tari¤ increases is similar to the result of Bacchatta
and Piermatini (2011). This means that the e¤ect of trade agreements on trade liberalization is positive and
signicant.
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investigates the injury of the industry. If the injuries are justied then TTBs are imposed.
There is a time lag between initiation and the imposition of TTBs.53 The result of this
estimation is somewhat di¤erent from that in table 4. The coe¢ cients of RI and H are
not statistically signicant. However, the sign of coe¢ cient of RI is negative. This is
related to the process of TTBs. When the government initiates TTBs, then the import and
market structure has already started to change. TTBs are imposed One of two years after
initiation. There is a signicant time lag between initiation and imposition of TTBs. During
this time, economic conditions change, which a¤ects the regression result. Further, there is
a potential endogeneity problem between economic variables and TTB policies. This a¤ects
the result from my estimation. The political power measure (output ratio) is still very
highly correlated with the probability of TTB imposition. This is because output ratio is
not a time variant variable. This means that the sectors that have relatively greater political
power were much more likely to impose TTBs, which is similar to the result with the TTB
initiation variable. The coe¢ cient on overhang dummy is positive and signicant. This is
consistent with the role of tari¤ overhang. This also reects the substitutable characteristics
between MFN and TTB policies.
The 4-9th columns in table 5 show the result from a di¤erent sample. In this
estimation, we drop sectors in which the country used safe guard (SG) policy to focus on
comparing MFN policies with discriminatory policies.54 The results under this specication
are similar to the previous cases.
Table 6 shows the marginal e¤ect of independent variables which change by one
standard deviation on the probability of each policy choice.55 If the import ratio changes
by 1 standard deviation, then the probability of MFN increasing goes up by 0.08% points.
53The rate of success of TTBs is 62.5%, (Bown,2000)
54When the government impose SG, discrimination is not allowed by the WTO agreement.
55In this simulation, the number of iteration is 100 because of the computer and program capacity.
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Table 6. The Marginal E¤ect of Key Variables
Variables P (tmfn > 0jtttb = 0) P (tttb > 0jtmfn = 0) P (tmfn < 0jtttb = 0)
RIt 1 0.00078 0.00020 -0.00228
Ht 1 0.00011 0.00033 -0.0029
(H) dRI 0.00042 0.00027 -0.00175
(H) (1  dRI) -0.00031 0.00017 -0.00236
Overt 1 -0.00818 0.00343 -0.01957
Financial crisis 0.00155 -0.0015 -0.0401
Predicted probability 0.02098 0.00306 0.14559
Considering the predicted probability of MFN increasing is 2.1% at the mean values of
independent variables, the import ratio changes increase the probability of MFN increasing
by 4%. As the same way, the probability of TTB increase by 10%, if the Herndahl index
increases by 1 standard deviation. This table also shows the e¤ect of overhang and nancial
crisis dummies.56 These marginal e¤ects are consistent with the prediction in theoretical
motivation.
Table 12 and 13 in the appendix present the results of single probit and bivariate
probit regressions. These tables also show that the factors which induce the government to
use MFN exibility are di¤erent from the factors that induce the use of TTBs. Compared
with the previous 3 choice model, the size of coe¢ cients are smaller but the sign and
signicance are similar. Table 13 presents the results from the bivariate probit estimation.
In this model, we can control and estimate the correlation of the error term from separate
single probit models. The magnitude and signicance from this model is similar to the single
probit model and the correlation of the error term is close to 0. This means the results
from the single and bivariate probit model are almost same because there are no omitted
variables issues that could a¤ect the probability of each exibility at the same time. In these
results, we also nd that both policy exibilities are used in di¤erent economic situations.
56The marginal e¤ect of dummy variable is calculated by comparing the probability of choice variable in
two cases: dummy variable is 0 or 1.
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Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to analyze the economic factors that induce par-
ticular tari¤ policy behaviors under the WTO trade agreements. This paper focuses on
the discrimination and contingency attributes of tari¤ policy. We examine the theoret-
ical motivation under which discriminatory tari¤ policy can be justied when there are
large di¤erences in productivity between the exporting countries. The incentive to impose
discriminatory tari¤s is to increase tari¤ revenue and terms of trade e¤ects.57
Using a simple Cournot model with three countries, we suggest three motivations
for the tari¤ policy exibilities: the sum of the exporting countriesmarginal cost change,
the di¤erence in the marginal costs between exporting countries, and the tari¤ overhang
level. More precisely, when there is a productivity shock in foreign exporting countries,
measured by the total amount of imports in the domestic market, the optimal policy is to
adjust MFN tari¤s. However, if there is a productivity shock in a specic country that
induces the market structure to change, the optimal tari¤ policy is to use discriminatory
tari¤ policies. Theoretical motivations also show that the higher bound tari¤ levels induce
the country to use MFN tari¤ adjustment.
In this paper, I provide evidence that is consistent with the models predictions.
First, I made proxies that capture two kinds of economic shocks. One is the time di¤erence
of the import ratio. The import ratio is dened as the ratio of the home countrys import
value divided by world import value in the same sector. This variable is used as a proxy for
the sum of foreign exporting countries productivity shocks. Another key variable is the time
di¤erence of import market Herndahl index. This variable captures sector-level changes
in market structure.
57The country that exports more has to pay more tari¤, so the price of that country after tari¤ decrease
when discriminatory tari¤ is imposed. We call this as the terms of trade e¤ect.
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Second, by analyzing nine countriesdata over thirteen years, I provide empirical
evidence that supports the theoretical motivation. The probability of the MFN tari¤ in-
creases is positively correlated with the import ratio surges. Also, the probability of MFN
tari¤ decreases is negatively correlated with the import ratio surges. Sectors with higher
overhang use MFN tari¤ policy more frequently to protect their market from unexpected
foreign countries productivity shocks. Import ratio surges are also positively correlated
with the probability of TTBs. However, discriminatory tari¤ policies are more strongly
correlated the import market structure changes rather than MFN tari¤ policies. Other
economic variables have di¤erent e¤ect on the probability of tari¤ policy behavior. The
inverse export elasticity and the output ratio have opposite e¤ects on the choice of MFN
and TTB policies. The probability of TTB is higher if the overhang level is lower, which is
opposite to the MFN tari¤ case.
The empirical evidence gives us new insight into tari¤ policy. The TTBs are more
sensitive to the risk of monopolization which characterize import market structure change.
The MFN tari¤ policies are used to protect the import market from the import surges. The
empirical analysis also provided some evidence that is consistent with the classical optimal
tari¤ theory. The probability of the MFN tari¤ adjustment is positively correlated with the
market power measure (inverse export elasticity). Overall, my data analysis suggests that
the MFN and TTB are used in di¤erent economic situations. This is a counter example to
the law of constant protection theory (or the exibility hypothesis) which emphasizes the
substitutability between the MFN and TTB exibilities.
Previous research focused on the country level data to nd the evidence of this
hypothesis. Those data conrm the exibility hypothesis.58 In this paper, I use the highly
58This is also related to the development of each country. Developed countries use TTBs more but
developing countries mainly use MFN.
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disaggregated HS-6 digit sector level data.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that both exibilities
have complementary characteristics. My data analysis supports the argument that the
important factors that induce TTB use is di¤erent from the factors that induce the MFN
exibility because many economic variables have opposite e¤ect on the probability of each
policy. This is the counter example to the "exibility hypothesis" or the "law of constant
protection theory", which argues that the country can choose any policy exibilities to
protect their import market and there is no di¤erence between TTBs and MFN exibilities.
My observation shows that the developing countries use two kinds of policy exibilities in
di¤erent economic situations, which is the evidence for the "complementarity argument".
I would like to discuss several avenues for future research. This paper assumes
that the bound tari¤ is chosen when the country chooses specic tari¤ policies: MFN and
TTBs. However, if we think about the dynamic optimization problem, the bound tari¤
includes the expectation of future economic shocks. Therefore, we need to analyze the
bound tari¤ decision mechanism using a dynamic optimization setup. Another topic is to
do similar empirical research with di¤erent samples. This paper includes nine developing
countriespanel data because of data limitations. In particular, there is a relative decit in
the availability of sectoral output data. If more data or a better proxy is available then the
sample size could increase. While this paper analyzes only the probability of tari¤ policy
choice, the size of tari¤ policy changes is also an important variable to analyze.
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Appendix: tables and gures
Table 7. Frequency of Policy Adjustment
Tari¤ variation MFN Flexibility
Increase Decrease Stable
TTB Flecibility Initiate 105 (0:03%) 407 (0:1%) 1201 (0:31%)
Not Use 17472 (4:44%) 68155 (17:32%) 306242(77:81%)
Table 8. Frequency of Policy Adjustment
Tari¤ variation MFN Flexibility
Increase Decrease Stable
TTB Flecibility Impose 45 (0:01%) 291 (0:07%) 656 (0:17%)
Not Use 17532 (4:45%) 68271 (17:35%) 306787(77:95%)
Table 9. The correlations between explanatory variables
Variables RIt 1 Ht 1 Output Ratio Inv. Export Els. GDPt 1 cGDPt 1 Balancet 1
RIt 1 1.0
Ht 1 0.064 1.0
Output Ratio 0.018 0.002 1.0
Inv. Export Els. -0.004 -0.007 0.014 1.0
GDPt 1 0.064 -0.03 0.014 -0.046 1.0
cGDPt 1 0.045 -0.037 0.011 -0.007 0.775 1.0
balancet 1 -0.021 0.013 -0.014 0.0008 -0.007 -0.032 1.0
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Table 11. Summary Statistics for Variables used in econometric estimation
Variables Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Dependent variables
Binary variable =1 if sector (i) of country(j)
increased MFN tari¤ in year (t) 0.04 0.2 0 1
Binary variable =1 if sector (i) of country(j)
decreased MFN tari¤ in year (t) 0.19 0.39 0 1
Binary variable =1 if sector (i) of country(j)
initiated TTB in year (t) 0.0057 0.075 0 1
Binary variable =1 if sector (i) of country(j)
imposed TTB in year (t) 0.0032 0.05 0 1
Explanatory variables
Country, sector, and time variant
Import ratio change in t-1 (RIijt 1) 0.0003 0.011 -0.3 0.32
Herndahl index change in t-1 (Hijt 1) -0.002 0.175 -0.766 0.763
Country and sector variant
Time average output ratio (ISIC 3digit) 0.023 0.024 0 0.225
Inverse export elasticity (HS 3 digit) 83.43 267.78 0.0005 1254.49
Country and time variant
GDP increasing rate in t-1 (GDPjt 1) 4.0 3.99 -10.89 9.8
Per capita GDP increasing rate in t-1 (GDPjt 1) 0.086 0.152 -0.62 0.44
Trade balance increasing rate in t-1 (Balancejt 1) 0.8 0.15 -0.62 0.44
Dummy variables
Overhang dummy=1 if previous years
overhang is less than 10% 0.2 0.4 0 1
Financial crisis dummy=1 if year is
greater than 2006 0.44 0.49 0 1
Year 1999 2011
Country 1 9
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Table 13. Probability of Policy Flexibility (Bivariate Probit)
Variab les b iprob it(1) b iprob it(2) b iprob it(nancia l crisis)
co e¢ cient marginal e¤ect co e¢ cient marginal e¤ect co e¢ cient marginal e¤ect
MFN up exibility
RIt 1 0:93 0:046 0:95 0:047 2:2 0:156
(0 .4) (0 .02) (0 .39) (0 .02) (0 .33) (0 .02)
Ht 1 0:001 0:00004
(0 .02) (0 .001)
(Ht 1)dIM 0:06 0:002 0:04 0:003
(0 .03) (0 .001) (0 .03) (0 .002)
(Ht 1)(1  dIM )  0:06  0:003 -0 .03  0:002
(0 .04) (0 .002) (0 .03) (0 .002)
Output Ratio  1:4  0:07  1:4  0:07  1:3  0:09
(0 .21) (0 .01) (0 .21) (0 .01) (0 .19) (0 .01)
Inv. Export E lastic ity 0:0001 8:3e  6 0:0001 8:3e  6 0:0001 8:2e  6
(0 .00001) (0 .00) (0 .00001) (0 .00) (0 .00001) (0 .00)
GDPt 1  0:03  0:001  0:03  0:001 0:06 0:004
(0 .002) (0 .0001) (0 .002) (0 .0001) (0 .02) (0 .0001)
cGDPt 1  0:26  0:01  0:26  0:01  1:3  0:09
(0 .08) (0 .003) (0 .08) (0 .003) (0 .05) (0 .003)
balancet 1 0:008 0:0004 0:008 0:0004 0:002 0:0001
(0 .0004) (0 .00002) (0 .0004) (0 .00002) (0 .0004) (0 .00003)
Overt 1  0:13  0:006  0:13  0:006  0:2  0:01
(0 .01) (0 .0006) (0 .01) (0 .0006) (0 .01) (0 .0007)
Lag of MFNup  1:09  0:02  1:09  0:02  0:32  0:01
(0 .05) (0 .0004) (0 .05) (0 .0004) (0 .02) (0 .0009)
Lag of TTB  0:18  0:008  0:18  0:008  0:17  0:01
(0 .07) (0 .002) (0 .07) (0 .002) (0 .06) (0 .003)
Lag of MFNsown  0:006  0:0003  0:006  0:0003  0:15  0:01
(0 .01) (0 .0007) (0 .01) (0 .0007) (0 .01) (0 .0008)
Financialcrisis 0:08 0:006
(0 .009) (0 .0006)
pred icted prob . 0 .02 0.02 0.0319
TTB exibility
RIt 1 1:82 0:016 1:81 0:016 1:82 0:017
(0 .72) (0 .006) (0 .72) (0 .006) (0 .72) (0 .007)
Ht 1 0:19 0:0017
(0 .04) (0 .0004)
(Ht 1)dIM 0:22 0:002 0:23 0:002
(0 .06) (0 .0006) (0 .06) (0 .0006)
(Ht 1)(1  dIM ) 0:15 0:0014 0:15 0:0015
(0 .06) (0 .0006) (0 .06) (0 .0006)
Output Ratio 4:3 0:04 4:3 0:04 4:3 0:04
(0 .24) (0 .002) (0 .24) (0 .002) (0 .24) (0 .002)
Inv. Export E lastic ity  0:0001  1:6e  6  0:0001  1:4e  6  0:0001  1:5e  6
(0 .00005) (0 .00) (0 .00005) (0 .00) (0 .00005) (0 .00)
GDPt 1 0:008 0:00008 0:008 0:00008 0:01 0:0001
(0 .005) (0 .00005) (0 .005) (0 .00005) (0 .004) (0 .00005)
cGDPt 1 0:41 0:003 0:41 0:003 0:09 0:001
(0 .11) (0 .001) (0 .11) (0 .001) (0 .11) (0 .001)
balancet 1 0:001 0.00001 0:001 0.00001 0:0005 4:3e  6
(0 .001) (0 .00001) (0 .001) (0 .00001) (0 .0009) (0 .00001)
Overdummy 0:28
 0:003 0:28 0:003 0:26 0:003
(0 .02) (0 .0003) (0 .02) (0 .0003) (0 .02) (0 .0003)
Lag of MFNup  0:037  0:0002  0:03  0:0002  0:01  0:00005
(0 .04) (0 .0003) (0 .04) (0 .0003) (0 .04) (0 .0004)
Lag of TTB 0:92 0:03 0:92 0:03 0:85 0:02
(0 .05) (0 .004) (0 .05) (0 .004) (0 .05) (0 .003)
Lag of MFNsown  0:07  0:0006  0:07  0:0006  0:09  0:0008
(0 .02) (0 .0002) (0 .02) (0 .0002) (0 .02) (0 .0002)
Financialcrisis  0:14  0:001
(0 .01) (0 .0001)
pred icted prob . 0 .0029 0.0029 0.00338
rho 0.02 0.02 0.03
0.02 0.02 0.03
N . of Obsrevartion 269167 269167 269167
Year xed e¤ect Yes. Yes. No.
Country F ixed e¤ect Yes. Yes. Yes.
M arginal e¤ect is ca lcu lated in the case in which only MFN increases or on ly TTB is used , exclud ing the case using b oth .
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Figure 3. The trend of protection
Figure 4. Import ratio and Herndahl index
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CHAPTER II
TARIFF BINDING AND OVERHANG: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
with Eric W. Bond and Mostafa Beshkar
Introduction
Following the original proposition by Bickerdike (1906) that for a nation, advan-
tage is always possible in normal circumstances from either import or export taxation,the
question of optimum tari¤ has become the subject of an intensive literature. Bickerdikes
insight was based on the premise that the incentive to tax imports is heightened if the cost
of such policies can be shifted to foreigners. This idea was later formalized in the optimal
tari¤ theory, which suggested that a countrys tari¤s should be positively related to their
market power, as reected by the inverse of the elasticity of export supply it faces. Thus,
one would expect larger countries to have higher tari¤s than small countries under the
optimal tari¤ theory.
A nations gains from shifting the cost of taxation to other countries are most likely
reversed if other nations pursue similar policies to their own advantage.1 Trade agreements
can be viewed as a means of escape from this terms-of-trade-driven prisoners dilemma
among governments, with all countries able to benet from reciprocal tari¤ reductions.
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that under a fairly general set of government objective
functions, it is the terms of tradeand this externality alonethat creates an ine¢ ciency
when governments set their trade policies unilaterally.Thus, an optimal trade agreement
1The seminal treatment is Johnson (1953). Syropoulos (2002) provides a recent treatment focusing on
the role of country size.
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should preclude governments from using their international market power to manipulate
their terms of trade. Similarly, the Trade Talkresult of Grossman and Helpman (1995)
indicates that e¢ cient tari¤s are independent of the countriesinternational market power.
In these political-economy models of trade agreements, departures from free trade reect
the political preferences of the governments rather than their international market power.
In contrast, the theory we develop in this paper suggests that market power is an
important determinant of optimal tari¤ bindings under the WTO. This result follows from
a trade-o¤ between exibility and discipline in the setting of tari¤ bindings. We argue that
the key to explain this pattern of tari¤ binding commitments is the fact that governments
value exibility in setting their trade policy, so that they can respond to shocks to their
preferences regarding openness to international trade. The WTO, which aggregates the
preferences of the member countries, will thus want to incorporate mechanisms which allow
governments to respond to preference shocks, while incorporating the externalities on other
countries.2
An optimal agreement, however, will not provide full exibility to countries to
respond to shocks when governments have private information about the magnitude of these
shocks. That is because there is an incentive for the importing country to misrepresent the
magnitude of the shock in order to take advantage of its market power. Providing exibility
to more powerful trading partners through higher tari¤ bindings will thus cause a relatively
greater e¢ ciency loss, so they will be given lower tari¤bindings under an optimal agreement.
This is the essence of the trade-o¤between exibilityto respond to shocks and discipline
2Using a model in which a free-riding problem discourages governments from negotiating e¢ cient tari¤s,
Ludema and Mayda (2010) show that the level of the negotiated tari¤ is lower when the free-riding problem
is less severe. Their framework di¤ers from ours in that they do not distinguish between bound and applied
tari¤s. We use the prevalence of tari¤ overhang and the negative relationship with importers market power
as evidence that trade negotiations have been inuenced by the trade-o¤ between exibility and discipline,
as explained in our model.
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on opportunistic use of trade policy.3
Table 14. Tari¤s and Trade Summary Statistics
Binding Status Num. of sector Share(%) Import(bil.$) Share (%)
Applied Tari¤ below Binding 196,062 65.32 1,760 24.14
Strong Binding (Applied Tari¤ at Binding) 51,680 17.22 4,410 60.48
Applied Tari¤ over Binding 8,301 2.76 413 5.66
Unbound 44,136 14.70 709 9.72
Total 300,129 100 7,292 100
Note: Applied tari¤ data is from 66 WTO members in 2007.
The data on tari¤ binding commitments in Table 14 illustrate the magnitude
of exibility that is present in the WTO agreements. These data show that for 66 WTO
member countries, 65% of the tari¤ lines at the HS 6-digit level had applied MFN tari¤ rates
that were below their tari¤ binding. The average tari¤ overhang in these sectors, which is
the di¤erence between the binding and the applied rate, was more than 20 percentage points.
The prevalence of sectors with tari¤ binding overhang suggests that many governments have
retained substantial exibility in adopting their import tari¤s.4
A second observation from this data is that the fraction of tari¤ lines which are
below their bindings varies substantially across sectors and across countries. The members
in the sample with the largest economies (US, EU, Japan, and China) all have more than
90% of tari¤ lines at the binding, while 25 members with smaller economies had 5% or less
of their tari¤s at the binding. The share of imports which are in tari¤ lines where there is a
positive binding overhang is 24% of all imports. These observations are consistent with the
prediction that exibility will be lower where there is a greater degree of market power.5
3In general, relative bargaining power of the parties in negotiations may also cause variation in tari¤
commitments across countries. However, if parties have access to side payments at the time of negotiating
the agreement, bargaining power will not impact the choice of tari¤ commitments.
4Rho (2012) and Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) show that in sectors with tari¤ overhang,
applied tari¤s adjust both up and down over time, which is a further evidence that governments do use tari¤
overhang as a exibility mechanism.
5Bagwell and Staiger (2011) nd empirical evidence for the hypothesis that countries with greater import
market power have agreed to greater tari¤ cuts under the WTO. This hypothesis, however, is weaker than
the central prediction of conventional terms-of-trade theories, which maintain that an optimal agreement
should prevent governments from using their market power to manipulate their terms of trade.
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Our theory also provides predictions about the relationship between market power
and the pattern of applied tari¤s and binding overhang under an optimal tari¤ binding
agreement. The fact that bindings are lower for countries with greater market power, given
the distribution of political power, means that there is a higher probability that a country
with greater market power will be at its binding. For countries with su¢ ciently large market
power, the tari¤ will always be at its binding. As a result, the expected binding overhang
will be a decreasing function of a countrys market power.
We also nd that the relationship between average applied tari¤s and import
market power is non-monotonic. For low levels of import market power we nd that this
relationship coincides with the optimum tari¤ result, i.e., applied tari¤s (on average) are
increasing in import market power. This occurs because countries will impose their optimal
tari¤ when the tari¤ is below the binding. However, as market power increases, the fraction
of the time at which the tari¤ is constrained by the binding increases. This must result in
a negative relationship between market power and the average applied tari¤ for countries
in the neighborhood of the threshold level of market power at which the tari¤ is always at
its binding. 6
Our theory provides a useful framework for an empirical analysis of tari¤ com-
mitments. Previous attempts at testing the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements
assume that governments negotiate tari¤ cuts.7 In reality, however, governments negotiate
6This result may be better understood in light of our rst result regarding optimal tari¤ bindings and
the conventional optimum tari¤ result. On one hand the unilaterally optimal tari¤ is increasing in market
power and, on the other hand, the maximum tari¤ that may be chosen by a government under an optimal
agreement is decreasing in the level of market power. Our analysis shows that the former (latter) e¤ect
dominates for low (high) levels of import market power.
7As shown by Bagwell and Staiger (2011) an implication of the conventional terms-of-trade theories is that
countries with greater import market power should agree to greater tari¤ cuts under an optimal agreement.
This hypothesis, however, is weaker than the central prediction of conventional terms-of-trade theories,
which maintain that under an optimal agreement there must be no relationship between a countries tari¤
comitments and its market power. This central prediction is obviously rejected by empirical observations
from WTO, as we show in this paper.
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their bound tari¤s and as a result, due to existence of overhang in many sectors/countries,
GATT/WTO commitments do not necessarily constitute a tari¤ cut. By generating a mis-
match between the theory and the empirical observations, this assumption has imposed
unnecessary limitations on previous empirical studies in this area.8
Previous empirical tests of terms of trade theories assume that once governments
enter into a trade agreement they are unable to exercise their market power in setting trade
policy. As a result, the two important inquiries of the terms-of-trade literature (namely,
optimum tari¤ and optimal agreements) are pursued independently. Our theoretical frame-
work, however, enables us to analyze how countries utilize their market power in setting
trade policy while they are restricted by tari¤ binding agreements. Therefore, in addition
to analyzing the relationship between market power and optimal tari¤ commitments (as in
Bagwell and Staiger (2011)), we are also able to study the relationship between applied tar-
i¤s and market power (as in Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008)). Moreover, our approach
allows us to increases the number of countries that can be included in the study from 16
countries (all of which are developing countries) in Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) and
Bagwell and Staiger (2011) to 66 countries (which includes both developed and developing
countries) in this paper.
We nd strong empirical support for our theoretical predictions. First, we observe
that the levels of tari¤ binding rates under the WTO are inversely related to measures of
import market power.9 ;10 This relationship is both statistically and economically important.
8Pre-agreement applied tari¤s are needed to calculate the size of tari¤ cuts in the accession process. As
a result, Bagwell and Staiger (2011) focus on new WTO members who presumably agreed to reduce their
tari¤s from non-cooperative to cooperative levels in one round of negotiations, as opposed to old GATT
members who reduced their tari¤s through several negotiation rounds that took place over 4 decades. This
reduces the total number of countries in their study to 16, all of which are developing countries.
9As measures of market power, we use inverse export elasticities and the countrys share of the world
import in the concerned sector.
10Bagwell and Staiger (2011) also nd that new WTO members with greater import market power have
generally agreed to greater tari¤ cuts, which is dened as the di¤erence between pre-WTO applied tari¤s
and the WTO tari¤ bindings.
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In particular, we nd that a one-standard-deviation increase in a countrys share of the world
import in a given industry, reduces the tari¤ binding rate of the country in that industry
by 3.5 to 4.46 percentage points.
We also nd a statistically-signicant negative relationship between the size of
tari¤ binding overhang and the importing countrys international market power in the con-
cerned sector. This relationship is also substantial since a one-standard-deviation increase
in the share of world import in a given sector reduces the size of tari¤ binding overhang by
around 8-17 percentage points in di¤erent empirical specications. As a related result, we
nd that it is substantially more likely to observe a zero overhang in sectors with greater
international market power.
Political environment also plays a role in determining the size of optimal tari¤
binding in our theory, such that a greater volatility in political pressure parameter increases
the level of optimal binding. Using a country-level variable for political instability, we nd
strong cross-country evidence for this relationship.
Our empirical study also sheds light on Subramanian and Weis (2007) nding
that membership in the WTO increases a countrys import volume substantially only if the
member under consideration is a developed country. Their nding may be better understood
in light of our observation that under an optimal agreement, less important import markets
are given more discretion and exibility in setting their trade policies. Similarly, our theory
provides a theoretical explanation for Freunds (2003) nding that the North-South Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) are a far-cry from being reciprocal, while the North-North and
South-South FTAs feature reciprocal exchange of market access.
Di¤erent aspects of exibility in trade agreements have been studied in the liter-
ature. Most of this literature, however, formulate the problem of optimal tari¤ agreements
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in a way that no binding overhang is theoretically generated. Instead, these works focus on
contingent exibility measures such as escape clauses or safeguards (GATT Article XIX),
antidumping measures and countervailing duties.11
The theoretical part of our paper builds on the nascent literature on the use
of tari¤ bindings as a exibility measure.12 Bagwell and Staiger (2005) analyze the role
of tari¤ bindings when countries have private information. Bagwell (2009) extends the
analysis to the case of a repeated game where tari¤s must be self-enforcing. Among other
results, Bagwell (2009) nds that optimally-chosen tari¤ bindings improve the welfare of
governments compared to a no-agreement case. Amador and Bagwell (2010) advance this
result by nding conditions under which a tari¤ binding is the best mechanism among those
that restrict the set of tari¤s from which governments can choose. While sharing some basic
elements of these two papers, our theory introduces country-specic parameters that enables
us to study the asymmetry of obligations under an optimal agreement.13
In the next section we introduce the basic settings for our model. In Section
11Such papers include Bagwell and Staiger (1990), Feenstra and Lewis (1991), Sykes (1991), Ludema
(2001), Beshkar (2010a), Beshkar (2010b), and Maggi and Staiger (2011b), Maggi and Staiger (2011a)
12The literature provides several explanations for the use of tari¤ bindings. Horn, Maggi and Staiger
(2010) show that at the presence of contracting costs, instead of writing a fully contingent agreement it may
be optimal to specify tari¤ bindings to save on contracting costs. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) show
that giving discretion to governments to choose a tari¤ below the binding reduces the ine¢ ciency due to
a domestic commitment problem. In Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007), however, the governments always
apply a tari¤ equal to binding and, thus, overhang is not predicted by the theory.
There is also an emerging literature that explores the role of tari¤ bindings at the presence of trade policy
uncertainty. Under various modeling assumptions, Froncois and Martin (2004), Sala, Schroder, and Yalcin
(2010), Handley (2010), and Handley and Limao (2010) show that one benet of tari¤ bindings is to reduce
uncertainty by censoring the possible range of applied tari¤s and limiting losses in the worst case scenario.
Finally, Limao and Tovar (2011) argue that governments choose tari¤ bindings to improve their bargaining
position vis a vis domestic interest groups. These papers, however, could not explain the existence of tari¤
overhang.
13These papers as well as the current paper focus on tari¤ bindings, while in practice tari¤ bindings
and contingent protection measures are both included in the agreement. In an ongoing research, Beshkar
and Bond (2012) study optimal trade agreements when tari¤ bindings and contingent protection measures
are both available. Bagwell and Staiger (2005) also introduce a model of tari¤ bindings with contingent
protection in which incentive compatibility is ensured by a dynamic constraint on the use of contingent
protection. Finally, Prusa and Li (2009) argue that due to the exibility provided by tari¤ binding overhangs,
the use of antidumping measures as a contingent protection measure is less critical for the governments.
Based on this argument, Prusa and Li (2009) call for a reform in antidumpings "vague and economically
illogical rules."
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II.3, we characterize optimal tari¤ binding as a function of import market power and other
variables of interest. Section II.3.1 studies the implications of our model regarding the
applied tari¤s and overhang under the optimal agreement. In sections II.4 and II.5 we
discuss our empirical model and results, respectively. We provide concluding remarks and
more discussion of the existing literature in Section II.6.
The Basic Setting
We consider a two-country (n+ 1)-good world economy. Letting good 0 to be the
numeraire, we assume that preferences in country i are given by
Ui = q0i +
nX
j=1
uji (qji) ;
for i = 1; :::; n and j = 1; 2: These preferences induce a demand function for good i in country
j that can be expressed as dij(pij). On the supply side, we assume that the numeraire good
is produced one-for-one from labor so that the wage is equal to one. Each of the other goods
is produced with a sector-specic factor and labor, which is mobile between sectors. We
let yij(pij) denote the supply function of industry i in country j as a function of the local
price.
We assume that the only trade policy at governmentsdisposal is ad valorem import
tari¤s, denoted by tij : The world price is denoted by pj . We assume that a governments
preferences over tari¤s can be described by a weighted social welfare function in which
the producers surplus in the import-competing sector receives a weight of ij  1: This
weight may vary across sectors and importing countries. In the subsequent discussion we
focus on one good that is imported to country 1 and, hence, drop the country and industry
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subscripts.14 Formally, letting V denote the importing countrys political welfare attributed
to the importable sector, we assume that
V (p; p; ) = S (p) + (1 + )(p) + tpm(p); (II.1)
where, S (p)  R1p d (ep) dep is consumer surplus,  (p)  R p0 y (ep) dep is producer surplus,
m = d  y is the import volume, and  is the extra weight given by the government to the
prots of the import-competing sector. Moreover, the welfare of the foreign government
from its respective exportable sector is given by
V  (p) = S (p) +  (p) :
The non-cooperative tari¤of the importing country, tN , may be obtained by setting
dV
d  0. Solving for this optimality condition yields
tN = ! + 
 
1 + tN
"my
!
; (II.2)
where, !; ", and my are inverse export elasticity, import elasticity, and import penetration
ratio, respectively.15 The rst term is the inverse of the foreign export supply function which
reects the part of optimal tari¤ that is due to the terms-of-trade motive. The second term
in (II.2) captures the political benet of raising the tari¤. This term is increasing in the
weight placed on political interests, but decreasing in   "my . The term  reects the
domestic resource distortion per dollar of prots transferred to domestic producers, since
a more elastic import demand raises the deadweight loss of raising the tari¤ and a larger
import penetration ratio reduces the gain in prot obtained from an increase in the tari¤.16
14Focusing on one good is without loss of generality within our framework in which a numeraire good is
available.
15Equation II.2 is essentially equivalent to Grossman and Helpmans (1995) formula for non-cooperative
tari¤, although in their model the political weight, , is common across sectors.
16Solving for t in II.2 yields the non-cooperative tari¤ tN () = !+
  ;where   "my . We assume through-
out the paper that  <  such that the Nash ad valorem tari¤ does not prohibit trade.
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In the analysis that follows, we assume that the inverse elasticity of export supply
can be expressed as a function of the foreign countrys export price, p(t), and exogenous
factors z! reecting the technology, factor endowments and preferences of the foreign coun-
try in that sector. A similar assumption will be made regarding the domestic elasticity and
import penetration ratio. With a slight abuse of notation, we will perform comparative
statics exercises using d! and d to denote the e¤ect of changes in these exogenous factors.
Assuming that the second order conditions are satised, it is shown in the Appendix that
we can use (II.2) to express the optimal tari¤ as a function of three key parameters,
tN = ~tN (; !; ); (II.3)
such that ~tN > 0; ~t
N
! > 0; ~t
N
 < 0. Greater market power and a larger political shock will
make the home country more protectionist, while a large domestic cost of tari¤ distortions
will reduce the optimal tari¤.17
Dening the joint political welfare of the two governments as W (t; )  V (t; ) +
V  (t), the necessary condition of world welfare maximization is given by @W@t  0: Solving
for t in this equation yields the politically e¢ cient tari¤
tE () =

    : (II.4)
where  >  must hold at an interior maximum. The politically e¢ cient tari¤ is increasing in
the value of protection and decreasing in the cost of protection, . The di¤erence between
17As an example, consider the asymmetric country model of Bond and Park (2002) with linear supply and
demand functions in each country: d(p) =  (1  p) ; d(p) = (1   ) (1  p), s(p) = p and s(p) = p.
Here  2 (0; 1) may be interpreted as the relative size of the home country and  > 1 as the measure of
the degree of foreign comparative advantage. In this case, ! = (1+ 2t)
1+
and  = 2; which implies that the
inverse export supply elasticity is increasing in the home countrys relative size and the degree of foreign
comparative advantage. These parameters would represent the exogenous factors determining the home
countrys optimal tari¤ in (II.3).
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the importers optimal tari¤ and the e¢ cient tari¤ will be tN ()   tE() = !  , which
is positive as long as the importer has positive market power. The di¤erence between
the importers unilaterally optimal tari¤ and the e¢ cient tari¤ reects the terms of trade
externality.
Information Structure
We will assume that the political weight, ; is a random variable that has a pdf
f() with compact support  = [; ]. The home government is thus uncertain about its
future preferences regarding tari¤s, and expected world welfare is
R 
 W (t(); )f()d: If
the realization of  is publicly observable, then a complete trade agreement that specied
tari¤s tE () would maximize expected world welfare. Such an agreement would involve
reciprocal trade liberalization, since it would reduce tari¤s by an amount tN ()  tE() in
state  for each imported good in each country, while allowing governments the exibility
to respond to domestic political shocks.
Our analysis of trade agreements will focus on the case in which  is not observable
to other countries. We will also assume that state-contingent transfers between countries are
not possible. With these assumptions, a trade agreement t() will be incentive compatible
if the importing country not prefer the tari¤ assigned in state  to that in any other state,
V (t(); )  V (t(r); )  0 for all r;  2  (II.5)
The full information agreement, tE(), will not be incentive compatible for the importing
country for  < , since the importing country would report the state to be the value r > 
for which tE(r) = tN ().
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Optimal Tari¤ Bindings
An optimal trade agreement in the presence of private information is one that
maximizes expected world welfare subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (II.5).
In our analysis, we will limit attention to agreements that take the form of a tari¤ binding,
which allows a country to impose any tari¤ that is less than or equal to its tari¤ binding. We
make this restriction because tari¤ bindings are the mechanism used in the GATT/WTO
agreements, and because they are incentive compatible. Furthermore, it has it has been
shown by Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Amodor and Bagwell (2010) in models sim-
ilar to ours that this restriction is without loss of generality under certain conditions on
preferences and the distribution of the political shocks.
Letting tB denote the tari¤ binding assigned to the importing country under a
trade agreement, the importer will choose its optimal tari¤ in any state where its optimal
tari¤ is below the tari¤ binding, and will choose the binding otherwise. Since the importers
optimal tari¤ is increasing in , we can invert (II.3) to obtain the threshold value of the
political shock at which the tari¤ is at the binding as
B(tB; !; ) = max[; ~tN
 1
(t)]; (II.6)
~tN
 1
t > 0; ~t
N 1
! < 0; ~t
N 1
 > 0 :
Increasing the tari¤binding will raise the threshold at which the given tari¤binding will bind
more frequently for a country with a larger optimal tari¤, so the threshold (at an interior
solution ) will be decreasing in market power The incentive compatible tari¤ schedule under
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the tari¤ binding can be expressed as
t() =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
tB if   B(tB; !; );
~tN (; !; ) if  < B(tB; !; ):
(II.7)
We refer to the outcome tB > tN () as one with tari¤ overhang, since there will exist states
of the world for which the tari¤ is strictly less than the binding.
Given the schedule of applied tari¤ in (I.13) and the distribution of political para-
meters, the expected joint welfare of the importing and exporting countries under the tari¤
binding, tB, is given by
E [W ] =
Z B

W (tN (); )f()d +
Z 
B
W (tB; )f()d: (II.8)
Assuming that the objective of the negotiators is to maximize their expected joint welfare,
the optimal tari¤ binding is obtained by choosing tB to maximize the expression given by
(II.8).18
Noting that W (t; ) = W (t; 0) +  (t), the rst-order condition for optimality at
an interior solution is given by
Z 
B

Wt
 
tB; 0

+ t
 
tB

f () d = 0:
Rearranging this condition, we can express the necessary condition as
 Wt(tB; 0)=t(tB) = E

j > B(tB; !; ) : (II.9)
The left hand side of this expression is the deadweight loss per dollar of prot generated
for import-competing producers. The right hand side is equal to the expected political
18This objective function is appropriate if lump sum transfers can be made between countries at the time
that the agreement is signed.
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premium from raising an additional dollar for producers, E

j > B.
The solution for the optimal binding is illustrated in Figure 5, which plots the
left and right hand sides of (II.9) against tB: As shown in Lemma 2 in the appendix, the
left-hand side of II.9 may be written as  Wt(tB; 0)=t(tB)  tB1+tB ; which is increasing
in tB as long as  does not decline too rapidly in tB. The E

j > B(tB; !; ) locus
ranges over [E(); ] and is non-decreasing in tB. For tB < tN (), the importing country
will keep its tari¤ at the binding for all  and the expected benet locus is horizontal at
E() over this interval. For t 2 (tN (); tN ()), increases in the binding raise the threshold,
@E[j>B]
@tB
=

f(B)
1 F (B)

@B
@tB
> 0, and thus raise the expected value of the shock above the
threshold. An intersection in this region yields an agreement with tari¤ overhang. For
tB > tN (), the tari¤ binding will never constrain the tari¤ policy of the home country
because it exceeds the maximum the home country would impose. In order for a solution
to the necessary conditions to represent a local maximum, the slope of the

tB
1+tB

 locus
must exceed that of the expected benet locus at an intersection.
A solution for a maximum with a bound tari¤ in the interval [0; tN ()) exists
under fairly weak conditions.19 Assuming these conditions are satised, we can derive the
relationship between the models parameters and the optimal binding. A corner solution
with no tari¤ overhang arises if (II.9) is satised at tB < tN (). Substituting from (II.2)
and (II.9) into this condition yields a corner solution if
!  E []  
   E [] : (II.10)
19If E()  0 and  <1, the expected benet of raising the binding will be no less than the cost at tB = 0:
A solution to (II.9) with tB < tN () will then exist if

tB
1+tB

  E
h
j > ~B(tB)
i
is continuous in tB and
is positive when evaluated at tN (). Noting that tN () = !+
  , this latter condition requires

 
1+!

! > 0.
The existence of an interior solution for the e¢ cient tari¤ with tE() > 0 requires  > , so this condition
will be satised if ! > 0:
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E(θ|θ θ)
~t
Bη/(1+tB)
tB
E(θ)
θ
_
tN(θ)tN(θ)_
_
Figure 5. Expected Benet and Cost of Raising a Tari¤ Binding
This condition will be satised if a countrys market power, as measured by !, is su¢ ciently
high relative to the expected value of the political shock when evaluated at . In order to
provide exibility, the bound tari¤ must be su¢ ciently high that it exceeds tN () :For
countries with signicant market power, this cost is too high to justify allowing exibility
through the use of tari¤ overhang.
If the condition in (II.10) fails when evaluated at , then the necessary conditions
will have an interior solution on (tN (); tN ()): Figure 5 can be used to illustrate the models
predictions about the relationship between country characteristics and the level of the tari¤
binding in a world-welfare-maximizing agreement. First consider the e¤ect of an increase
in a countrys market power, i.e., an increase in !. This has the e¤ect of raising the Nash
tari¤ and lowering B(tB) for tB 2 (tN (); tN ()), which shifts the expected benet locus as
illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 5. An increase in the market power of the importing
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country reduces the expected benet of raising the binding, and thus reduces the optimal
binding.
A reduction in  will have a similar e¤ect on the expected benet locus as an
increase in market power, because it also raises the Nash tari¤ and reduces the threshold
at which the binding holds. However, it also has the e¤ect of reducing the cost of raising
the binding, which shifts the cost locus downward proportionally. If the solution is a strict
binding with no overhang (i.e. tB < tN ()), only the latter shift applies and the tari¤
binding will rise. If the solution is an interior solution with tari¤ overhang, the e¤ect on the
binding will be ambiguous. Finally, note that a shift in the distribution of political shocks
that raises E(j  B) will raise the tari¤ binding at all solutions for tB:
The following proposition summarizes our results thus far:
Proposition 1 (Optimal Binding) (i) If ! > E[]  E[] , there will exist a local optimum
at which there is no tari¤ overhang. The optimal tari¤ binding is tB = E() E() , which is
increasing in E() and decreasing in :
(ii) If !  E[]  E[] ; there exists a local optimum at which there is tari¤ overhang
for some states of the world. The optimal tari¤ binding is decreasing in ! and increasing
in E(j  B). The e¤ect of  on the binding is ambiguous.
Proposition 1 establishes comparative statics results in the neighborhood of a local
maximum. If the solution to this problem is unique, it provides testable implications about
the relationship between market power and the level of the tari¤ binding. In particular, it
predicts that a countrys tari¤ binding is non-increasing in its market power, and strictly
decreasing if there is tari¤ overhang. 20
Proposition 1 also yields a prediction about the relationship between market power
and the probability that a countrys applied tari¤ is at the binding. The probability that a
20Since both the cost and benet loci in Figure 1 are positively slope, this stronger result requires additional
restrictions on the behavioral parameters and the distribution of political shocks. In the special case of linear
supply and demand discussed above, f 0()  0 is a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness for all values of country
size and comparative advantage. With f 0() > 0, uniqueness requires that the country not be too large.
Our empirical predictions thus also require that conditions of this type be satised.
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countrys applied tari¤ is at the binding is given by 1   F (B(tB; !; )). Therefore, in the
region that tB is decreasing in the inverse export elasticity, the likelihood of a zero overhang
should be increasing in ! because both the direct and indirect (through the change in tari¤
binding) e¤ects of an increase in market power will reduce B:
Corollary 1 Under the optimal tari¤ binding agreement with tari¤ overhang, the likelihood
of zero overhang is increasing in !: For ! > E[]  E[] , we always have zero overhang under
the optimal agreement.
Tari¤ Binding Overhang
Optimum tari¤ theories predict that absent international trade policy commit-
ments, i.e., when countries have fullexibility in choosing their trade policies, the adopted
import tari¤ is an increasing function of a countries international market power in the con-
cerned sector. What is the relationship between applied tari¤ and international market
power when countries are subject to tari¤ binding commitments that may provide a lim-
itedexibility? Since in practice a large fraction of tari¤ lines are below their bindings, it
would be useful to have predictions regarding applied tari¤s and market power. The results
above provide us with a framework in which we can address this question.
We start by considering the magnitude of tari¤ binding overhang, which is one of
the most interesting features of applied tari¤s under the WTO agreement. Given a tari¤
binding, tB, the size of a tari¤ binding overhang as a function of the state of the world,
denoted by g (), is given by
g () =
8>><>>:
tB   tN () if  < B  min[; tN 1(tB)];
0 if   B;
where, B was dened in (II.6), i.e., B: The average overhang, g, can be written as E(g) =R B


tB   tN () f () d; with the impact of the importing countrys market power, as
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measured by !, on the average size of overhang given by
dE(g)
d!
=
Z B


dtB
d!
  dt
N ()
d!

f () d +

tB   tN  B f  B
=
Z B


dtB
d!
  dt
N ()
d!

f () d:
But since tN! () > 0 and
dtB
d! < 0 for ! <
E[] 
 E[] , it must be the case that
dg
d! < 0: Formally,
Proposition 2 (Overhang) Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the average size
of overhang is strictly decreasing in the international market power if and only if ! < E[]  E[] .
For ! > E[]  E[] , the overhang is always zero
Figure 6 illustrates this point for two levels of international market power parame-
ters !0 and !1; such that !0 < !1: In this example the optimal binding for either market
power level allows for overhang, i.e., B (!0) ; B (!1) > . As seen in this gure, an increase
in the market power parameter from !0 to !1 lowers the binding and increases the applied
tari¤ in states where there is overhang. As a result, the average overhang under the optimal
tari¤ binding agreement decreases as ! increases. Figure 6 also shows that there will be
conicting e¤ects of international market power on the average level of the tari¤, which is
given by
E

tA

=
Z B

tN ()f()d + (1  F (B))tB:
The applied tari¤ of the larger country is higher in the region where both coun-
tries have overhang, but is lower in the region where both countries are at the binding.21
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to ! yields
d
d!
E

tA

=
Z B

tN! ()f()d +
 
1  F (B) tN  B dBd! : (II.11)
21We refer to the case where the market power paramter is given by !1 (!0) as the large-country (small-
country) case.
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Figure 6. Agreement Tari¤ Schedules (Solid Lines) and Market Power: !1 > !0
The rst term must be positive, because an increase in the market power increases the
Nash tari¤. The second term will be negative by Proposition (1). The former e¤ect must
dominate in the neighborhood of ! = 0; since B !  as ! ! 0. The latter e¤ect will
dominate in the neighborhood of ! = E[]  E[] , since 
B !  as ! ! E[]  E[] . Formally,
Proposition 3 (Applied Tari¤) The average applied tari¤ is an increasing (decreasing)
function of ! for su¢ ciently small (large) values of !.
The non-monotonicity result of this paper may be understood by noting two con-
icting forces that determine the size of the applied tari¤s under an optimal agreement.
On one hand, greater international market power increases the size of unilaterally optimal
tari¤, which tends to increase the average applied tari¤. On the other hand, as shown in
Proposition (1) and depicted in Figure (6), the optimal agreement features a lower binding
for sectors with greater international market power, which reduces the maximum allowed
tari¤ under the agreement. The former e¤ect dominates when market power is small and
the tari¤ binding is very high, while the latter e¤ect dominates for su¢ ciently large levels
of market power.
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Data and The Empirical Model
In the rest of the paper we provide empirical observations regarding the main
predictions of our theory. To study tari¤ bindings and overhang, we utilize data on Tari¤
Bindings and MFN-Applied Tari¤s for WTO members that is available from WTO (2010)
for the period 1995-2009. The number of years for which applied tari¤ data is available
varies substantially across members. Most members report applied tari¤ data for at least
one year during this period, but a complete time series is available for only 14 countries.
The current tari¤ bindings were set at the time of the WTO agreement in 1995, and have
remained essentially unchanged since that time.
Applied tari¤s, on the other hand, show considerable variation. This adjustment
falls into two parts. In the period immediately following the agreement, there was signicant
reduction in applied tari¤ rates as countries reduced their tari¤s to meet their new binding
obligations, Interestingly, these reductions included both reductions in tari¤s that were over
the binding as well as reductions in tari¤s that were already under the binding. Once the
phase-in period ended, adjustments in applied rates have continued, but the frequency of
adjustments varies substantially across countries and does not show a signicant upward or
downward trend.
Our theoretical model does not attempt to address the phase-in of applied tari¤
rates following the negotiation of a trade agreement. Therefore, we will focus primarily on
using a cross section for a particular year in our estimations. We use cross sectional data
from year 2007, because the phase-in period for original WTO members was completed
by that time.22 Applied tari¤ data for 66 members accounting for 76% of world import
22Virtually all of the phase-in periods for countries that were members in 1995 were completed by 2003-
2005. In addition, the data for 2007 was not a¤ected by the nancial crisis. Since our model focuses on
sector-specic and country-specic shocks, we avoided the nancial crisis years where there were signicant
systemic shocks.
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is available for 2007.23 Our selection criteria resulted in a total of 66 WTO members,
including 52 original members and 14 new members. The data on applied tari¤ provides
tari¤ information on approximately 5,200 sectors at the HS 6-digit level for each of the
members, resulting in a sample of over 300,000 tari¤ lines.
Table 14 (in the introduction) reports the fraction of all tari¤ lines and the fraction
of all imports that fall under one of three categories with respect to the overhang and tari¤
binding: zero overhang (the applied rate equals the bound rate), tari¤ overhang (applied
rate strictly less than bound rate) and unbound (no tari¤ binding negotiated).24 Although
tari¤ lines with a zero overhang account for only 16.53% of all tari¤ lines, they account for
65% of world imports. Thus, a zero overhang is much more likely to be found in tari¤ lines
that account for the largest fractions of world trade. Table 16 (in Appendix A) provides
a summary of tari¤ binding status across countries. This table shows a substantial cross-
country variations in the binding status: more than 90% of the applied tari¤s are at their
bindings for 5 members (EU,China, Japan, Switzerland, and the US), while there are less
than 5% of tari¤ lines at their binding for 25 members.25
We test the predictions of Proposition 1 using the following Tobit model:26
23We used data from 2006 for Belize, Nicaragua, Turkey, and 2008 for Morocco, Sri-Lanka, and Tunisia,
as these countries did not report their applied tari¤s in 2007.
24Table 14 also reports the fraction of tari¤ lines in which applied tari¤ is greater than the binding. These
cases, which account for less than 3 percent of tari¤ lines (less than 6 percent of world trade), are related to
the breach of the agreement or the use of contingent protection measures such as safegards.
25These countries include Brazil, India, Columbia, Philippine, Chile, Peru, Bangladesh, Kuwait, Do-
minican Republic, Uruguay, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Kenya, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahrain,
Jamaica, Honduras, Ghana, Mauritius, Madagascar, Zambia, Mongolia, and Guyana.
26According to the theory, at a corner solution, which prevails if ! > E[] 
 E[] , the optimal binding is given
by tB = E[]
 E[] . Therefore, contrary to the underlying assumption in this Tobit model, the corner solution
for tB is not necessarily zero and it is a function of . In fact, the Tobit specication presumes that any
observation with tB > 0 represents an interior solution in which case tB must depend negatively on !.
Therefore, if the theory is true, the Tobit specication will be biased against the prediction of our theory by
making the parameter estimates smaller and less statistically-signicant.
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tBij = 1!ij + 1ij +Xj1 + "ij ; (II.12)
tBij = t
B
ij if t
B
ij > 0;
tBij = 0 if t
B
ij  0:
In this model, i and j are sector and country subscripts, tB and tB are the observed
tari¤ binding and its associated latent variable, ! is international market power,  is the
product of import elasticity and import penetration ratio, and Xj is a vector of country-
level variables that we discuss below. Proposition 1 implies that 1 < 0, while the sign of
1 is ambiguous.
In cases where we have explanatory variables that are available at the HS 6-digit
level, the dependent variable is the bound tari¤ from the WTO database.27 In cases where
we have variables that are only available at the HS 3-digit level, the dependent variable is
the simple average of the bound tari¤s over the 6-digit HS lines within the relevant 3-digit
HS category.28
We also use a Tobit model to test whether there is a negative relationship between
the size of the overhang observed in the data and the measure of international market power
as predicted by Proposition 2:
gij = 2!ij + 2ij +Xj2 + "ij ; (II.13)
gij = g

ij if g

ij > 0;
gij = 0 if gij  0:
27As will be discussed below, we use two alternative measures of international market power, namely,
import ratio and inverse export elasticity. The former (latter) is available at the 6-digit (3-digit) HS tari¤
lines.
28Similar results were obtained when we used trade weighted tari¤ binidngs as the dependent variable.
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In this model g = tB   tA is the observed overhang and g is the associated latent variable.
The explanatory variables are the same variables that were included in II.12. Proposition
2 implies that 2 > 0, but no clear prediction is established for 2.
A nal testable prediction is that of Corollary 1 that the likelihood of zero overhang
is increasing in the measure of international market power. In cases where we have a market
power measure that is available at the HS 6-digit level, the prediction can be tested using
a Probit model, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable whose value is equal to
one if the applied tari¤ equals (or is greater than) the bound tari¤.29 The probit model can
be expressed as
Pr
 
tAij  tBij j!ij ; ij ; Xj

= 
 
3!ij + 3ij +Xj3

: (II.14)
Corollary 1 implies that 3 < 0. In cases where some explanatory variables are available
only at the HS 3-digit level, we aggregated the 6-digit HS data by calculating the share of
the 6-digit HS lines in the 3-digit HS category that were at the binding. We then used OLS
to estimate the e¤ects of the explanatory variables on the share of 3-digit HS lines that
were at the binding.
International Market Power Measure
International market power plays a central role in our theory. We use two measures
of market power: the inverse of the export supply elasticity and the members import volume
as a share of world imports in the sector. There are advantages and disadvantages to each
of these measures, so we chose to use both in testing the role of market power.
29As was shown in Table 14, in 2.76% percent of tari¤ lines the applied tari¤ is greater than the binding.
We include such cases in the zero-overhang category.
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Broda andWeinstein provide estimations of export supply elasticity using a method-
ology derived by Feenstra (1994) and extended by themselves in Broda and Weinstein
(2006). Although the export supply elasticity is the market power measure suggested by
our theory, there are two limitations in the use of these measures. First, these estimated
elasticities are only available at the HS 3-digit level and for only 42 of the countries in our
sample. Second, as noted by Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008), much of the variation
in the estimated elasticities is across goods by construction. In other words, the estimated
inverse export elasticities mostly capture variations of market power across sectors within
each country. Therefore, when we use inverse export elasticity as the measure of market
power, we will focus on a cross-sector and within-country analysis by including country
xed e¤ects.
As an alternative measure of international market power, we will also use the
members import volume as a share of the world imports in the concerned sectors. As is
well-known, the true elasticity of export supply faced by country i for a given good can be
expressed as30
"i =
 
"X +
P
k 6=i
"kWk
!
=Wi;
where, Wi is country is share of world imports in that good, "X is the world export supply
elasticity, and "k the import demand elasticity for country k. Therefore, a countrys share of
the world import is inversely related to that countrys true export supply elasticity.31 This
measure has the advantage of being available at the HS 6-digit level for all of the countries
in our data set, and also provides a measure that can better capture the variation in market
30Letting X and Xi denote the world export supply and the export supply function facing country i,
we have Xi = X  Pk 6=imk, which implies dXidp = dXdp  Pk 6=i dmkdp . This can be written as "i Xip =
"X X
p +
P
k 6=i "k
mk
p , or "

i =

"X +
P
k 6=i "kWk

=Wi, where Wk is country ks share of the world import.
31In our data, as in Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008), there is a positive and statistically signicant
relationship between inverse export elasticity and import share.
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power across countries.
A concern about the use of market share data is that it is also an endogenous
variable in our regressions because it is related to the applied tari¤s. We therefore take an
instrumental variable approach by using GDP and per-capita endowment of several pro-
ductive resources of the economy, including productive capital, intangible capital, natural
(agricultural) capital, and natural minerals as instruments for import ratio.32 This choice of
instrumental variables is motivated by the factor-content-of-trade methodology developed
by Romalis (2004), in which relative resource endowment determines comparative advan-
tage and, hence, the structure of trade in the world. Fitted values of import ratio are
calculated for six-digit product category of the Harmonized System. This entails running
4466 separate regressions (one for each HS 6-digit product category) in the rst stage. In
97% of these regression there are at least two coe¢ cients with statistically signicant esti-
mates. Moreover, the result of an F-test shows that 97.8% of these sectoral regressions are
signicant at a 10% level.
Other Explanatory Variables
Political factors also play a role through their impact on the conditional mean of
the political shock, E[   1j  B]: Unfortunately, we do not have a good measure of
political inuence at the sectoral level that is available across countries. A potential proxy
for the importance of political shocks at the country level is an index of political instability
that is constructed by the the Economist Intelligence Unit. This index ranks countries on
a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest level of instability. The index is constructed
using factors such as the number of outbreaks of violent conicts, type of regime, and level
32The data on productive resources of the member countries is obtained from World Bank (2010).
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of economic development. Our hypothesis is that countries that are politically unstable are
more likely to su¤er from extreme values of the political shocks, and thus should have a
greater demand for exibility to deal with those shocks. If this hypothesis is correct, our
model then implies that a higher political instability number is associated with greater tari¤
bindings and overhang.
Finally, as suggested by the theory, import demand elasticity and import penetra-
tion ratio are other determinants of the optimal tari¤. We have data on import demand
elasticities, " in the notation of (II.2), obtained from Broda and Weinstein (2006) for 42
of the countries at the HS 3-digit level. Unfortunately, production data was available for
an even smaller set of industries and countries. As a result, in regressions that include
 = "m=y as an explanatory variable, we were limited to using data from manufacturing
sectors for 24 countries.33 As noted above, the theory does not establish unambiguous
comparative statics results for these variables in most cases. Therefore, we constructed
estimates of the model both with and without these variables.
Table 15 reports summary statistics for our key explanatory variables. GDP is
highly skewed, reecting the presence of a few members with very large markets (United
States, European Union, and Japan) among the 66 countries. We also included GDP
per capita as an explanatory variable, as a proxy for an alternative hypothesis that poor
countries are generally given high bindings and not expected to make signicant market
access concessions. Since market power variables are correlated with GDP per capita in
the data, we check if the signicance of the international market power measures in our
estimation is robust to inclusion of GDP per capita.
33Manufacturing output data is available for 4 digit ISIC categories from UNIDO. These production data
were matched to the HS 3-digit categories to obtain the import ratio variable.
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Table 15. Descriptive Statistics
Name Average Median Min. Max.
GDP (bil.$) 528 32 0.8 11,670
per capita GDP($) 8831 3683 171 41904
Political Instability Index 3.95 4.1 0.2 6.8
Bound tari¤ rate (%) 28.56 25 0 800.3
Applied tari¤ rate (%) 8.165 5 0 800.3
(in bound sectors)
Tari¤ Overhang (percentage point) 21.41 15 0 454.2
Import share(%) 1.35 0.056 0 99.91
Inverse Export Elasticity 62.39 1.12 0.0004 1645.96
Import Elasticity 8.45 3.27 1.074 821.89
Note: Cross sectional data from year 2007 for 66 WTO members. Tari¤ rates are the average of
tari¤ lines at the HS 6-digit level. Import and export elasticities are measured at HS 3-digit level.
Number of observations: 300179. Source: WTO, World Bank, United Nation, and the Economist
Intelligence Unit.
Empirical Results
Table 17 shows the results for the Tobit regression (II.12) of the tari¤ binding
against market power and other variables. In the rst two columns a countrys share of
world imports in a sector is used as the measure of market power. This measure is available
at the HS 6-digit level for all of the 66 WTO members in our sample, resulting in more
than 247,000 observations. Our estimation shows a negative and statistically signicant
relationship (at the 1% level) between import share and the level of the tari¤ binding,
which is consistent with the prediction of Proposition 1. Standard errors were calculated
assuming two-way clustering at the country and sectoral level. The impact of international
market power, as measured by import share, is also economically signicant: a one-standard-
deviation, equal to 4.6 percentage points, increase in the import share, reduces the tari¤
binding by 3.5-4.46 percentage points.34
The results also indicate that the political instability measure has a positive and
statistically signicant relation to the tari¤ binding, which is also consistent with the theory
if we assume that political instability is positively related to the average magnitude of
34Standard deviation of the import share variable is 4.7. Multiplying this number with the coe¢ cient of
the import share in column 1 and column 2 of Table 17 yields 3.5 and 4.46, respectively.
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political pressure. GDP per capita is also included to control for the possibility that the
level of development plays a role in determining bindings.
Column 3 uses the Broda-Weinsteins estimated inverse export elasticities as a
measure of international market power. In this specication we also include import demand
elasticity, ", as an explanatory variable.35 As noted in the discussion above, the use of
this measure restricted our analysis to the use of weighted tari¤ bindings at the HS 3-digit
level for 42 countries. Using country xed e¤ects, we nd a negative relationship between
the inverse elasticity and the level of the binding that was signicant at the 1%-level. The
estimated coe¢ cient for " was not statistically signicant, which is in line with lack of an
unambiguous theoretical relationship between " and the level of optimal tari¤ binding.
The remaining columns in Table 17 report tests on subsets of the sample of coun-
tries or industries. These tests serve as robustness checks on our estimates for the entire
sample of countries. Columns 4 and 5 report results for the original WTO members (52
countries) and those that were admitted after 1995 (14 countries), respectively. These re-
gressions indicate a negative and statistically signicant relationship between market power
(measured by import share) and the level of the bindings, although the magnitude is smaller
for the new entrants and is only signicant at the 10%-level.
Columns 8 and 9 report results where separate equations were estimated for man-
ufactured products and agricultural goods. There are reasons to believe that the political
economy of manufacturing and agricultural sectors are substantially di¤erent. First, a
greater variability in output levels and prices is likely to be observed in agriculture than
in manufacturing, which is likely to lead to more extreme political shocks in agriculture.
Furthermore, the trade liberalization process in manufacturing has generally made far more
35In other specications (not reported) we used  instead of ". The estimated coe¢ cients have the expected
sign but show a lower level of statistical signicance.
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progress than in agriculture. The results indicate similar negative and statistically signif-
icant impacts of import share on the level of bindings in both sectors. One signicant
di¤erence for the agricultural sectors is that there is a negative and statistically signicant
e¤ect of GDP per capita on bindings in agriculture. The results using export supply elas-
ticities to measure market power have a negative e¤ect, but the result is not statistically
signicant.
Table 18 reports the results of the Tobit model (II.13) for tari¤ overhang. The
results are broadly similar to those obtained for the tari¤ binding equations, although in
this case the signicance of the market power e¤ects is even stronger. Both market power
measures have coe¢ cients that are negative and signicant at the 1% for the equations
involving all countries, as well as in the original member/new member subgroups and for
the manufacturing sectors. These estimated e¤ects are also economically important. In
particular, a one-standard-deviation, equal to 4.6 percentage point, increase in import share
results in an 8-17 percentage-point decrease in the magnitude of the tari¤ binding overhang.
The results for the political instability variables are also positive for the equation involving
all countries, although the statistical signicance is somewhat reduced. GDP per capita
also plays a role in the determination of overhang in the agricultural sector, which is also
consistent with the ndings on tari¤ bindings.
Table 19 reports the marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables of the Probit
regression (II.14) of the likelihood of zero overhang against a measure of market power
and other explanatory variables. The results for this regression are also consistent with
the theory, such that sectors with greater import market power are more likely to have an
applied tari¤ at the binding. This result holds across all specications when import share is
used as the measure of market power (Columns 1, 2, 4-6, and 8). To illustrate the magnitude
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of these e¤ects, compare the marginal of ! in column 1, which is 0.014 at the mean of import
share (1.32%), and 0.013 at the median of import share (0.06%). This numbers indicate
that a one-standard-deviation increase in import share makes it 7 percentage-points more
likely to have an applied tari¤ that is at the binding, i.e., a zero overhang.
In columns 3, 7, and 9, we use inverse export elasticity as the measure of interna-
tional market power. As explained above (subsequent to the Probit model II.13), we use
an OLS specication when export elasticity is used. Column 3, which reports the result of
the OLS regression on the entire sample, shows a statistically and economically signicant
coe¢ cient for inverse export elasticity. These coe¢ cient estimates, however, are statistically
insignicant when the agricultural and manufacturing subsamples are studied separately.
As in previous regressions, political instability has a negative and highly signicant e¤ect
on tari¤ overhang in the HS 6-digit regressions, which is consistent with the notion that
countries with greater variability in political shocks will require greater exibility in tari¤
bindings and, as a result, are less likely to be at the binding.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to derive and examine predictions of the terms-of-trade
theory when governments value exibility in setting their policies. We model the trade-o¤
between curbing beggar-thy-neighbour motivations and exibility in the design of trade
agreements, and argue that recognizing this trade-o¤ is the key to explain the observed
patterns in the tari¤ binding commitments and applied tari¤s under the WTO.
We provide a systematic account of the empirical relationship between tari¤ com-
mitments, applied tari¤s, and measures of international market power. As predicted by the
theory, the level of tari¤ binding and the size of tari¤ binding overhang are both inversely
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related to measures of import market power.
Our theoretical model abstracts away from some important elements that are rel-
evant in trade agreements. First, we ignore the possibility of including an escape clause
in the agreement, which allows the signatories to set tari¤s above their committed tar-
i¤ bindings. There are at least three approaches to introduce an incentive-compatible
and welfare-improving escape clause in a trade agreement. In one approach, explored by
Feenstra and Lewis (1991), Sykes (1991), Ludema (2001), Beshkar(2012), Beshkar (2010a),
Beshkar(2010b), and Maggi Staiger (2011b), Maggi and Staiger (2011a), parties can breach
the contract if they compensate the a¤ected parties according to a pre-specied remedy
system. A second approach, which is under study by Beshkar and Bond (2012), assumes
the availability of a costly state-verication process, in which parties may set tari¤s above
the binding if they can verify publicly that their current contingency justies higher tari¤s.
A third approach is to impose a dynamic constraint on the use of contingent protection, as
in Bagwell and Staiger (2005) and Martin and Vergote (2008).
We also abstract from the issues regarding the non-discrimination clause and the
related exibility measures. Nondiscrimination is an important element of the GATT/WTO.
However, the member countries are given some exibility to violate the non-discrimination
clause under the anti-dumping agreement. The literature on trade agreements still lacks a
convincing model that explains the merits of including a discriminatory exibility measure
such as anti-dumping. In particular, we lack a formal model to study the interaction be-
tween discriminatory and non-discriminatory exibility measures in practice. For example,
Prusa and Li (2009) argue that due to the exibility provided by tari¤ binding overhangs,
the use of anti-dumping measures as a contingent protection measure is less critical for the
governments and, hence, may be excluded from the WTO.
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Appendix: proofs and tables
Lemma 1 Nash and E¢ cient tari¤s are given by tN () = !+  and t
E () =   , respec-
tively, where   "my .
Proof. The world market clearing condition satises m(p(1 + t)) + m(p) = 0:
Letting  = 1 + t, totally di¤erentiating the world market clearing condition yields
dp
d
=   m
0(p)p
m0(p) +m0(p)
=
=  p


"
"+ "
;
where, " = pm
0
m is the elasticity of foreign export supply and " =  pm
0
m is the elasticity
of import demand. The home price change can then be written as
dp
d
= p

1 +
dp
d

p

= p
"
" + "
:
The non-cooperative tari¤ of the importing country may be obtained by setting dVd  0.
Taking derivative of V in ?? yields
dV
d
=
@V
@p
@p
@
+
@V
@p
@p
@
=

(p  p)m0 + y @p
@
 m@p

@
=

tpm0 + y

p
"
" + "
+

p


m"
" + "
:
Thus, importing countrys optimality condition, dVdt  0, may be written as
 t "
1 + t
+ 
y
m

" +
"
1 + t
= 0:
Solving for t in this equation yields:
tN () =
1
    (! + ) ; (II.15)
where,   "my and ! = 1" .
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Dening the joint political welfare of the two governments as W  V (p; p; ) +
V  (p), the necessary condition of world welfare maximization is
dW
dt
 @W
@p
@p
@t
+
@W
@p
@p
@t
= 0: (II.16)
As shown by Bagwell and Staiger (1999), this condition reduces to @V@p = 0,
36 which implies
t
1 + t
pm0 + y = 0;
or,
  t
1 + t
"+ 
y
m
= 0: (II.17)
Rearranging this equation yields the importing countrys politically e¢ cient tari¤
tE () =

    :
Lemma 2  dW(t
B ;0)=dt
d(tB)=dt
= t
B
1+tB
:
Proof. The e¤ect of tari¤ on the unweighted joint welfare can be expressed as
dW (p; p; 0)
dt
=
dV (p; p; 0)
dt
+
dV 
dt
=
@V (p; p; 0)
@p
dp
dt
+
@V (p; p; 0)
@p
dp
dt
+
@V 
@p
dp
dt
= tpm0(p)
dp
dt
 mdp

dt
 mdp

dt
:
Noting that m+m = 0 and " =  pm0m , the impact of home tari¤ on the unweighted world
36To obtain this result, note that @W
@p
= @V
@p
and @W
@p =
@V
@p +
@V 
@p = m + m
 = 0. Therefore, dW
dt
=
@V
@p
@p
@t
= 0 if and only if @V
@p
= 0.
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welfare can be written as
dW (p; p; 0)
dt
=   t"m
1 + t
dp
dt
: (II.18)
Moreover, the e¤ect of tari¤ on prots of import-competing producers in the home country
is
d
dt
= y(p)
dp
dt
(II.19)
Therefore, the marginal deadweight loss of tari¤ when t = tB may be written as
 dW
 
tB; 0

=dt
d (tB) =dt
=
tB
1 + tB
; (II.20)
where,  = my ".
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Table 16. Binding Status Across WTO Members in the Sample
Member
Average
B inding
Average
Applied
Zero
Overhang
US 3.73 3.74 94.1%
EU 4.16 4.23 92%
Japan 2.91 2.94 89.4%
China 10.04 10.03 93.2%
Canada 5.20 3.72 47.1%
Brazil 31 .40 12.43 1.0%
India 50.37 12.95 3.7%
Korea 16.37 11.66 35.4%
Mexico 34.95 11.94 7.1%
Austra lia 10.09 3.49 27.1%
Turkey 30.35 10.31 18.6%
Argentina 31.86 11.17 0.7%
Sw itzerland 0 0 100%
Saudi Arabia 10.81 4.60 7.3%
Hongkong 0 0 100%
Indonesia 37.20 6.90 1.6%
Norway 3.07 0.684 50.6%
S. A frica 17.97 7.58 22.7%
Thailand 25.41 8.95 23.6%
Israel 18.18 5.33 19.7%
Singapore 6.99 0 21.6%
Columbia 42.84 12.53 0.02%
Malaysia 14.63 7.33 23.4%
Philipp ine 25.57 6.25 3.8%
Pakistan 59.68 13.41 10.9%
Chile 25.07 5.99 0%
Peru 29.54 8.62 1.3%
Bangladesh 162.68 16.98 1.0%
New Zealand 10.17 2.94 42%
Kuwait 100 4.60 0.02%
Vietnam 11.43 16.81 28.3%
Moro cco 41.26 21.45 15.8%
Dom . Rep. 34.95 7.19 0.8%
Member
Average
B inding
Average
Applied
Zero
Overhang
Tunisia 58.93 21.49 5.7%
Croatia 6.13 4.67 64.5%
Oman 12.44 4.60 8.9%
Uruguay 31.56 10.54 0.2%
Guatemala 42.40 5.52 0.1%
Costa R ica 43.29 6.43 2.0%
Sri Lanka 29.11 13.04 0.4%
Ecuador 21.79 11.92 9.0%
Panama 23.38 7.27 8.9%
Kenya 95.01 12.995 0.1%
El Salvador 36.88 7.05 2.3%
Trin . Tob. 55.61 7.19 1.3%
Jordan 16.34 11.13 28.8%
Bahrain 34.10 4.60 1.8%
Iceland 13.25 2.85 42.3%
Boliv ia 39.97 8.29 0%
Jamaica 49.73 7.35 0.5%
Honduras 31.94 5.55 1.8%
Ghana 92.57 13.07 0%
Gabon 21.37 17.85 0.2%
Mauritius 104.88 3.09 7.7%
Georgia 7.20 1.03 28.1%
A lbania 6.98 5.21 39.1%
N icaragua 40.70 5.57 1.9%
Madagascar 27.34 12.35 2.5%
Zambia 106.52 13.59 0%
Niger 44.57 12.02 9.5%
Moldova 6.73 4.38 63.3%
Mongolia 17.52 4.96 0.7%
Togo 80 12.02 0%
Belize 57.97 10.38 1.2%
Cap e Verde 15.79 10.29 15.4%
Guyana 56.80 10.73 1.4%
Note: Members are ranked based on their GDP in 2007.
80
T
ab
le
17
.
T
ar
i¤
B
in
di
ng
C
om
m
it
m
en
ts
an
d
M
ar
ke
t
P
ow
er
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
T
a
ri
¤
B
in
d
in
g
S
ec
to
rs
A
ll
S
ec
to
rs
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
W
T
O
m
em
b
er
s
(#
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(4
2
)
O
ri
g
in
a
l
(5
2
)
n
ew
(1
4
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(4
2
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(4
2
)
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
M
et
h
o
d
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
T
o
b
it
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Im
p
o
rt
sh
a
re
 0
:7
6


 0
:9
5


 0
:9
3

 0
:3
7

 0
:9
1


 0
:9
4

(0
:2
3
)
(0
:2
8
)
(0
:3
6
)
(0
:2
0
)
(0
:2
9
)
(0
:4
4
)
lo
g
(!
)
 0
:4
7


-0
:0
0
9
 0
:4
2
(0
:1
5
)
(0
:0
4
)
(0
:4
9
)
"
0
:0
1
 0
:0
1


0
:0
0
3
(0
:0
1
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
4
)
lo
g
 GD
P
C
a
p
it
a

 2
:0
0
 1
:8
5
 6
:9
5
 3
:3
8
0
:7
2
 1
0
:0
9

(3
:3
9
)
(3
:3
7
)
(4
:7
3
)
(3
:4
3
)
(3
:2
3
)
(4
:6
7
)
P
o
l.
In
st
a
b
il
it
y
5
:0
1

4
:8
0

3
:0
0
2
:8
3
5
:1
9


3
:8
3
(2
:0
4
)
(2
:0
0
)
(2
:6
2
)
(1
:5
1
)
1
:9
0
(3
:3
6
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
y
N
o
N
o
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
T
w
o
W
a
y
C
lu
st
er
in
g
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
o
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.0
1
7
1
0
.0
1
7
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
2
8
9
0
.0
1
6
0
0
.0
2
3
7
0
.2
0
3
2
0
.0
1
5
9
0
.0
3
9
0
#
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
4
7
7
4
2
2
2
8
4
8
1
6
0
5
0
1
7
0
6
4
9
5
7
8
3
2
2
1
0
1
0
7
4
4
4
3
3
7
6
3
5
1
6
0
7
N
ot
e:
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
co
un
tr
y
du
m
m
y.
81
T
ab
le
18
.
T
ar
i¤
O
ve
rh
an
g
an
d
M
ar
ke
t
P
ow
er
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
B
in
d
in
g
O
v
er
h
a
n
g
S
ec
to
rs
A
ll
S
ec
to
rs
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
W
T
O
m
em
b
er
s
(#
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(2
4
)
O
ri
g
in
a
l
(5
2
)
n
ew
(1
4
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(2
4
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(2
4
)
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
M
et
h
o
d
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
T
o
b
it
IV
T
o
b
it
T
o
b
it
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Im
p
o
rt
sh
a
re
 1
:7
3


 3
:7
3


 3
:6
5


 4
:4
5


 1
:6
1


 1
:9
4

(0
:5
2
)
(0
:9
5
)
(0
:9
2
)
(1
:5
9
)
(0
:5
2
)
(0
:4
9
)
lo
g
(!
)
 0
:4
1


-0
:1
5


-0
:1
3
(0
:0
6
)
(0
:0
4
)
(0
:1
6
)
"
0
:0
1

-0
:0
0
7

0
:0
1
(0
:0
0
6
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
1
)
lo
g
 GD
P
C
a
p
it
a

 1
:1
5
 0
:7
3
 5
:7
8
 2
:7
8
1
:2
8
 9
:3
7

(3
:6
5
)
(3
:6
1
)
(4
:8
8
)
(3
:4
8
)
(3
:5
0
)
(4
:8
2
)
P
o
l.
In
st
a
b
il
it
y
4
:5
0

3
:9
8

2
:0
7
2
:1
6
4
:8
9

3
:2
0
(2
:1
8
)
(2
:1
2
)
(2
:6
8
)
(1
:4
3
)
2
:1
1
(3
:3
5
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
y
N
o
N
o
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
T
w
o
W
a
y
C
lu
st
er
in
g
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
o
P
su
ed
o
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.0
1
9
1
0
.0
2
1
6
0
.1
2
9
4
0
.0
3
4
7
0
.0
2
2
5
0
.0
2
3
9
0
.2
0
6
3
0
.0
1
8
2
0
.1
5
6
3
#
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
4
7
7
4
2
2
2
8
4
8
1
6
0
5
0
1
7
0
6
4
9
5
7
8
3
2
2
1
0
1
0
7
4
4
4
3
3
7
6
3
5
1
6
0
7
N
ot
e:
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
co
un
tr
y
du
m
m
y.
82
T
ab
le
19
.
L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
of
T
ar
i¤
at
th
e
B
in
di
ng
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
Z
er
o
-O
v
er
h
a
n
g
D
u
m
m
y
S
ec
to
rs
A
ll
S
ec
to
rs
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
W
T
O
m
em
b
er
s
(#
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(4
2
)
O
ri
g
in
a
l
(5
2
)
n
ew
(1
4
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(4
2
)
A
ll
(6
6
)
A
ll
(4
2
)
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
M
et
h
o
d
P
ro
b
it
IV
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
IV
P
ro
b
it
IV
P
ro
b
it
IV
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
IV
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Im
p
o
rt
sh
a
re
0
:0
1
4


0
:0
3
7


0
:0
1
9


0
:1
2


0
:0
3
9


0
:0
2
3


(0
:0
1
)
(0
:0
2
)
(0
:0
2
)
(0
:0
9
)
(0
:0
3
)
(0
:0
3
)
lo
g
(!
)
0
:0
0
2

0
:0
0
1
 0
:0
0
(0
:0
0
1
)
(0
:0
0
1
)
(0
:4
9
)
"
-0
:0
0
0
:0
0
0
3

 0
:0
0
(0
:0
0
)
(0
:0
0
0
1
)
(0
:0
0
)
lo
g
 GD
P
C
a
p
it
a

0
:0
1
5
0
:0
0
8
0
:0
5
1


 0
:0
2
5
0
:0
0
6
0
:0
2
4
(0
:1
0
)
(0
:1
0
)
(0
:1
1
)
(0
:1
8
)
(0
:1
0
)
(0
:1
1
)
P
o
l.
In
st
a
b
il
it
y
 0
:0
4
9


 0
:0
4
5


 0
:0
1
9

 0
:0
2
 0
:0
4
5


 0
:0
4
4

(0
:0
6
)
(0
:0
6
)
(0
:0
7
)
(0
:1
1
)
(0
:0
0
)
(0
:0
8
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
y
N
o
N
o
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
T
w
o
W
a
y
C
lu
st
er
in
g
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
o
(P
su
ed
o
)
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.1
5
3
6
0
.1
8
9
1
0
.6
4
4
7
0
.3
5
0
7
0
.0
7
2
1
0
.1
9
7
5
0
.6
9
1
8
0
.1
4
4
4
0
.7
2
7
7
#
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
9
1
8
7
8
2
6
9
0
3
9
6
4
3
1
2
1
1
0
4
9
5
7
9
9
0
2
3
5
6
8
7
4
8
2
4
3
3
1
7
2
1
6
0
7
N
ot
e:
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
co
un
tr
y
du
m
m
y.
In
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
,
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
st
ro
ng
bi
nd
in
g
in
H
S
3-
di
gi
t
se
ct
or
s.
M
ar
gi
na
l
e¤
ec
t
is
re
p
or
te
d
in
th
e
pr
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
.
83
CHAPTER III
FIRM-LEVEL INVESTMENT AND EXPORT DYNAMICS
with Joel B. Rodrigue
Introduction
We develop a dynamic model of heterogeneous rms who make investment and
export decisions through time. Consistent with our data, it shows that new exporters in-
vest heavily in new capital as they enter and grow into export markets. Moreover, the
model emphasizes that rm-level investment and export decisions evolve endogenously with
rm-specic productivity and export demand shocks. We show that failing to account for
endogenous responses to di¤erential demand shocks across markets leads to biased pro-
ductivity estimates due to quasi-xed factors of production, such as capital stock. We
structurally estimate the model using detailed information on export and investment de-
cisions among Indonesian manufacturing rms. Allowing rms to endogenously invest in
new capital substantially improves the models ability to match numerous features of rm-
level data; namely: di¤erential investment and revenue growth rates across exporting and
non-exporting rms, the export entry and survival rates among new exporters, and the
distribution of new exporters across productivity and capital stock. Counterfactual exper-
iments assess the impact of trade liberalization and nancial reform on the evolution of
aggregate exports and investment over time.
Exporting rms are almost universally found to be larger, more productive, capital-
intensive and pay higher wages than their non-exporting counterparts. Not surprisingly,
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numerous countries have pursued development strategies that emphasize export promotion
with the purpose of creating and expanding rms with these desirable characteristics. Al-
though it is natural to expect new exporters to increase capital holdings as they expand
into export markets, little is known about the nature of rm-level investment dynamics
in relation to changes in export behavior. For instance, do new exporters begin investing
before entry or only once they have successfully penetrated export markets? Likewise, do
capital constrained rms forgo sales on domestic markets in order to enter new markets
abroad? What impact do investment costs have on the decision to export? Our aim is
to develop a model and estimation strategy to answer these questions within one coherent
framework.
It is well-known that rm-level investment in physical capital varies dramatically
within narrowly dened industries and this di¤erential behavior has important implications
for aggregate performance.1 Similarly, accounting for investment dynamics have proven
particularly important for capturing rm exit and asset accumulation in a developing coun-
try (Bond, Tybout and Utar, 2010). While these papers focus exclusively on the domestic
market, our model highlights the role that exports have on encouraging investment and,
likewise, the impact of costly investment on deterring rms from entering and maintaining
their presence in export markets.
Allowing rms to endogenously invest in new capital substantially improves the
models ability to match numerous features of rm-level data have proven di¢ cult for mod-
ern models of rm-level trade to match. Specically, the endogenous capital adjustment
model rationalizes why many new exporters are small (underinvestment prior to exporting),
why export revenues grow rapidly over the rst few years of initial exporting (rapid new
1See Doms and Dunne (1994), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power
(1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), among others.
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investment upon initial entry), why domestic revenue grows more slowly among new ex-
porters (capital-constraints) and why there is strong rm-level persistence in export status
(irreversible investment in capital holdings). Remarkably, the model is able to replicate
these features of rm-level behavior even though this information is not used to estimate
the model parameters. Recent contributions by Luttmer (2007) and Arkolakis (2010a) ar-
gue that rm-level selection across markets and productivity growth can account for exit,
entry and revenue dynamics in domestic markets, exports markets or both. Our model pro-
vides an alternative explanation for rm-level selection and growth in new markets, costly
investment and the gradual accumulation of capital.2
We follow a rich literature studying the impact of rm-level decisions on export
dynamics. Constantini and Melitz (2008), Ederington and McCalman (2008), Atkeson and
Burstein (2010), Lileeva and Treer (2010), Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) and Bustos (2011)
study the impact of rm-level innovation on productivity evolution and exporting over time.
Similarly, a number of recent papers recognize the role of increasing marginal costs, often
justied by a xed capital input, in determining rm-level trade outcomes. For example,
Ruhl and Willis (2008), Nguyen and Schaur (2011), Cosar, Gunar and Tybout (2011),
Vannoorenberghe (2012) and Ahn and McQuoid (2012) suggest that allowing for increasing
marginal costs are key to capturing sales correlation across markets or export dynamics.3
Our model links exporting and investment through three mechanisms. First, the
return to investment depends on the rms current decision to export. Second, we allow that
marginal costs may depend on the rms capital stock and, as such, previous investment
2Riano (2011) has calibrated a related model of rm-level investment and exporting in Columbia. His
model does not account for convex and non-convex for capital adjustment costs or the impact the export
demand shocks have on productivity estimation. Moreover, Riano (2011) focusses on the impact of exporting
on rm-level volatility while we emphasize the impact on rm dynamics and the impact that allowing for
capital accumulation has export and investment growth through time.
3Similarly, Soderbery (2011) presents a model with constant marginal costs and a constant rm-level
production capacity to capture the sales correlation across markets.
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decisions. Third, in an environment where rms incur one-time sunk export costs, current
export and investment decisions depend on the rms export history. Investment in capital
holdings expands rm capacity and allows for complex intertemporal trade-o¤s between
endogenous investment and export decisions. A key distinction between our model and
those that precede it is we allow rms to make a continuous investment decision rather than
simply a binary choice between investing and non-investing. Further, our model includes
for both convex and non-convex investment costs and allows us to capture the extent to
which investment frictions deter entry into export markets.
In our framework, as in much of the preceding literature, both export and in-
vestment are direct functions of the heterogeneous productivity and export demand shocks
which evolve over time. A key step in our exercise is the estimation of rm-level productiv-
ity. Previous methods to estimate rm-level productivity tend to focus on a single market
when developing productivity estimates and abstract away from the fact that rms may face
di¤erent sets of shocks in di¤erent markets. In line with Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2011),
we argue that failing to account for heterogeneous demand shocks across markets will likely
lead to biased productivity estimates in export-oriented industries. We develop a method
to consistently estimate rm-level productivity in this context which can be applied to most
rm-level manufacturing data sets. In particular, our method needs to allow for di¤erential
shocks across markets and rms which evolve over time. A key insight of our method is
that we are able to exploit di¤erential export behavior over time to simultaneously iden-
tify rm-level productivity and the shape of the marginal cost function. Further, we show
ignoring these e¤ects has a sizable impact on estimated production function coe¢ cients;
among the Indonesian manufacturing industries under study the capital share coe¢ cient
falls substantially across industries (8-32 percentage points). This is particularly important
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for productivity estimation: our productivity estimates suggest that accounting for di¤er-
ential shocks across markets increases productivity estimates for small, capital constrained
rms. We nd that new exporters, who are often small, and build capital holdings slowly
over time, and often mistakingly characterized as generally unproductive. Our ndings
suggest that standard estimates of rm-level productivity are downwards biased for new
exporters by 14-15 percent across industries. While numerous papers nd that most new
exporters are small and unproductive (e.g. Arkolakis 2010b), we conclude that largely new
exporters are small, but very productive.
We structurally estimate the models parameters using detailed information on
rm-level investment and export decisions among Indonesian manufacturing rms. The
models parameters are estimated using indirect inference and the estimated model matches
average investment and export behavior across heterogeneous rms. We nd that allowing
for investment costs drastically reduces the estimated size of export entry costs by 83-94
percent. Further, although numerous papers suggest that xed export costs are a key
factor in determining export entry and persistence, we use simulation methods to argue
that these costs are likely to have a relatively small role in determining rm entry decisions
and dynamics in export markets.
We use the simulated model to study the impact of trade liberalization or nancial
reform on aggregate export and investment behavior. We nd that a 10 percent increase
in export market size leads to a 5-9 percent increase in aggregate exports relative to the
benchmark model after 10 years. Further, our simulations suggest that the contribution
of new exporters, or the extensive margin of export growth, is very sensitive to model
specication.4 In contrast, we nd that trade liberalization has a relatively small impact
4The contribution of the extensive margin to aggregate exports is studied in Evenett and Venables (2002),
Hummels and Klenow (2002), Ruhl (2003), Alelssandria and Choi (2007), Kehoe and Ruhl (2009), Arkolakis
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on aggregate investment since only a relatively small number of large rms export in both
the benchmark and counterfactual experiments.
We also study the impact of nancial reform. We nd that reducing investment
costs by 10 percent has a small impact on aggregate exports initially, but after 10 years
the aggregate export growth rate are 5-12 percentage points higher than the benchmark
model. Consistent with the evidence in Manova (2010) we nd that this e¤ect is particularly
strong in industries where capital-constraints are most severe. Moreover, 10 years after the
reduction in investment costs aggregate investment remains 24-28 percent higher than the
baseline model and exporters account for 9-10 percent of the annual investment growth.
The next two sections present our model of investment and exporting and describe
the data we use to estimate rm-level productivity and the models structural parameters.
Sections 3 and 4 describe the estimation methodology and present the results. The fth
section discusses the policy implications of our work and the sixth section concludes.
The Model
We rst consider the production and investment environment for each rm. Each
rm produces according to a Cobb-Douglas production function qjt = e!jtk
k
jt l
l
jt where q is
the rms total production, ! is rm-specic productivity and k and l are rm js current
holdings of capital and variable inputs, respectively. We assume that variable inputs can
be freely adjusted each period, but investment in physical capital only becomes productive
the year after the initial investment. The time-to-build" assumption is common in micro-
models of rm-level investment (see Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) or Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) for examples), but will be particularly important for rms in our context
(2010b), and Alessandria and Choi (2011).
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since they will not be able to immediately adjust to within-period shocks to productivity
or demand. We discuss the rms investment decision in more detail below.
We can write rm js short-run marginal cost function as:
ln cjt =   lnl   k
l
ln kjt   1
l
!jt + lnwt +
1  l
l
ln qjt (III.1)
where wt is a set of relevant variable input prices and qjt is the target, prot-maximizing
level of output. Note that if l = 1 the model exhibits short-run constant marginal costs and
the marginal cost function does not depend on target output. This assumption is common
in both theoretical models of heterogeneous rms and trade and empirical applications.5
Equation (III.1) implies that rms with larger capital stocks incur lower marginal costs,
ceteris paribus. This implies that across two equally productive rms, the rm with the
larger capital stock will produce at a lower cost and, as such, the rm with the larger capital
stock to be more likely to export.
Firms also incur costs when they choose to invest. We write the rms investment
cost function, C(ijt; kjt), as
C(ijt; kjt) =  0ijt +  1

ijt
kjt
2
kjt +  21[ijt > 0] (III.2)
where ijt is the rm-level choice of investment, and  0 and  1 are investment cost parame-
ters capture the convex adjustment costs of investment in Indonesia, and 1[] is an indicator
function. Fixed investment costs are captured by  2 which is drawn from the distribution
G . Fixed investment costs represent the need for rm restructuring and are intended to
capture indivisibilities in capital, increasing returns to the installation of new capital and
increasing returns to retraining and restructuring of production activity. Both convex and
5See Melitz (2003), Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and Manova (2011) for theoretical models with constant
marginal costs and Kasahara and Lapham (2007), Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011), Rodrigue and Soumonni
(2011) for examples of empirical models with constant marginal costs.
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non-convex parameters have been found to be important for capturing rm-level investment
dynamics in the US (c.f. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis
(2010)). However, we are not aware of any work that has attempted to capture the nature
of these costs in a developing country context.
We maintain standard assumptions regarding the structure of domestic and export
markets (see Melitz (2003) for an example). Both markets are assumed to be monopolisti-
cally competitive, but segmented from each other so that rms will not interact strategically
across markets. Firm j faces the domestic demand curve qDjt at home and export demand
curve qXjt abroad:
qDjt = Q
D
t (p
D
jt=P
D
t )
 = Dt (p
D
jt)
  (III.3)
qXjt = Q
X
t (p
X
jt=P
X
t )
ezjt = Xt (p
X
jt)
 ezjt
where QDt , Q
X
t , P
D
t and P
X
t are the industry aggregate output and price indices, 
D
t and
Xt are demand aggregates,  is the (constant) elasticity of demand, p
D
jt and p
X
jt are the
prices chosen in each market and zjt is a shock to rm js export demand in year t.6
Data limitations require a number of assumptions. First, we assume that each rm
is a separate organizational entity and that each rm produces a single output which can
be sold at home or abroad.7 Second, there are two sources of short-run cost heterogeneity:
di¤erences in rm-level capital stocks and productivity. We allow marginal costs to vary
with rm-level output and, as such, demand shocks in one market will a¤ect the static
output decision in the other market (and requires us to model revenue and prots in each
market jointly).
6The assumption of rm specic export demand shocks are is common in this literature. This feature
allows the model to capture heterogeneity in export intensity across rms.
7The rst part of this assumption will not be too restrictive. Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2008) report
that 95% of the plants in the Indonesian manufacturing census are separate organizational entities.
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Firm j decides whether or not to export and sets the price for its output in each
market to maximize the discounted sum of domestic and export prots. The optimal do-
mestic market price pDjt implies that the log of domestic market revenue r
D
jt is:
ln rDjt =  ( + 1)[ t + k ln kjt   (1  l) ln(1 + Xt ezjt)djt + !jt] (III.4)
where  is a function of the elasticity of substitution and the variable input share parameter,
 = [( + 1)l   ] 1. The parameters  t and Xt capture all of the terms which do not
vary across rms,
 t = l ln

lwt
 + 1

+
ln Dt
 + 1
Xt =
Xt
Dt
;
where wt and Xt capture variable input prices and the relative size of the home and foreign
markets, respectively.8 We dene djt to be binary choice variable that takes a value of 1 if
the rm exports and zero otherwise. In contrast to standard heterogeneous rms and trade
models with constant marginal costs the last term in equation (III.4) implies that domestic
revenue is a function of the rms decision to export if l 6= 1. Examining this term we see
that the assumption of constant marginal costs will be most damaging when rms charge
low mark-ups ( is large in absolute value), foreign markets are relatively big (Xt and zjt
are large) and when the absolute value of l is far from 1.
Firms that choose to export also earn the revenue from export sales
ln rXjt = ln r
D
jt + ln 
X
t + zjt (III.5)
which is the export counterpart to the domestic revenue function (III.4). The export specic
demand shock zit captures the di¤erence in export intensities across exporting rms with
similar productivity levels.
8The coe¢ cient Xt captures industry-wide variation in export demand.
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Firm-specic productivity captures various sources of heterogeneity, and as such,
it is important to interpret their e¤ects cautiously. Specically, !it captures any source
of rm-level heterogeneity that a¤ects the rms revenue in both markets; this may be
product quality, for example, but we will refer to it as productivity. Similarly, the export
shock captures any sources of rm heterogeneity specic to the export market.9
The structure of the model allows us to calculate gross short-run operating prot
for both exporters and non-exporters before investment costs are paid as
jt =  

1


rDjt(
D
t ;
X
t ; kjt; djt; !jt; zjt) (III.6)
Short-run operating prots are implicitly observable with data on revenue in each market
and will be important for determining the export and investment decisions developed in the
dynamic model below.
Transition of the State Variables
Consider the evolution of capital stock, productivity, export demand shocks and
the state variables Dt and 
X
t over time. The models time-to-build" assumption is em-
bedded in the evolution of the rms capital stock
kjt = (1  )kjt 1 + ijt 1 (III.7)
where ijt 1 is the rms total investment in physical capital in period t   1 and  is the
per-period depreciation rate on physical capital.
We assume that productivity evolves over time as a Markov process that depends
9Without the export shock the model predicts that all rms with the same productivity level should
export the same amount. This prediction is easily rejected in the data. Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2011)
and Rodrigue and Soumonni (2011) demonstrate that export demand shocks vary widely across rms and
are important determinants of rm-level behaviour. As in the preceding literature we include the export
shock to capture this feature of the data.
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on the rms participation in the export market, and a random shock:
!jt = g(!jt 1) + jt (III.8)
= 0 + 1!jt 1 + jt
The stochastic element of productivity evolution is captured by jt  N(0; 2). Note
that the stochastic element of productivity is carried forward into future periods.10 We
also assume that the export demand shock evolves according to the following rst-order
Markov-process:
zjt = zjt 1 + jt
where jt  N(0; 2). The persistence in z captures factors such as the nature of the rms
product, the set of countries they export to, long-term contractual or reputation e¤ects that
lead to persistence in the demand for its exports over time. Last, we treat the aggregate
state variables ln Dt and ln 
X
t as exogenous rst-order Markov processes.
Dynamic Export and Investment Decisions
We next consider the rms dynamic decisions to export and invest. We assume
that the rm rst observes the xed and sunk costs of exporting, Fjt and 
S
jt, and decides
whether or not to export in the current year. The export costs are assumed to be iid
draws from the joint distribution G . As documented in Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007),
Alessandria and Choi (2011) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) export xed and sunk cost
parameters are often estimated to be large in magnitude and important determinants of
rm-level export behavior. After making its export decision, the rm observes the xed
10We have also tried including a learning-by-exporting term in this equation. However, since it was never
estimated to be signicantly di¤erent from zero, we chose to remove it from the model.
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cost of investment this period,  2jt, and decides how much to invest in the current year.
11
Denote the value of rm j in year t before it observes xed or sunk costs by Vjt:
Vjt(sjt) =
Z
max
djt
fjt(sjt; djt = 1)  djt 1Fjt   (1  djt 1)Sjt + V Ejt (sjt);
jt(sjt; djt = 0) + V
N
jt (sjt)gdG (III.9)
where sjt = (!jt; zjt; kjt; djt 1;Dt ;Xt ) is a vector of state variables, and V Ejt and V
N
jt are
the value of an exporting or non-exporting rm, respectively, after it makes its optimal
investment decision. Note that if the rm chooses to export, we allow for the possibility
that xed cost associated with initial entry Sjt may be drawn from a di¤erent distribution
than those for subsequent entries, Fjt.
The value of investment can in turn be characterized as:
V Ejt (sjt) =
Z
max
ijt
fEtVjt+1(sjt+1jdjt = 1; ijt)  C(ijt; kjt)gdG 
for exporting rms and
V Njt (sjt) =
Z
max
ijt
fEtVjt+1(sjt+1jdjt = 0; ijt)  C(ijt; kjt)gdG 
for non-exporting rms where  is the discount factor, C(ijt; kjt) captures both the convex
and non-convex costs of capital adjustment in (III.2), and the rms expected value is
EtVjt+1(sjt+1jdjt; ijt) =
Z
D0
Z
X0
Z
z0
Z
!0
Vjt+1(s
0)dF (!0j!jt; djt)dF (z0jzjt)
dG(X0jXt )dG(D0jDt )
If the rm does not choose to invest (ijt = 0) we would expect the rms capital
stock to fall and the rms marginal costs of production to rise next period. Conversely,
11An alternative assumption is that the export and investment decisions are made simultaneously. While
this leads to a similar model, the computational di¢ culty of estimating this model is substantially greater.
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if the rm invests enough to increase its capital stock in period t + 1 the rms marginal
costs will fall. The rst-order condition for the investment decisions for either exporters or
non-exporters can be written as
 0 + 2 1

ijt
kjt

= Et
@Vjt+1(sjt+1jdjt; ijt)
@ijt
(III.10)
The left side of (III.10) is the marginal cost of adjustment and is independent of the rms
export decision or history.12 The right side is the expected marginal gain and includes the
e¤ects on both the intensive (the amount of investment) and extensive margins (whether to
invest or not).13 The expected marginal gain from investment clearly depends on the rms
export decision. By entering export markets, rms raise the marginal value of capital and in
turn encourage greater investment. Note, however, that if the rm initially carried a small
capital stock, as many new exporters do, it is unlikely that they will optimally choose to
jump immediately to a new larger capital stock due to convex adjustment costs.14 Rather
we would expect that small exporters will optimally choose to expand their capital holdings
over several years.
Similarly, the net benet to exporting, conditional on investment, can be described
by the value functions. We can write the marginal benet from starting to export, MBE,
12While it is conceivable that rms with longer export histories may be able to secure cheaper credit for
investment we do not consider this possibility here.
13The RHS of (III.10) ignores the e¤ects of ijt on the probability of adjustment since the e¤ect of capital
adjustment on the probability of adjustment is evaluated just at a point of indi¤erence between adjusting and
not adjusting. For each ijt there are values of !jt which bound adjustment and non-adjustment. Variation
in ijt does inuence these boundaries, but since the boundaries are points of indi¤erence between adjustment
and non-adjustment, there is no further e¤ect on the value of the objective function. See Cooper, Haltiwanger
and Willis (2010) for further discussion.
14While it is beyond the scope of this paper to detail all of these patterns across heterogeneous rms
and industries, we refer the interested reader to Rho and Rodrigue (2012) for further broad, reduced-form
evidence on the nature of capital holdings among new exporters over time.
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for any rm as:
MBEjt = jt(sjt; djt = 1)  jt(sjt; djt = 0)  djt 1Fjt   (1  djt 1)Sjt| {z }
Initial Gain/Loss
+V Ejt (sjt)  V Djt (sjt)| {z }
Future Gain/Loss
(III.11)
It is often assumed that rms incur initial losses on export decisions due to large sunk costs
associated with entering those markets. These decisions are nonetheless justied by a large
enough stream of future export sales. Here, we allow that the export decision may a¤ect
the initial gain (or loss) through sunk costs, investment costs and forgone domestic sales.
Conversely, equation (III.11) suggests that rms with large capital stocks that su¤er a fall
in demand on the domestic market (measured as a fall in productivity here), may nd it
optimal to enter export markets given their excess capacity.
The Data
Data Source and Construction
The primary source of data is the Indonesian manufacturing census between 1990
and 1995. Collected annually by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Budan Pusat Statistik
(BPS), the survey covers the population of manufacturing plants in Indonesia with at least
20 employees. The data captures the formal manufacturing sector and record detailed plant-
level information on over 100 variables covering industrial classication, revenues, capital
holdings, new investment in physical capital, intermediate inputs, and export sales. Data
on revenues and inputs are deated with wholesale price indices.15
15Price deators are constructed as closely as possible to Blalock and Gertler (2004) and include separate
deators (1) output and domestic intermediates, (2) energy, (3) imported intermediates and (4) export sales.
Further details can be found in the online appendix available at https://my.vanderbilt.edu/joelrodrigue.
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Key to our analysis the data also include a measure of the market value of capital
holdings along with the value of new investment in each year. Specically, the data con-
tain annual observations on the estimated replacement value of xed capital, purchases of
new investment and capital sales across ve type types of capital: land, buildings, vehicles,
machinery and equipment, and other capital not classied elsewhere. The capital stock
and investment series are created by aggregating data across types. Following Blalock and
Gertler (2004) we deate capital using a wholesale price indices for construction, imported
electrical and non-electrical equipment and imported transportation equipment. To con-
struct the capital stock deator we weight each price index by the average reported shares
of buildings and land, machinery and equipment and xed vehicle assets, respectively. In
years following 1990 we use the perpetual inventory method to construct a measure of
capital holdings as
kjt+1 = (1  )kjt + ijt (III.12)
where  is the industry-specic, average depreciation rate reported in the data.16
Because the Indonesian manufacturing sector covers a wide scope of industries,
we choose to focus on two specic industries so industrial di¤erences do not contaminate
16The depreciation rate, , varies between 0.117 and 0.118 over the industries we study. These estimates
are very close to those reported in Schündeln (2011) who studies depreciation rates among Indonesian
manufacturers over a similar period. Our data do contain annual estimates of the rms holdings of capital
stock. However, since these estimates are determined by asking rm managers for the estimated replacement
value of existing capital, year to year variation in this capital measure will potentially su¤er from severe
measurement error over time. To examine this issue we construct a measure for the log error in the capital
evolution process
kjt = ln(~kjt+1   (1  )~kjt   ijt) (III.13)
where  is the industry-specic average reported depreciation rate reported in the data and ~k is the year-
to-year reported market value of capital. We nd that the variance of this error process is often large even
within narrowly-dened industries. For example, in the plastics industry the standard deviation of kjt is 25
percent of the mean value of log capital. Similarly, the standard deviation of kjt is 31 percent of the mean
value of log capital in the fabricated metals industry. Investment data, in contrast, is likely to be measured
precisely since the market value of new investment can be obtained directly from purchase receipts. After
constructing our series by the perpetual inventory method we compare the constructed distribution of capital
with that from the survey data. We nd that these are nearly identical in each year.
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our estimates. Specically, we estimate the structural model using data from the plastic
products (ISIC code 356) and fabricated metals (ISIC code 381) industries. We choose
these two industries as they represent typical industries in a developing country, but have
very di¤erent capital-intensity. The plastics industry includes plastic dinnerware, mats,
containers, tubes and similar products. The fabricated metals industry includes cutlery,
hand tools, hardware, metal furniture, xtures and like products. In each industry we
follow a balanced panel of continuing rms over time. Our main samples follow 343 and 302
rms in the plastics and fabricated metals industries between 1990 and 1995, respectively.17
Sample Moments
Figure 7 presents the rm-level distribution of investment rates, new investment
divided capital stock, in both industries and across export status. In each case the invest-
ment rate distributions have a substantial mass at zero, fat tails, and are highly skewed
to the right. However, it is clear that the percentage of exporting rms which are actively
investing and the average size of the capital increases are much larger among exporting
rms relative to non-exporters. The main features of the investment distributions are sum-
marized in Table 20.18 In each industry we compute the variable input share as the ratio of
total variable inputs (wages, materials, electricity, fuel) to total sales. Of the two industries
we examine the variable input share is substantially larger among fabricated metal produc-
ers, on average. Further, investment rates and frequencies are also larger in the fabricated
metals industry.
17Our data includes information on export status, inputs and revenues in 1989 which allows us to construct
the rms initial conditions in 1990. Further, we stop our sample in 1995 for two reasons. First, the
Indonesian manufacturing survey does not report physical investment in 1996. Second, in 1997-1998 the
Asian crisis hits Indonesia which greatly altered the nature and composition of exporting and investment in
Indonesia.
18A expanded set of summary statistics and documentation of macroeconomic trends are available in the
online appendix available at: https://my.vanderbilt.edu/joelrodrigue.
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In either industry we observe sharp di¤erences between exporters and non-exporters.
Consistent with the evidence presented in Rho and Rodrigue (2012) we nd that exporters
are almost twice as likely to invest in new capital than the average rm and, among those
that invest, exporting rms are increasing the size of their capital holdings more than twice
as fast.
The last two rows examine the correlation between exporting and investment. We
observe current export and investment status are positively correlated, but the correlation
coe¢ cient ranges between 0.14 and 0.22. If we restrict our attention to rms that both
investing and exporting in the same year, we observe that the correlation coe¢ cient on the
log of export sales and the log of net investment rises to 0.28-0.29.19
Although we observe some positive contemporaneous association between invest-
ment and export behavior, it is plausible that rms would optimally choose to build up
capital stock before penetrating export markets (or wait until they have successfully entered
export markets to invest in new capital). Table 21 presents an investment and exporting
transition matrix for each industry. In either industry we observe that among non-exporting
rms, those which were actively building up capital stock in the previous year are 2.0-2.5
times more likely to export in the subsequent year. Similarly, non-investing exporters are
1.2-2.5 times more likely to invest in physical capital in subsequent years relative to rms
that dont engage in either activity.
While Tables 20 and 21 suggest an inherent complementarity between investment
and exporting, it is unclear to what extent these are determined by each other or other
factors. For instance, both investment and exporting highly persistent activities, possibly
reecting the persistence in unobservable, rm-level productivity. We explore these issues
19As discussed below, in our data approximately 10 percent of rms export in each year and industry.
Likewise, 27-39 percent of rms are actively investing in physical capital in any year.
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below.
Estimating Firm-Level Productivity and Marginal Costs
It is well-known that rm-level productivity is an important determinant of export
and investment decisions and, as such, it is important that we recover reliable estimates
of each rms productivity series. To do this we draw on the control-function literature
pioneered by Olley and Pakes (1996). Below we specify precisely how we recover estimates
of rm-level productivity that we will later use to structurally estimate the models dynamic
parameters.
We begin by rst recovering an estimate of the mark-up. Since optimal prices
in this environment can be expressed as a mark-up over the rms marginal cost we can
multiply both sides of the pricing equation by total quantity sold to reveal the following
relationship between revenues, rjt, and total variable costs, vjt:
vjt = lqjtcjt
= l

1 +
1


rjt + "jt = rjt + "jt (III.14)
where the error term "it captures measurement error in total variable cost and l captures
the share of variable inputs in production. In our data we use the sum of total wages,
intermediate material costs and energy expenditures as a measure of total variable costs.
With this estimate in hand, we proceed to estimate rm-level productivity. Recall
that the domestic revenue function is
ln rDjt =  ( + 1)[ t + k ln kjt   (1  l) ln(1 + Xt ezjt)djt + !jt] + ujt
where we have added an iid error term to equation (III.4). Using our denition of  and
101
the estimate of  from equation (III.14) we can rewrite the composite error term as20
  1
l


   1

(!jt  
 
1  l) ln(1 + Xt ezjt)djt

+ ujt
Here the composite error includes both an iid component and two rm-specic, time varying
components: productivity and export-demand. As in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) we note that input demand is an increasing function of either unobservable
and rewrite unobserved productivity and export demand components as a non-parametric
function of observables that are correlated with them. A key di¤erence, and challenge, in
our context is that we have two unobserved components to separately identify. We use
rm-level material, mjt, and electricity, njt, demand as proxies for productivity and export
demand and rewrite domestic revenue as
ln rDjt = %0 +
TX
t=1
%tDt  
1
l


   1

[k ln kjt   (1  l) ln(1 + Xt ezjt)djt + !jt] + ujt
= %0 +
TX
t=1
%tDt + f(kjt;mjt; njt) + vit (III.15)
where %0 is a constant, Dt is a set of year dummies and we approximate f() by a fourth
order polynomial of its arguments. The essence of the above method is that the function
f() captures the combined e¤ects of capital, productivity and export demand on domestic
revenue.
We rst estimate (III.15) by OLS, recover an estimate of the composite term, '^jt
and construct a productivity series for each rm. Specifcally, tted value of the f(), '^it,
captures
1
l


   1

(
 
1  l) ln(1 + Xt ezjt)djt   !jt   ak ln kjt

(III.16)
20To see this recall that  = l=(   l) and insert this into ( + 1) = ( + 1)=[( + 1)l   ].
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which is a function of capital, productivity and export demand. Inserting 'jt into (III.8) we
can write the following equation of the capital, export demand and the composite residual
'^jt =
0
l
+
k
l
ln kjt   1  l
l
ln(1 + Xt e
zjt)djt
+1

'^jt 1  
k
l
ln kjt 1   1  l
l
ln(1 + Xt e
zjt 1)djt 1

+ jt (III.17)
where the asterisk indicates that the variable is scaled by =(   1).
We cannot yet take equation (III.17) to the data since we will not be able to
identify the parameters on the productivity process without knowledge of the unobservable
zjt or the parameter Xt whenever the rm chooses to export. Fortunately, equation (III.5)
suggests that we can rewrite the unobserved export demand shock as of the observed rm-
level export intensity in years the rm chooses to export
zjt = ln
 
rXjt
rDjt
!
  ln Xt ) z^jt  ln(1 + Xt ezjt)djt = ln
 
rTjt
rDjt
!
(III.18)
where rTjt = r
D
jt + r
X
jt .
21 An advantage of our method is that we can construct z^jt for both
exporters and non-exporters since the theoretical export intensity term in the productivity
equation, ln(1 + Xt e
zjt)djt, always takes a value of 0 whenever the rm does not export
(regardless of the value of zjt).22 Substituting equation (III.18) into equation (III.17) we
can then write the estimating equation as
'^jt =
0
l
+
k
l
ln kjt   1  l
l
z^jt + 1

'^jt 1  
k
l
ln kjt 1   1  l
l
z^jt 1

+jt (III.19)
21Readers may be concerned that domestic revenues may not always be positive. However, in our sample
all rms always report positive domestic sales.
22A second concern may arise from the fact that z^jt is a function of the error term ujt in equation (III.15).
However, our data reports the total value of sales rTjt and percentage of sales from exports, X from which
we construct domestic and export revenues. As such, any log linear measurement error is total sales will be
proportional to the measurement error in domestic sales. Let ~rTjt represent the true value of total sales so
that our observed value is then rTjt = ~r
T
jte
~ujt and ~ujt is an iid error term. Since rDjt = Xr
T
jt = X~r
T
jte
~ujt (or
alternatively since ujt = ln(X) + ~ujt), it follows that the ratio of rTjt=r
X
jt = 
 1
X and z^jt is independent of
~ujt.
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To estimate the productivity process we will also need the following relatively mild
assumptions:
Assumption 1
The rm makes its export decision before hiring variable inputs.
There are no period-to-period adjustment costs in variable inputs.
Under these conditions the input demand for materials or electricity will only
depend on the export shock among exporting rms. In particular, among non-exporters
mjt = mt(kjt; !jt)
njt = nt(kjt; !jt) if djt = 0 (III.20)
while among exporting rms
mjt = mt(kjt; !jt; zjt)
njt = nt(kjt; !jt; zjt) if djt = 1 (III.21)
This is crucial since we do not observe any information on export revenues, or export shocks,
in years when the rm does not export. Among non-exporters relative variation in inputs
will reect di¤erences in productivity alone. Because of this the inverted input demand
among non-exporters is a bijection in productivity. As illustrated in equation (III.21), it is
generally not true that input demand is a bijection in productivity alone among exporting
rms and, as such, we need to condition on the size of export demand shock in order to
isolate productivity.23
Our approach is similar to that in Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2011) who use
an investment proxy combined with measurements of export intensity to control for export
23As in cited papers above we are implicitly assuming that rms can observe, or reliably forecast, the
export demand shock.
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demand shocks when estimating a productivity series among Bangledeshi garment manu-
facturers. In their model (as in ours) the investment policy function will depend on the
export demand shock, even among non-exporters.24 Unfortunately, most rms in our data
do not export and their method is invalid if we do not observe export sales for all rms
in the data.25 Since static input demand should only reect the rms current export deci-
sion, our approach, though similar, is much less demanding of the rm-level data and more
appropriate to our economic environment.
A second interesting feature of our method worth highlighting relates to the fact
that we identify the shape of the marginal cost function o¤ of rm-level entry behavior
into export markets. This is in sharp contrast to much of the preceding literature which
estimates production or cost functions using data on rm inputs and total output alone.
Our method, though closely related to preceding control-function exercises, provides an
alternative identication strategy and represents an important robustness check for key
estimates in many economic models.
Clearly, estimating equation (III.19) by non-linear least squares will potentially
su¤er from endogeneity bias since the current decision to export and z^jt are functions of
rm-level productivity. As such, we follow Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) and form
the twelve moments to obtain our estimates of the production function and productivity
process. In particular, we assume that E[jtjXjt] = 0,
where Xjt = [kjt; k2jt; k
3
jt; kjt 1; k
2
jt 1; k
3
jt 1; z^jt 1; z^
2
jt 1; z^
3
jt 1; '^

jt 1; '^
2
jt 1; '^
3
jt 1].
We estimate equation (III.19) by GMM and recover the parameters governing
24Intuitively, the investment policy function will reect the rms export prospects over time and is a
function of zit.
25As noted in Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2011) productivity series cannot be determined if there are
zero values in investment or export sales. While these observations are rarely zero in their data, our data is
similar to many other rm-level data sets where we often observe zero values. For example, approximately 10
percent of rms report positive export sales in either industry. See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for further
discussion of the role of zero values in a similar context.
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the evolution of productivity and the shape of the marginal cost function. Using these
parameters we construct an estimated productivity series for each rm !j = (!j0; :::!jT )
where
!jt =
(1  )l

'^jt + (1  l)z^jt   k ln kjt: (III.22)
Note the productivity measure is increasing in export intensity, z^, and decreasing in capital
stock, k. The implication is that if two rms have the same level of domestic sales and the
same capital stock (export sales), but one has larger export sales (capital stock), then this
rm must be more (less) productive.
Structural Estimation
We estimate the remaining 8 model parameters by the indirect inference method
of Gourieroux et al. (1993) and Smith (1993). Our objective is to estimate the vector of
structural parameters,  = ( 0;  1;  2; 
F ; S ;X ; ; ), by matching a set of simulated
statistics, s, with a corresponding set of statistics derived from the data, d.
26 The re-
maining structural parameters correspond to the investment cost function parameters, the
export cost parameters, the export market size parameter and the parameters governing
the evolution of the rm-specic export demand shocks.27
The estimated structural parameters are those that minimize the weighted average
distance between the simulated statistics and the statistics from the data. Intuitively, since
26In contrast, to much of the literature on export dynamics we choose to pursue indirect inference instead
of likelihood based methods since the rms investment decision greatly complicates the construction of
any potential likelihood function. Specically, because investment is a continuous variable, solving for the
conditional choice probabilities while allowing a su¢ cient number investment choices greatly increases the
computational burden associated with estimating the model.
27Since Dt and 
X
t were almost always nearly constant over years we restricted these parameters to be
the same in all years, Dt = 
D and Xt = 
X , so as to simplify the estimation routines. We also set the
discount factor in the Bellmans equation ~ to 0.95 and omit it from the estimation routine.
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the set of simulated statistics rely on the underlying structural parameters, minimizing the
distance between the simulated and actual statistics provides consistent estimates of the
structural parameters under mild conditions. The indirect estimator  is dened as the
solution to the minimization of
^ = arg min

[d   s()]0W^ [d   s()]
where s() =
1
S
PS
n=1 sn(), n = 1; :::; S is an index of simulations and W is a weighting
matrix. We use the inverse of the covariance matrix of the data moments for the weight-
ing matrix where the covariance matrix is computed by bootstrapping over rms (with
replacement) in 1000 separate bootstrap samples. Since s() is not analytically tractable
the minimization is performed using numerical techniques. Given the discretization of the
state space and the potential for discontinuities in the model, we use a simulated annealing
algorithm to perform the optimization.
The statistics we match are listed in Tables 22 and 23. They include both OLS
regression coe¢ cients and summary statistics from the data. The rst four moments are
chosen to capture basic features of investment and export behavior in the data. The rst two
moment describe investment patterns in the data. In particular, the rst moment captures
the average number of rms which actively invest in any given year while the second is
the mean investment rate in the data. Analogously, moments three to six correspond to
moments describing export behavior. These include the mean frequency of exporting, the
fraction of current exporters who exported in the previous year, the mean level of export
sales among rms who export and the variance of log export intensity among exporting
rms.28
The second set of statistics are comprised of regression coe¢ cients from 3 separate
28Export intensity is measured as the ratio of export sales to domestic sales.
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OLS regressions:
ijt
kjt
= %0 + %1!jt + %2djt + 
k
jt (III.23)
!jt = &0 + &1djt + 
x
jt (III.24)
~zjt = #0 + #1zjt 1 + zjt (III.25)
where ~zjt = ln(rTjt=r
D
jt).
29 The variable ~zjt captures export intensity at the rm-level and
corresponds to export intensity term in the rms revenue equations ~z  ln(1 + Xt ezjt).
The rst equation (III.23) captures the relationship between investment, produc-
tivity and exporting. The second equation (III.24) captures the average productivity level in
the data and the mean productivity di¤erence between exporters and non-exporters in the
data. Even though we have already estimated the parameters of the productivity process,
this regression is useful in disciplining the models export and investment behaviour. In
particular, the magnitude of the export and investment costs determine the distribution
of exporters and, thereby, the observed productivity di¤erence between exporters and non-
exporters in any period. The third equation (III.25) captures the persistence in export
intensity which is inherently tied to the persistence export demand in the model. Our
model suggests that each rm will receive an export shock in each year, regardless of its
export decision. Naturally, we only observe information on export shocks in years when a
rm chooses to export. However, it is straightforward to simulate export demand shocks
for each rm in the simulated model. We then use these shocks in simulating the model,
constructing the simulated ~zjt measures for each rm and evaluating equation (III.25) on
the simulated data. Table 23 lists all of the regression coe¢ cients we focus on matching.30
29Recall that rTjt is the rms total revenues, r
T
jt = r
D
jt + r
X
jt . Also, we originally included a second order
productivity term, !2jt, in equation (III.23). Since it was always imprecisely estimated we dropped it from
our specication.
30Year dummies were excluded since they were generally insignicant and very small in magnitude.
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As noted above, the frequency of investment and the investment rate and among
investing rms is higher in the fabricated metals industry. Most of the export statistics are
very similar across industries with the exceptions of the persistence in export status and
the level of export intensity which are slightly higher in the plastic products industry. In
both industries exporting rms are associated with higher investment and productivity.
Estimating the model requires the discretization of the state space. We follow Rust
(1997) to discretize the state space for the unobserved state variables !jt and zjt using a 100
random grid points. We discretize capital stock and investment with 50 xed grid points
over the distribution of capital and investment respectively.31
Results
Mark-Ups, Productivity and Marginal Costs
The rst-stage parameter estimates governing mark-ups, the shape of the marginal
cost function and the evolution of productivity are reported in Table 24. We observe that
both industries are estimated to have nearly long-run constant returns to scale in production;
the sum of the share parameters k and l ranges between 0.86 and 0.87 across industries.
Nonetheless, if capital is a quasi-xed factor in the short-run the estimates suggest that we
should expect both industries to treat shocks in a manner that reects strongly increasing
marginal costs in the short-run. This is particularly true in the plastics industry where the
31Capital grid points are the mean capital level within every two percentiles of the capital distribution.
Similarly, the rst investment choice is set to 0 and remaining 49 choices are chosen by rst sorting the
positive investment data into 49 equally sized bins from smallest to largest and then choosing the mean
investment level in each bin as a grid point. The capital grid size is chosen in this fashion to minimize
computational requirements while allowing for depreciation to a¤ect that rms decisions. For instance, if
the capital grid points are chosen too coarsely it is possible that a rm will almost always remain in the
capital bin even if they dont invest anything. Naturally, this would broadly bias the results. We nd that
with 50 capital and investment grid points xed as above depreciation will lead rms to move to a lower
capital grid point if they choose not to invest.
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capital share, k, is relatively large and the variable input share, l, is relatively small.
The estimated parameter ^ is a function of both the market elasticity and the
variable input share. Together they imply that the elasticity of demand in the fabricated
metals industry  = l=( l) =  14:64 while the mark-up is estimated to be  1=(+1) =
0:07. Similarly, the implied elasticity parameter and mark-up are -5.8 and 0.21 in the plastic
products industries.32 In both industries productivity is estimated to be highly persistent
across rms. As such, we expect that highly productive rms are able to gain substantially
from export sales and will have a strong incentive to invest in new physical capital as they
expand into export markets.
For comparison, we repeat our experiment under the assumption that marginal
costs are constant in the short-run. In particular, we set l = 1 in each market and
repeat the estimation exercise described in section 2.3.33 Most of the models parameters
are estimated to be substantially di¤erent under the assumption of constant marginal costs.
In particular, we highlight an increase in the capital share parameter and an increase in
the estimated variance of the productivity shock process. Examining equation (III.19) it
is straightforward to see why we recover these results. Suppose initially that all rms are
non-exporters (so that djt = djt 1 = 0) and that recall that our estimate of '^t is invariant
to our assumption about the value of l. Assuming that l = 1 would not change the
variables in the estimating equation, only their interpretation. In fact, by overestimating
l, which is in the denominator of the rst two terms, we also cause k to be overestimated.
Of course, some rms do export and, as such, the estimates are likely to su¤er from
32These are well within the estimated range of mark-ups for manufacturing industries. See De Loecker
and Warzynski (2011) for an example.
33Strictly speaking for this exercise to be valid in this context we also need the additional assumption that
the productivity term does not a¤ect all inputs in a strictly Hicks neutral fashion as in Section 1. Only in
this case will the relative variation in inputs contain information of productivity separate from the export
demand shock. Nonetheless, this particular set of assumptions is uncommon in the literature. See Aw,
Roberts and Xu (2011) or Rodrigue and Soumonni (2011) for examples.
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omitted variable bias. However, since only 10 percent of rms export in either industry it
is plausible that the bias in the point estimates may be small. In fact, when we examine
the plastic products industry we observe that estimated coe¢ cient capital in column (2),
k = 0:660 (l = 1), is very similar to the capital coe¢ cient divided by the variable
input coe¢ cient in column (3), k=l = 0:347=0:513 = 0:676 as our model would predict.
Similarly, in the fabricated metals industry we observe that in column (4) the capital share
coe¢ cient under the constant marginal cost assumption is k = 0:130, while the ratio
of the capital share parameter to the labour share parameter in column (3) is k=l =
0:090=0:776 = 0:116. Simply accounting for increasing marginal costs explains the majority
of the estimated di¤erences across models.
A similar exercise provides an intuitive explanation for the di¤erence in the stan-
dard error in the productivity evolution equation, . By incorrectly assuming that l = 1,
the predicted residual in equation (III.19) will include variation from both the productivity
error term, jt, but also the export demand shocks among exporting rms, ln z^jt. As long
as these are not perfectly correlated with each other our model predicts the increase we
observe across models.
Last, this exercise helps clarify the identifying mechanism through which we are
able to capture the variable input share and the shape of the marginal cost function. Specif-
ically, we rely exclusively on the correlation between changes in domestic performance and
export performance.34 We are not aware of any other work which exploits this variation in
export status to identify the shape of the marginal cost curve.35 A key advantage in this
scenario is that we do not need to observe all the rms variable inputs (labour, materials,
34Nguyen and Schaur (2011), Soderbery (2011), and Vannoorenberghe (2012) use similar variation to
explain correlation between domestic and export sales.
35Ahn and McQuoid (2012) provide additional micro-evidence that conrm that capacity constrained
exporters in Indonesia tend to behave in a fashion which is consistent with increasing marginal costs.
111
fuel, energy, etc) or make strong assumptions regarding whether these are xed or variable
in nature when identifying the production function parameters.36
This di¤erence is not just a matter of empirical interest, but also has important
economic consequences. For instance, the omission of the export intensity term, z^jt, in the
productivity series (III.22) implies that any estimate of productivity is likely to be biased
downwards among exporting rms.37 We examine this issue by regressing productivity on
the log of capital and an export status dummy variable for productivity estimates from
both the increasing and constant marginal cost models:
!jt = 0 + 1 ln kjt + 2djt +  t + "jt (III.26)
where  t is a year-specic dummy variable. We nd that exporter productivity premium,
2, is underestimated by 14 and 15 percent in the fabricated metals and plastic products
industries, respectively. Previous work emphasizing that most new exporters tend to be
small and not particularly productive are likely to underestimate the productivity di¤erence
between exporting and non-exporting rms.38
Export Market Size, Export Costs and Investment Costs
The remaining structural parameters, estimated by indirect inference, are pre-
sented in Table 25. To fully illustrate the impact of omitting the dynamic capital adjust-
ment process on models of heterogeneous rms and trade we also repeat the second stage
36We do need to assume that any inputs which are xed in nature are used in a fashion which is com-
plementary to physical capital. For inputs such as skilled labor, which we might expect to behave like a
quasi-xed input, research also suggests that adjustments in skilled labour hires are likely to change in step
with capital holdings. See Krusell et al. (2000) for an example.
37A natural analogy exists among less structural estimates of productivity. For instance, numerous models
suggest that the distribution of productivity is closely tied to the distribution of domestic revenue across
rms (e.g. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011)). However, if domestic revenue tends to fall in the initial
years of export entry because of quasi-xed factors such as capital, exporting rms will appear smaller and
less productive than they would have otherwise.
38Full results available upon request. All coe¢ cients are signicant at the 5 percent level. See Arkolakis
(2010b) for an example of a model where most new exporters are both small and unproductive.
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estimation exercise in two restricted models. First, we re-estimate the model without any
capital dynamics and investment costs. In this case, rms are still subject to increasing
marginal costs. However, we assume that capital is xed over time. These restrictions
create an environment similar to those in Ruhl and Willis (2007), with the exception that
we allow rms to receive rm-specic export demand shocks. Second, we repeat this ex-
ercise assuming that the rm faces a constant marginal cost function in the short-run as
in Das, Roberts and Tybout (1997). To be consistent we use the rst-stage estimates and
productivity series generated under the same assumption.
We observe substantial di¤erences in the parameter estimates across industries
and models. Consider rst the sunk and xed costs of exporting which have received
substantial attention in the rm-level trade literature. The work horse model of rm-level
exporting with constant marginal costs (Model 3) predicts very large sunk entry costs to
export markets; the parameter S implies that the mean sunk cost draw is 51.5 and 92.9
million Indonesian rupiahs in the fabricated metals and plastics industries, respectively. It
is clear from Table 25 that sunk export costs are much lower in Models 1 and 2.39 Simply by
allowing rms to have an increasing marginal cost curve we observe that the estimated sunk
export costs fall to 15.5 and 7.5 million rupiahs; these represent an 83-85 percent reduction
in the rm-level sunk entry costs. Allowing capital adjustment cost reduces export entry
costs even further. We nd that under Model 1 S is estimated to be 3.3 and 6.8 million
Indonesian rupiahs in the fabricated metals and plastics industries, respectively. Relative to
the model with constant marginal costs, this represents a 93-94 percent decline in the export
entry cost parameter. As we will outline below, the smaller size of the sunk cost parameter
is indicative of the fact that it will have a much smaller role to play in determining rm-level
39These parameters will generally be greater than the average incurred export costs, since many rms
only export when the receive a low cost draw. We report incurred export costs below.
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outcomes over time.
The xed export cost parameter is similarly smallest in Model 1 and largest in
Model 3. The xed export costs largely help pin down the productivity di¤erence between
exporting and non-exporting rms. There are two forces at work here. On one hand, as
noted above, the productivity di¤erence between exporters and non-exporters is greater
under models with increasing marginal costs. This will tend to inate xed export costs in
order to keep too many low productivity rms from entering export markets. On the other
hand, the return from exporting is smaller since marginal costs increase with production,
at least in the short-run. Our results suggest that this second e¤ect dominates the rst. In
the plastics industry we observe that the mean xed export costs draw falls from 4.0 million
rupiahs in Model 3 to 1.0-1.1 million rupiahs in Models 1 and 2. Likewise, in fabricated
metals industry the mean xed export costs draw falls from 2.5 million rupiahs in Model 3,
2.1 million rupiahs in Models 2 and 1.0 million rupiahs in Model 1.
The third, fourth and fth parameters in Table 25, ,  and ln X , capture the
persistence of export demand shocks, the variation in export demand shocks and the relative
size of the export market, respectively. Intuitively, the rst two are identied by variation
in export intensity conditional on capital stock and productivity, while the third is pinned
down by the average size of export revenues relative to domestic revenues. Across models
there is substantial persistence in export demand and relatively large export demand shocks
across rms.40 Export markets are generally much smaller than domestic markets; across
models the size of export markets are estimated to be 5-8 percent of the domestic market
in the fabricated metals industry and 10-16 percent of plastics industry.
The last three parameters are the convex investment cost parameters ( 0,  1)
40As documented in Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2011) and Rodrigue and Soumonni (2011) export de-
mand shocks vary widely across rms and can be key determinants of export behavior.
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and the xed investment cost parameter ( 2). These parameters imply that investment is
quite costly in Indonesia. For the median level of capital holdings in the fabricated metals
industry, the cost of increasing capital holdings by 32.1 percent, the average investment rate
among investors, is 4.0 million Indonesian rupiahs before xed investment costs. This is
approximately 52 percent of the median total revenues among rms which choose to invest.
Nearly identical results are found in the plastics industry.
Although the above results suggest that investment is extremely costly in Indone-
sia, there are at least two reasons that this result is arguably reasonable. First, investment
is costly in Indonesia; prime lending rates among state and private banks were often well
above 20 or 30 percent per year between 1990 and 1995. Moreover, it is well established
that access to credit markets is particularly limited among small producers in developing
countries and loans are often characterized by interest several times higher than market
rates. Second, as suggested by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) new investment entails
costly disruptions to rm production. Among US producers they estimate that these costs
may be as much as 20 percent of total prots. In our context, we observe that among those
who invest, they tend invest at a much higher rate. Larger investments, in combination
with a weaker institutional environment, are likely to entail much larger disruption costs.
Numerous papers have suggested that the parameter  2 is a key parameter for
determining investment behavior. Estimates range from a high of 22 in Hayashi (1982)
to a low of 0.05 in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Our results are close to the Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006) estimates for the US economy in the fabricated metals industry, but
somewhat higher in the plastics industry. This is intuitive since the capital share parameter,
k, is relatively high in the plastics industry and constrained plastics producers will have
a relatively strong incentive to make larger investments. The model predicts relatively
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modest xed investment costs. Across industries the average xed investment cost draw
ranges from 10 to 53 thousand Indonesian rupiahs. The xed investment costs are roughly
1 to 2 percent of median total revenues across industries.
Although it is clear that adding capital adjustment signicantly changes the es-
timates of key parameters in a standard heterogeneous rms and trade model, it is not
obvious whether the estimates allow the model to better t the data. Moreover, the esti-
mates along do not provide a clear indication of the economic signicance of the change in
the models dynamics. We turn to these issues next.
Model Performance
We simulate all three models to assess their predictive ability relative to the ob-
served empirical patterns exporting, investment and productivity. We take each rms
initial year status (!j1; zj1; kj1; dj1) in our data as given and simulate the following 5 years
productivity shocks !it, export demand shocks zit, export costs F , S and xed investment
costs  1. We repeat the simulation exercise 100 times for each rm and report the average
of these simulations.
Estimated Investment and Export Moments
The rst set of moments we consider are those used to estimate the model. Tables
26 and 27 demonstrate that the model is able to capture the basic export and investment
patterns in both industries relatively well. In Table 26 we observe that there is more
persistence in export status in the data than in the model. Matching this feature has
often proved di¢ cult for heterogeneous rms and trade models and, as such, authors have
estimated di¤erent sunk costs for di¤erently-sized rms.41 We abstract from this possibility
41See Das, Roberts and Tybout (1997) or Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) for examples.
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here in order to focus on the interaction of investment and exporting.
Likewise, in Table 27 we nd that the investment rate is increasing in produc-
tivity in both the actual and simulated data. However, the coe¢ cient on productivity is
somewhat larger in the actual data relative to the simulated data. This plausibly reects
additional heterogeneity not captured by the model. For instance, it is likely that beyond
some productivity threshold highly productive rms gain better access to credit markets.
Since this is beyond the scope of the current study we leave this for future research. We
repeat this exercise for the models without capital adjustment. Since the models perform
similarly we relegate these results to the appendix.
Investment and Export Dynamics
In this section we consider the models ability to match investment behavior across
exporting and non-exporting rms. In particular, Figure 8 plots the average investment rate,
it=kt, in both the model and the data among new exporters and non-exporters. The dashed
blue and red lines represent the investment rates among exporting and non-exporting rms
in the data, respectively, while the solid blue and red lines capture the models predictions.
For clarity, note that we only study the surviving exporters in each year and non-exporting
rms that never choose to export. This is true both in the actual and simulated data.42
In each industry and for each type of rm we observe that the model matches the
data relatively well. Although the estimation exercise does try to match the mean di¤erence
in investment between exporters and non-exporters, our estimation routine does not exploit
any moments which capture the investment of new exporters over time. As expected we nd
that the investment rate among new exporters is well above that of non-exporting rms and
42Changing the selection of rms does not materially a¤ect the performance of the model, but does make
the gures harder to interpret.
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this is particularly true in the window immediately around the rms export entry date. In
the fabricated metals industry where both the model and the data suggest that investment
rates spike up the year before exporting and continue to be relatively high during the year
of initial entry. A similar pattern is found in the plastics industry, although the data
suggests that investment rates do not respond as strongly until rms enter export markets
in this industry. As expected the investment rate among fabricated metals producers is
substantially higher than that in the plastics industry. In both industries, investment rates
remain well above that of non-exporters for several years after initial entry into export
markets.
Non-exporting rms, in contrast, exhibit almost no change in their average in-
vestment behavior over time. Investment are relatively low and constant, suggesting that
investment activity among these rms is largely aimed at replacing depreciated capital. As
we study next, this di¤erential investment behavior has important implications for both
exit and entry decisions and observed patterns of revenue growth.
Exit and Entry Dynamics
It is well known that many new exporters are small and the average duration
of exporting is very short. At the same time, entry rates into exporting are low. These
features are prevalent in our data. Table 28 documents the average entry rate into exporting
over all years in our data, while Figure 9 plots the survival rate among new entrants into
exporting over time. Across industries the survival rate is lowest in the rst year after
entry reecting the fact that many rms exit immediately after entering export markets for
one year. After the rst year of exporting, the survival rate grows gradually as only rms
with greater productivity, capital holdings and export demand remain in export markets.
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Likewise, Table 28 shows that entry rates range between 3 and 4 percent across industries.43
Standard models of heterogeneous rms and trade are unlikely to be able to match
these features of the data. Large, sunk export entry costs create a strong incentive for new
entrants to remain in export markets beyond the initial year of entry. Reducing the size of
sunk entry costs can generate too much entry into export markets and a sharp reduction in
the persistence in exporting among later exporters. Moreover, as we will document later,
this will create distortions in the predicted productivity distribution of exporting rms.
Table 28 presents the predicted entry in both the actual and simulated data for all
three models. All models are able to capture this basic feature of the data reasonably well.
In contrast, Figure 9 shows that only the model with capital adjustment (Model 1) is able
to reasonably replicate the survival pattern of exporters over time. In both industries the
model with constant marginal costs, but no capital adjustment (Model 3), predicts only a
small decline after initial entry and a survival rate which is almost constant over time. Due
to large entry costs new entrants are generally large, productive and are very protable on
export markets. Moreover, when sunk costs are large even small rms are unwilling to exit
when facing relatively large export shocks in order to avoid paying the sunk entry cost in
the future.
The model with increasing marginal costs, but no capital adjustment (Model 2),
predicts larger initial exits than Model 3, but also cannot match the survival rate over time.
In the plastics industry smaller sunk costs make future entry less costly than in Model 3,
which encourages a larger number of rms to exit export markets immediately after initial
entry. However, the sunk and xed export costs are still large enough to prevent the model
from matching the observed exit rates, particularly in the initial years after entry. In the
43See Ruhl and Willis (2007) for an example from Columbia which documents very similar patterns.
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fabricated metals industry, the sunk and xed costs of entry are su¢ ciently small to generate
enough initial exit from export markets, but remain too after the initial year. The reason
for this is that current exporters have no way to reducing the opportunity costs of foregone
domestic sales over time. As such, exporting is far less protable over time and the model
cannot match the persistence in exporting among new entrants.
Allowing capital to adjust addresses these dynamic features of the data. In par-
ticular, to the extent that continued exporting will require a larger capital stock, the costs
of investment act as costs of exporting and deter unproductive rms from remaining in
export markets over time. At the same time, we observe that surviving exporters are much
more likely to invest and hold relatively large amounts of capital. For these rms continued
exporting is relatively inexpensive since exit will often create excess capacity (relative to
a model with frictionless capital-adjustment over time). In this sense, capital-adjustment
inherently builds persistence into the standard heterogeneous rms and trade model.
Domestic Revenue Dynamics and Exporting
Numerous authors document that domestic revenue growth among new exporters
is generally slower than comparable non-exporters.44 This is true in our data as well.
Consider the following regression where we regress the change in log domestic revenues
( ln rDjt) on the change in export status (djt), the change in productivity (!jt) and the
change in capital holdings ( ln kjt) in our data:
 ln rDjt = 0 + ddjt + !!jt + k ln kjt + "jt (III.27)
44See Nguyen and Schaur (2011), Soderbery (2011) and Vannoorenberghe (2012) for example.
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where "jt is an error term.45 In Table 29 the OLS coe¢ cient on d is always negative
and highly signicant. Our estimates suggest that domestic revenue grows 43-47 log points
slower among exporters relative to comparable non-exporters.46
We repeat this exercise on the simulated data from all three models. Both models
with increasing marginal costs (Model 1 and Model 2) match the estimated coe¢ cients
in the data closely. The only exception is third column in the plastics industry where the
coe¢ cient on the change in exporting is relatively small and insignicant. However, once we
add productivity and capital to the equation the coe¢ cient on the change in exporting falls
substantially and becomes strongly signicant. In contrast, the coe¢ cient on the change
in exporting in the model with constant marginal costs (Model 3) is always positive and
sometimes insignicant.47
Export Revenue Dynamics
Conversely, export revenue grows strongly in the years after initial entry among
surviving exporters. There are arguably a number of mechanisms which might explain this
phenomenon. As emphasized in Eaton et al. (2009) surviving exporters demonstrate strong
revenue growth in the initial years after rst entry and argue that a search and learning
mechanism may explain this empirical regularity. Similarly, Ruhl and Willis (2007) suggest
that exogenously growing export markets can generate a similar pattern. While we agree
that these mechanisms are likely important features, capital growth over time can also
explain an important part of the observed export revenue growth.
45As in Nguyen and Schaur (2011), Soderbery (2011) and Vannoorenberghe (2012) we do not include any
measure of export intensity in equation (III.27). However, to the extent that export shocks are relatively
persistent, taking rst-di¤erences of the dependent and explanatory variables will mitigate the impact of the
unobserved rm-level di¤erences.
46To see this note that 1  exp( 0:628) = 0:466 and 1  exp( 0:554) = 0:425.
47The rst two coe¢ cients in the last column of Table 10 are insignicant in both industries. No coe¢ cient
is reported on the change in capital in Models 2 and 3 since kjt is constant over time.
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Figure 10 documents the actual export revenue growth in the data and the sim-
ulated revenue growth all three models among surviving exporters. Before discussing the
performance of each model it is important to recognize that there are two e¤ects on export
revenues which tend to o¤set each other in all three models. First, we examine revenue
growth among surviving exporters and since rms with stronger export revenue growth are
more likely to continue exporting, this selection e¤ect would tend to increase the export
revenue growth over time. Second, all of our estimates suggest that export shocks decline
on average across rms since  < 1. Well refer to this as the depreciation e¤ect.
In the plastics industry all three models predict export revenue growth below that
in the data. However, the model with dynamic capital adjustment predicts positive export
revenue growth in the rst after entry, while the models without capital adjustment suggest
that export growth tends to decline rather than rise over time. In Models 2 and 3 we
observe that the depreciation e¤ect outweighs the selection e¤ect. In contrast, by allowing
the depreciation e¤ect to be o¤set by capital growth, we observe an initial rise in export
revenues among continuing exporters in the plastics industry. Similarly, beyond the rst
year the model with capital adjustment performs as well or better than the other models
in matching the observed growth in export sales.
In the fabricated metals industry the results are even more striking. In this case,
the model with capital adjustment matches the observed export revenue in the data closely
in the rst three years after initial entry. However, again both models without capital
adjustment predict much stronger declines in export growth rates over time. While there
are important di¤erences across industries, in either case, allowing capital to adjust over
time signicant improves model performance along this dimension.
122
Discussion
The model with capital adjustment (Model 1) performs as well or better than com-
parable models along a number of relevant dimensions. Remarkably, this result is achieved
even though little of the information used to evaluate the model is used to estimate the
models key parameters. Specically, the model with capital adjustment captures di¤erences
in exporter investment rates over time, export entry and exit rates over time, movements
in domestic revenues in response to exporting and growth in export revenues over time
relatively well even though the model does not directly use any of this information to pin
down model parameters. In contrast, the models without capital adjustment (Models 2 and
3) are not able to match these features of the data. Although di¤erences across models may
not appear to be dramatically large, it is worth noting that these di¤erences are important
for the predicting how rms will respond to changes in the economic environment. For in-
stance, we document below that allowing for capital adjustment has important quantitative
and qualitative implications regarding how we expect rms to respond to policy changes
(e.g. trade liberalization).
The Determinants of Exporting
Incurred Export Costs
Export entry costs have played a particularly important role in determining the
predicted rm-level responses to policy change in a number of settings.48 Tables 30 and 31
present the average export xed and sunk costs across the distribution of heterogeneous rms
in each industry. In particular, we consider the costs incurred by rms in each quartile of the
productivity distribution and each quartile of the capital distribution. We rst determine
48See Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) or Alessandria and Choi (2011) for examples.
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productivity thresholds in the actual data so as to divide all rms into four quartiles. We
repeat the exercise for capital. We then study the costs incurred by exporters that fall
into each productivity-capital quartile combination. The capital quartiles vary along the
horizontal dimension of Tables 30 and 31, while the productivity quartiles vary along the
vertical dimension. A key issue in this exercise is that the distribution of productivity
varies according to our initial assumption on the shape of the marginal cost function. In
this case, we are careful to apply the thresholds from the actual productivity series which
were produced under the same marginal cost assumption.
For instance, the average xed export cost incurred by a plastics producer that
is in the rst quartile of the (empirical) productivity and the rst quartile of the capital
stock distribution is 150 thousand 1983 Indonesian rupiahs (approximately 165 US dollars).
While these gures seem small it is important to recognize that most rms in the plastics
industry are also relatively small; median total revenues are 3.4 million 1983 Indonesian
rupiahs. Likewise, the average xed export cost incurred by a fabricated metals producer
that is in the rst quartile of both the productivity and capital stock distributions is 108
thousand 1983 Indonesian rupiahs. Across industries this would represent 4.1-4.5 of total
revenues for the median rm.
As we would expect, the xed and sunk export costs are generally increasing in
both productivity and capital stock across models. Moreover, the xed and sunk export
costs are generally smallest in the model with capital adjustment (Model 1) and largest
in the constant marginal cost model without capital adjustment (Model 3). There is an
important exception to this rule. Among small and/or unproductive rms the incurred xed
and sunk costs of exporting in Model 1 are often larger than those in Model 2 (increasing
marginal costs without capital adjustment). This is striking since the average sunk and
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xed cost draw in Model 2 is larger than that in Model 1. The explanation for this result is
straightforward: by allowing rms to expand their capacity, exporting has a greater value
to small rms and, as such, they are willing to incur greater costs to begin or continue
exporting.
Similarly, we observe that relative to the other models, Model 1 predicts a relatively
moderate degree of variation in the xed or sunk costs incurred across rms. To see this,
choose any row in the either Table 30 or 31 and compare the increase in the xed/sunk
cost of exporting along the distribution of capital. We observe that the increase in the
incurred xed costs is always smallest in Model 1 relative to the models without capital
adjustment. Similarly, choose any quartile of the capital distribution and compare the
increase the incurred xed along the productivity distribution. The increase in xed or
sunk costs is again most moderate in Model 1.
Finally, we note that while the di¤erences in the incurred xed and sunk costs are
generally quite small in Model 1, export sunk costs are typically much greater in Model 3.
Interestingly, Models 1 and 2 suggest that the incurred export sunk costs are smaller than
export xed costs among small and unproductive producers. Consistent with our intuition,
many small or unproductive rms will only enter export markets when it is particularly
inexpensive to do so.49
Exporter Productivity Implications
As documented here and elsewhere many new exporters are relatively small.50 We
nd a similar pattern in our data. Table 32 presents the distribution of new exporters in
both the actual and simulated data. The rst two panels of Table 32 compare the percentage
49We omit further discussion of investment xed costs since these do not vary much across the distribution
of rms.
50See Arkolakis (2010b) for an example.
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of new exporters in each quartile of the empirical capital-productivity distribution. It is
immediately obvious that there are some important di¤erences across the initial marginal
cost assumption. Note that the capital distribution does not change across each of the
rst two panels and, as such, the same percentage of rms is contained in each of the
corresponding columns across panels (up to rounding error). For example, in the plastics
industry, the rst column of the rst panel suggests that 9 percent of all new exporters are
found in the rst quartile of the capital distribution. The second panel shows the exact same
result, though these rms are divided up di¤erently across the productivity distribution.
There are a number of interesting and important di¤erences across the rst two
panels. First, the new exporters again appear relatively more productive under the assump-
tion of increasing marginal costs, relative to that of constant marginal costs. In the plastics
industry, the productivity data constructed under the assumption of increasing marginal
costs suggests that 65 percent of new exporters are in the top quartile of productivity dis-
tribution. In contrast, under the assumption of constant marginal costs only 42 percent
of new exporters are in the top quartile of the productivity distribution. Likewise, within
columns a higher percentage of new exporters are always in the top quartiles of the pro-
ductivity distribution under the assumption of increasing marginal costs. Analogous results
are found in the fabricated metals industry.
Across industries we observe that the model with capital adjustment matches the
joint distribution of capital and productivity among new exporters relatively well. In the
plastics industry there is a substantial improvement achieved by allowing capital to adjust
relative to both models without capital adjustment. In particular, the models without
capital adjustment predict too many high productivity exporters relative to the data. The
reason for this that cost of exporting in both cases is relatively high, either in terms of
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direct export entry costs (Model 3) or foregone domestic sales which cannot be mitigated
through capital growth (Model 2).
The fabricated metals industry displays much smaller di¤erences in model perfor-
mance along this dimension. This is precisely what we would expect since l is closer to 1
and the constant marginal assumption is not as restrictive. Nonetheless, Model 3 predicts
that the percentage of exporters in the top quartile of the productivity distribution is 8
percent higher than that found in the data.
Counterfactual Experiments
Export promotion has often been a key component of many developing countries
plan for economic growth (Fernandes and Isgut, 2007). In many instances, reform packages
aimed at liberalizing trade in goods markets have been coupled with larger economic and
nancial reforms, often occuring within the same year.51 Our objective is to quantify the
impact of increased market access or reduced investment costs on export and investment
behavior over time. To evaluate the impact of these policy changes we consider two coun-
terfactual policy experiments: trade liberalization and nancial reform. In each experiment
we consider the rms initial state in 1990 and simulate the model forward 10 years after a
change in one or more parameters aimed at capturing a change in the economic and policy
51See Manova (2008) for further discussion. A similar pattern occurred in Indonesia, though not for the
same reasons. Indonesia joined the WTO in 1995 encouraging greater exports abroad. By the fall of 1997
the Asian nancial had severely a¤ected the Indonesian economy and by 1998 large structural and nancial
reform was undertaken (IMF, 1998). Disentangling the e¤ects of trade liberalization, nancial reform and
the broader economic crisis are clearly questions of substantial economic importance. Unfortunately, they
are beyond the scope of this paper.
127
environment.
Trade Liberalization
The rst experiment aims to provide insight on the e¤ect of trade liberalization on
Indonesian producers. In 1995 Indonesia joined the WTO which broadly allowed Indonesia
to gain greater access in world markets. In our model variable trade costs, such as tari¤s,
are embedded in the parameter capturing export market size, Xt . We attempt to capture
this e¤ect by increasing the value of Xt by 10 percent. We can then re-simulate the model
before and after the policy and compare the growth in exports and investment.52 We repeat
this exercise for Models 1-3 to highlight how di¤erent assumptions lead to di¤erent policy
conclusions in this context.
Table 33 documents the growth in exports and investment in each model. The rst
row of each panel in Table 33 reports the annual aggregate growth in total exports induced
by the policy changes. The rst four columns present the gain in exports in the rst, third,
fth and tenth years after trade liberalization. The increase in export market size has
a large initial impact on export sales in our preferred specication, Model 1. Aggregate
exports increase by 9.3 and 10.7 percent in the rst year after the change in policy in the
fabricated metals and plastics industry. However, after the rst year the percentage increase
in exports over the benchmark models declines. This occurs for two reasons. First, the
expansion of the highly productive exporters is o¤set by greater investment costs. Second,
the change in policy initially induces a strong response along the extensive margin. Many
rms with relatively large capital holdings choose to enter export markets immediately
after the change in policy. However, many of these rms exit immediately since they are
52We are admittedly abstracting from any e¤ect that trade liberalization may have on input prices or
technology in the short-run.
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unwilling to maintain a higher level of capital. Nonetheless, ten years after the change in
policy we observe that annual exports are 5.1-8.9 greater than they would have been under
the benchmark model.
Across models there are a number of striking patterns. First, Model 3, the work-
horse model with constant marginal costs and no capital adjustment, suggests by far the
largest response to trade liberalization. In the rst year after the change in policy aggregate
exports grow by 13 percent in each industry and remain 11-12 percent than the benchmark
simulations 10 years after the change in policy. Relative the model with increasing mar-
ginal costs and capital adjustment (Model 1) we observe that aggregate export growth is
approximately 3 percentage points lower in all years among plastics producers and 3 to 6
percentage points lower among fabricated metals producers. While these di¤erences may
seem small, they are in fact very large relative to the moderate degree to trade liberaliza-
tion; the response of export growth among fabricated metals producers is more than twice
as large in Model 3 as it is Model 1 after 10 years. In this sense, a model with constant mar-
ginal costs and no capital adjustment is likely to lead to broadly overestimate the impact
of trade liberalization on export growth.
The second row of Table 33 indicates the contribution from the extensive margin
and provides an explanation for these results. That is, the second row calculates new
exportersthe percentage of total exporters attributable to rms that were induced to begin
exporting because of the change in policy. Model 3 has by far the smallest contribution
from new exporters across models. The reason for this is that large, productive, current
exporters rms expand quickly into larger export markets increasing the contribution from
the intensive margin. At the same time, smaller, less productive rms continue to restricted
from export markets by overestimated export entry costs. This e¤ect is reinforced by the
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fact that most estimates of productivity for small rms are likely to be biased downwards,
as they are here. Not surprisingly, we observe that extensive margin plays a very small
role in Model 3 relative to Model 1. The contribution from new exporters is 5-7 percentage
points higher in plastics industry and 4-8 percentage points higher in the fabricated metals
industry in the model increasing marginal costs and capital adjustment (Model 1) relative
for the workhorse model (Model 3).
Comparing Model 2, the model with increasing marginal costs and no capital
adjustment, with Model 3 we observe much smaller di¤erence in short-run aggregate export
growth. This is to be expected since capital adjustment occurs slowly over time. In the
plastics industry annual aggregate export growth is 1-2 percent higher in Model 1 relative
to Model 2, while in the fabricated metals industry we observe export growth rates which
are nearly identical across models.53 Although these di¤erences in aggregate exports are
relatively small, the two models are achieving them in very di¤erent ways. Initially, there
is a smaller response along the extensive margin in the model without capital adjustment.
The model with capital adjustment initially encourages greater export entry through smaller
export entry costs and a mechanism ease the tradeo¤ between domestic and export sales
(investment). However, as productive exporters grow their capital stocks the contribution
from the extensive margin falls in the model with capital adjustment. Conversely, since
capital is xed in Model 2 the contribution from the extensive margin remains very high.
Ten years after the change in policy the contribution from the extensive margin is estimated
to be as much as 8 percentage points too high in the model without capital adjustment.
Overall, these results from our rst experiment have important implications for
the literature studying the implications of trade liberalization for heterogeneous producers.
53Industrial di¤erences are largely reecting di¤erences in the capital and variable input shares of produc-
tion, k, and l.
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First, models which assume constant marginal costs will likely provide misleading policy
predictions, particularly in the short-run. Second, considering only the small class of mod-
els the increasing marginal costs, we observe that models without capital adjustment are
likely to have to similar short-run implications for aggregate export growth to those with
capital-adjustment. However, the qualitative mechanism through which these estimates are
achieved are likely to di¤er substantially.
The third row of each panel in Table 33 studies the growth in aggregate investment
induced by the change in policy. For ease of interpretation we present the growth in annual
investment ows. It is worth noting, however, that the cumulative growth in capital holdings
is somewhat larger than that presented in Table 33 since new capital depreciates slowly.
Since capital is xed in all but the rst model new investment is clearly zero in both Models
2 and 3. However, even in Model 1 we observe a relatively small response of investment
to trade liberalization. Trade liberalization immediately increases new investment by 1.6
percent in the plastics industry and 6.3 percent in the fabricated metals industry. After
the initial increase in investment ows, the annual increase in investment falls over time.
Five years after the initial increase in investment the additional growth is 1.1-1.2 percent
higher than the benchmark model across industries. There are two mechanisms behind this
pattern. The change in policy increases the return to investment encouraging rms to invest
more than before. It also encourages rms to invest earlier than otherwise. Due to xed
investment costs, early investors refrain from investing later and the aggregate investment,
relative to the benchmark model, falls. In fact, in the fabricated metals industry, where
aggregate investment initially rose by 6.3 percent, we nd that it is 0.5 percent lower than
the benchmark model 10 years after the change in policy. Across industries, cumulative
investment, net of depreciation, is 1.4-2.2 percent greater after 10 years.
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The fourth row of each panel in Table 33 presents the growth in the exporter
contribution to aggregate investment. Specically, we measure the growth in the percentage
of total investment which is undertaken by exporting rms. In our context this is a natural
lower bound on the total contribution of exporting to investment growth as we ignore all
rms which undertake new investment in years prior to entering export markets. In both
industries we observe strong growth in the exporter contribution to aggregate investment;
in the plastics industry the fraction of investment due to exporters grows by 9.1 percent
in the rst year after trade liberalization, while it grows by 35.7 percent in the fabricated
metals industry. Over time the contribution from exporters falls as less productive rms
exit the export market.
In sum, small changes in the trade environment have very small e¤ects on aggre-
gate investment behavior. This is predictable for a number of reasons. First, most rms,
even those that export heavily, tend to earn most sales from the domestic market. As such,
small changes in a relatively small market are not likely to have big e¤ects on the invest-
ment behavior of most rms, particularly those that are unlikely to enter export markets.
Second, once rms have had su¢ cient time to adjust to the change is policy, exporting and
investment behavior is typically dominated by a relatively small number of large rms.
Financial Reform
The second experiment we consider is nancial reform of the Indonesian credit
markets. We interpret this policy as a reduction in rm-level investment costs. In this
case, we reduce the investment cost function parameters,  0,  1 and  2, by 10 percent.
Since Models 2 and 3 do not allow for any change in capital holdings, we only perform
this experiment on our preferred specication, Model 1. Given our previous results, we
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expect that a reduction in investment costs will lead to both a rise in investment and
exporting. However, to fully examine the interaction of trade and nancial reform we also
consider the impact of contemporaneous trade and nancial liberalization simultaneously
reducing the investment cost parameters by 10 percent and increasing the export market
size parameter by 10 percent. As documented by Manova (2008), in developing countries
trade and nancial reform often occur together, and have very di¤erent implications across
heterogeneous rms and industries. The results are reported in Table 34.
The rst four columns of Table 34 report results for our nancial reform experi-
ment while the last four columns consider the experiment where both policies are applied
simultaneously. As we would expect there is a jump in aggregate investment in both indus-
tries immediately after nancial reform. However, since new investment does not become
productive until the second year there is no growth in exports along the intensive margin
and few non-exporters are induced to start exporting due to the change in policy. Again, we
observe that the growth in annual investment falls over time, though in this case, it remains
substantially higher than the benchmark model. Ten years after the change in policy annual
aggregate investment is 27.7 percent higher than the benchmark model in the fabricated
metals industry and 23.8 percent higher in the plastics industry. The rise in capital holdings
in turn has a substantial impact on exports over time. Among fabricated metals producers,
exports are predicted to be 6.1 percent greater than that in the benchmark model after 10
years, while in the plastics industry they are 13.2 percent larger. In the plastics industry,
where marginal costs rise particularly rapidly for capital-constrained rms, reducing invest-
ment costs is a relatively e¤ective policy for stimulating exports. In this sense our results
mirror those in Manova (2008) and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) which suggest that
capital-intensive, nancially-dependent industries are likely to grow faster, domestically or
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internationally, in response to nancial development.
The last experiment combines the trade liberalization exercise with a simultane-
ous reduction in investment costs. Not surprisingly we nd that the combination of the
two policies has the largest impact on both aggregate investment and exports. Initially,
aggregate export behavior closely resembles that under trade liberalization alone, while
aggregate investment behavior is 2.9-3.4 percent higher than it was under the nancial re-
form experiment. While aggregate investment again falls over time, it is always above the
observed investment rate in the second experiment reecting the additional gain from ex-
porting. After 10 years the annual aggregate investment rate is 1.6-2.2 percent higher in the
last experiment relative to the nancial reform experiment without contemporaneous trade
liberalization. Over the entire 10 year period the plastics and fabricated metals industry
experience a cumulative growth in investment, net of depreciation, which is 1.9-4.4 percent
higher, respectively, under the last experiment relative to the second experiment.54
While these are relatively small di¤erences the predicted growth rates of aggregate
investment, the addition of simultaneous trade liberalization increases represents an annual
aggregate investment growth rate increase of 6-9 percent across industries. In capital-scarce
developing countries these di¤erences represent key di¤erences in policy outcomes. Even
more starkly, we observe that simultaneous trade or nancial reform leads to much greater
growth in exports relative to scenarios where each policy is applied individually. In either
industry we observe that after 10 years the aggregate growth rate of exports is approximately
double what it was in the preceding experiments.
54Note that the cumulative growth in aggregate investment from the second experiment is 28.9-45.9 percent
in the plastics and fabricated metals industries, respectively.
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Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to evaluate the impact of investment on exporting over
time. Consistent with our data, we develop a model which shows that new exporters invest
heavily in new capital as they enter and grow into export markets. It emphasizes that rm-
level investment and export decisions evolve endogenously with rm-specic productivity
and export demand shocks.
We show that endogenous responses to di¤erential demand shocks across markets
a¤ect productivity estimates due to quasi-xed factors of production, such as capital stock.
Our results suggest the failing to account for these shocks biases the productivity di¤erences
between exporting and non-exporting rms by 14-15 percent in the Indonesian plastics and
fabricated metals industries.
We structurally estimate the model using detailed information on export and in-
vestment decisions among Indonesian manufacturing rms. Accounting for capital-adjustment
substantially alters the performance of the model. We nd that sunk (rst-time) export
costs are reduced by 93-94 percent while xed (per-period) export costs fall by 83-85 per-
cent across industries. The estimated model demonstrates that export costs have a much
smaller impact on rm-level export decisions after accounting for investment costs.
Allowing rms to endogenously invest in new capital substantially improves the
models ability to match numerous features of rm-level data. Comparing the model with
capital adjustment to standard models without investment dynamics we nd that the model
with investment dynamics outperforms the standard models on numerous dimensions. In
particular, the model with investment dynamics is able to simultaneously di¤erential in-
vestment and revenue growth rates across exporting and non-exporting rms, the export
entry and survival rates among new exporters, and the distribution of new exporters across
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productivity and capital stock.
Counterfactual experiments assess the impact of trade liberalization and nancial
reform on the evolution of aggregate exports and investment over time. We nd that both
policies have an important impact on aggregate exports and investment over time and that
there is a strong degree of complementarity between investment and exporting, particularly
in capital-intensive industries. After 10 years a 10 percent increase in export market size
increases annual aggregate exports by 5-9 percent and cumulative aggregate investment (net
of depreciation) by 1.4-2.2 percent across industries. Similarly, reducing investment costs
by 10 percent increases annual aggregate exports by 6-13 percent and cumulative aggregate
investment by 29-46 percent across industries.
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Appendix: tables and fugures
Table 20. Investment and Export Moments
Plastics Fabricated Metals
Median Variable Input Share 0.784 0.849
Average investment rate (I/K) (all rms) 0.078 0.130
Average investment rate among exporters 0.199 0.316
Inaction frequency 0.720 0.598
Inaction frequency among exporters 0.428 0.377
Average export intensity among exporters 0.401 0.419
Correlation of export and investment status 0.218 0.142
Correlation of log export sales and log investment 0.291 0.278
Table 21. Annual Transition Rates
Status in t+ 1
Plastics Fabricated Metals
Status in t Neither only Inv. only Exp. Both Neither only Inv. only Exp. Both
All Firms 0.682 0.213 0.045 0.061 0.579 0.326 0.037 0.058
Neither 0.900 0.080 0.014 0.006 0.868 0.106 0.019 0.007
only Inv. 0.295 0.655 0.008 0.043 0.236 0.713 0.011 0.041
only Exp. 0.141 0.028 0.647 0.183 0.360 0.000 0.500 0.140
Both 0.108 0.118 0.118 0.657 0.060 0.202 0.107 0.631
Table 22. Moments Used For Estimation
Summary Statistic Plastics Fab. Metals
Mean frequency of investment 0.271 0.386
Mean investment rate (it=kt) among rms where it > 0 0.251 0.309
Mean frequency of exporting 0.104 0.096
Fraction of year t exporters who exported in year t  1 0.763 0.655
Mean log export sales among exporting rms 8.675 8.841
Variance of export intensity 0.391 0.665
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Table 23. OLS Regression Coe¢ cients Used For Estimation
Regression Coe¢ cient Plastics Fabricated Metals
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
%1 0.044 0.008 0.230 0.025
%2 0.098 0.018 0.098 0.035
&0 -2.291 0.017 -0.495 0.011
&1 0.661 0.053 0.429 0.034
#1 0.744 0.020 0.580 0.024
Notes: The squared productivity term in equation (III.23) is omitted from the regression in the plastic products
industry since it is not precisely estimated. Similar tables estimated for the model under constant marginal costs are
presented in the appendix A.1.
Table 24. Mark-Ups, Productivity and Marginal Costs
Plastics Fabricated Metals
l Estimated l Set to 1 l Estimated l Set to 1
Parameter Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
 0.425 0.062 0.425 0.065 0.723 0.060 0.723 0.060
l 0.513 0.114 1  0.776 0.060 1 
k 0.347 0.066 0.660 0.162 0.090 0.036 0.130 0.054
0 -0.249 0.383 -0.526 0.849 -0.020 0.100 -0.053 0.171
1 0.863 0.018 0.854 0.021 0.917 0.027 0.895 0.030
 0.366 0.072 0.733 0.167 0.147 0.039 0.205 0.070
Notes: Standard errors are based 200 bootstrap replications.
Table 25. Export Market Size, Export Costs and Investment Costs
Plastics Fabricated Metals
Model No. 1 2 3 1 2 3
F 1.037 1.084 3.969 1.100 2.131 2.461
(0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.015) (0.017)
S 6.688 15.508 92.852 3.273 7.590 51.508
(0.014) (0.048) (0.109) (0.006) (0.021) (0.573)
 0.779 0.795 0.782 0.936 0.885 0.828
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.001)
ln 0.144 0.183 0.191 0.307 0.319 0.317
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ln X -2.293 -1.843 -1.989 -2.835 -2.496 -2.632
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.035) (0.010)
 0 64.089 17.278
(0.153) (0.072)
 1 3.551 0.051
(0.017) (0.0001)
 2 0.053 0.010
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Endogenous k-Adjust. Yes No No Yes No No
Marginal Costs Increasing Increasing Constant Increasing Increasing Constant
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 26. Data and Model Based-Moments
Plastics Fab. Metals
Summary Statistic Data Model Data Model
Mean frequency of investment 0.271 0.274 0.386 0.302
Mean investment rate (it=kt) among rms where it > 0 0.251 0.198 0.309 0.332
Mean frequency of exporting 0.104 0.119 0.096 0.083
Fraction of year t exporters who exported in year t  1 0.763 0.584 0.655 0.524
Mean log export sales among exporting rms 8.675 8.064 8.841 8.965
Variance of export intensity 0.391 0.237 0.665 0.895
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Table 27. Data and Model Based OLS Parameter Estimates
Plastics Fabricated Metals
Parameter Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
%1 0.044 0.080 0.230 0.217
%2 0.098 0.025 0.098 0.011
&0 -2.291 -2.360 -0.495 -0.508
&1 0.661 0.716 0.429 0.549
#1 0.744 0.641 0.580 0.797
Notes: The squared productivity term in equation (III.23) is omitted from the regression in the plastic products
industry since it is not precisely estimated. Similar tables estimated for the model under constant marginal costs are
presented in the Appendix.
Table 28. Entry Rates in Export Markets
Plastics Fabricated Metals
Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.027 0.056 0.053 0.045 0.036 0.040 0.027 0.037
Endog. k-Adjust.  Yes No No  Yes No No
Marginal Costs  Increasing Increasing Constant  Increasing Increasing Constant
Table 29. Exporting and Domestic Revenue
Plastics
Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 0.022 -0.042 0.026 -0.009 0.063 -0.011 0.088 0.000
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.000)
djt -0.356 -0.628 -0.049 -0.241 -0.139 -0.321 0.194 0.000
(0.112) (0.082) (0.048) (0.023) (0.057) (0.033) (0.051) (0.000)
!jt 1.282 1.389 1.391 0.745
(0.038) (0.007) (0.009) (0.000)
 ln kjt 0.305 0.488
(0.070) (0.029)
Fabricated Metals
Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 0.059 0.006 0.028 -0.018 0.052 0.012 0.059 0.000
(0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.000)
djt -0.346 -0.554 -0.342 -0.483 -0.329 -0.479 0.138 0.000
(0.128) (0.102) (0.080) (0.063) (0.090) (0.069) (0.061) (0.000)
!jt 2.963 3.369 3.376 2.610
(0.158) (0.035) (0.029) (0.000)
 ln kjt 0.215 0.284
(0.062) (0.035)
Endog. k-Adjust.  Yes No No
Marginal Costs  Increasing Increasing Constant
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The rst two coe¢ cients in the last column are insignicant at conventional
levels.
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Table 30. Export Fixed Costs
Plastics
Quartiles Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
!tnkt 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.150 0.220 0.333 0.520 0.094 0.175 0.236 0.625 1.630 2.148 2.175 2.970
2 0.303 0.420 0.487 0.622 0.205 0.382 0.403 0.725 3.058 2.916 2.673 3.415
3 0.345 0.536 0.579 0.660 0.352 0.448 0.470 0.790 3.624 2.472 3.154 3.482
4 0.580 0.718 0.766 0.815 0.717 0.684 0.892 0.912 3.318 3.185 4.693 3.615
Fabricated Metals
Quartiles Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
!tnkt 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.108 0.082 0.162 0.531 0.061 0.079 0.090 0.345 1.185 1.561 1.507 1.729
2 0.292 0.313 0.348 0.347 0.148 0.286 0.550 0.617 1.141 1.454 1.486 1.717
3 0.230 0.641 0.555 0.641 0.488 0.494 0.811 0.963 1.499 1.475 1.752 1.902
4 0.125 0.630 0.763 0.816 0.907 0.949 1.270 1.527 1.552 1.894 1.983 2.161
Endog. k-Adj. Yes No No
Marg. Costs Increasing Increasing Constant
Table 31. Export Sunk Costs
Plastics
Quartiles Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
!tnkt 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.076 0.122 0.234 0.606 0.114 0.126 0.160 0.734 3.690 3.820 5.359 9.889
2 0.170 0.285 0.504 0.903 0.354 0.161 0.205 1.249 5.646 9.448 12.618 15.549
3 0.350 0.566 0.697 1.227 0.685 0.653 0.701 1.857 8.668 9.682 7.338 18.354
4 0.778 1.159 1.447 2.027 1.482 1.537 1.582 3.232 10.721 20.883 23.691 22.981
Fabricated Metals
Quartiles Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
!tnkt 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.077 0.056 0.073 0.245 0.030 0.047 0.076 0.133 1.372 1.677 2.575 4.568
2 0.097 0.170 0.163 0.260 0.064 0.118 0.190 0.372 2.396 3.242 3.128 4.869
3 0.271 0.321 0.395 0.527 0.270 0.396 0.532 0.741 4.076 4.101 4.854 6.136
4 0.347 0.634 0.895 1.001 0.916 1.039 1.402 1.875 5.667 6.892 8.261 11.136
Endog. k-Adj. Yes No No
Marg. Costs Increasing Increasing Constant
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Table 34. Financial Reform: Counterfactual Export and Investment Growth (Model 1)
Plastics
Experiment Financial Reform Alone Trade and Financial
Year 1 3 5 10 1 3 5 10
Aggregate Exports (%) 0.3 4.0 6.2 13.2 11.1 13.7 15.7 23.0
Extensive Margin (%) 100.0 23.5 20.1 18.1 26.8 24.4 20.7 18.5
Aggregate Investment (%) 46.8 32.5 28.2 23.8 50.2 34.3 30.4 26.0
Exporter Contribution (%) 11.8 10.5 5.0 8.8 18.6 16.2 11.1 13.7
Fabricated Metals
Experiment Financial Reform Alone Trade and Financial
Year 1 3 5 10 1 3 5 10
Aggregate Export (%) 0.1 3.2 4.1 6.1 9.4 10.7 10.2 12.2
Extensive Margin (%) 100.0 12.8 12.6 6.5 18.5 20.1 16.3 13.2
Aggregate Investment (%) 61.7 46.8 40.8 27.7 64.6 51.4 43.2 29.3
Exporter Contribution (%) 43.3 26.7 16.7 10.3 57.7 38.7 23.5 15.2
Notes: Aggregate export and investment growth are measured relative to annual benchmark ows (these are not
cumulative measures).
Additional Model-Performance Results
This section documents the models performance matching the empirical moments
and regression coe¢ cients in the models without capital adjustment. Model 2 is the model
with increasing marginal costs, while Model 3 is the model with constant marginal costs.
The investment moments and regression coe¢ cients are omitted since the there is no capital
adjustment in these models and they are not used for estimation. Like the model with capital
adjustment we observe slightly less persistence in export status in the simulated data than
in the actual data. Unlike the model with capital adjustment we also tend to observe that
the model predicts an export productivity premium , &1, that is too high. This tension due
to the sunk cost feature of the model. Larger sunk export costs create higher persistence
in export status, but prevent small, less productive rms from entering export markets.
In the model with capital adjustment, this was not the case since export entry costs were
relatively small.
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Table 35. OLS Regression Coe¢ cients Under Constant Marginal Cost Assumption
Regression Coe¢ cient Plastics Fabricated Metals
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
&0 -4.373 0.034 -0.735 0.013
&1 0.679 0.104 0.299 0.043
#1 0.744 0.020 0.580 0.024
Notes: We drop equation (III.23) from the structural estimation routine since there is no investment decision estimated
in this context.
Table 36. Data and Model Based-Moments
Model 2: Increasing Marginal Costs, No Capital-Adjustment
Plastics Fab. Metals
Summary Statistic Data Model Data Model
Mean frequency of exporting 0.104 0.115 0.096 0.057
Fraction of year t exporters who exported in year t  1 0.763 0.662 0.655 0.534
Mean log export sales among exporting rms 8.675 8.293 8.841 9.198
Variance of export intensity 0.391 0.375 0.665 0.800
Model 3: Constant Marginal Costs, No Capital-Adjustment
Plastics Fab. Metals
Summary Statistic Data Model Data Model
Mean frequency of exporting 0.104 0.119 0.096 0.095
Fraction of year t exporters who exported in year t  1 0.763 0.678 0.655 0.674
Mean log export sales among exporting rms 8.675 8.252 8.841 8.621
Variance of export intensity 0.391 0.364 0.665 0.513
Table 37. Data and Model Based OLS Parameter Estimates
Model 2: Increasing Marginal Costs, No Capital-Adjustment
Plastics Fabricated Metals
Data Source Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
&0 -2.291 -2.337 -0.495 -0.500
&1 0.661 0.686 0.429 0.603
#1 0.744 0.700 0.580 0.720
Model 3: Constant Marginal Costs, No Capital-Adjustment
Plastics Fabricated Metals
Data Source Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
&0 -4.347 -4.513 -0.735 -0.769
&1 0.679 1.126 0.299 0.523
#1 0.744 0.714 0.580 0.772
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Figure 7. Investment Rate Histogram
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Figure 8. Investment Rate across Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms
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Figure 9. Survival Rate among New Exporters
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Figure 10. Export Revenue Growth among Surviving Exporters
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CHAPTER IV
GROWING INTO EXPORT MARKETS: THE IMPACT OF EXPORTING ON
FIRM-LEVEL INVESTMENT IN INDONESIA
with Joel B. Rodrigue
Introduction
Since the 1960s numerous East Asian countries have witnessed unprecedented eco-
nomic growth rates. Not surprisingly, international success in a variety of manufactured
goods markets has lead numerous researchers to study the determinants of export growth
among East Asian manufacturers and the consequent impact of exporting on manufactur-
ing e¢ ciency. This paper contributes to this literature by studying the causal link between
exporting and capital growth. A emerging line of research strongly argues that new ex-
porters are often restricted by a lack of physical and working capital and, because of this,
make systematically small entries into export markets. Further, imperfect credit markets
constrain the ability of new exporters to grow into new markets, limiting the gains from
export promotion in developing countries.
Our study di¤ers from the existing literature in three important respects. First,
we study changes at the rm level during and after entry into export markets. This allows
us to characterize how rms build up capital holdings over time and the length of time re-
quired to adjust to exporting. Second, our study has an explicit focus on the causal impact
of exporting on rm-level investment. While preceding research has convincingly argued
that working capital is a key determinant of export outcomes, very few studies have the
extent to which exporting a¤ects the incentive to invest as they grow into export markets.
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For instance, Manova and Yu (2012) argue strongly that rm-level working capital plays a
key role in determining the nature rm-level entry into export markets. We provide comple-
mentary evidence which suggests that as rms enter into export markets, there investment
reect key changes in the demand for existing capital. Third, our rm-level data from
Indonesia allow us to characterize the role of credit constraints on new investment among
exporting rms in Indonesia. Specically, our data allows us to study the impact of export-
ing on investment across rm ownership (foreign and domestic) and lending regimes (pre-
and post- nancial crisis). We nd that rms with better access to credit markets make
consistently larger investments in physical capital when entering export markets. While ex-
isting evidence indicates that rms with better access to credit markets much better export
performance (see Manova, Wei and Zhang (2011) for example), we provide evidence that
of changes within rms which are consistent with the interpretation that new exporters are
often credit constrained.
It is well known that across countries exporting rms are typically among the
largest and most productive rms in a given industry and, not surprisingly, more likely to
invest. In this context disentangling correlation and causality is of utmost importance for
policymakers, but also poses numerous challenges for researchers. If high productivity rms
are more likely to export, exporting becomes an endogenous variable and simple least-
squares estimation is invalid. To address this issue we use propensity score matching to
assess the causal e¤ect of exporting on investment. The matching technique allows us to
create the missing counterfactual of an acquired rm had it not entered export markets. It
does so by pairing each rm that chooses to export in the future with a similar rm that
never exports.
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We then combine propensity score matching with a di¤erence-in-di¤erence ap-
proach. The causal impact of exporting is inferred from the average divergence in the
investment paths between each new exporter and its matched control rm. Our approach
directly addresses concerns with reverse causality and omitted variable biases. Specically,
by matching new exporters and non-exporters in the year prior to initial entry into export
markets, we control for rm characteristics that a¤ect investment activity equally in across
rms, such as productivity, capital-intensity, labor force quality, past investment, or access
to foreign distribution networks. Our results are thus identied purely from the variation
in investment outcomes across similar rms within narrowly dened industries.
Our analysis, covering the period between 1990-2000, is based on detailed rm-
level data from the Census of Indonesian Manufacturing Plants. We nd that Indonesian
manufacturers actively increase physical capacity faster than comparable rms as they enter
export markets and continue investing faster than comparable rms for at least three years
after entry. We document that the investment rate among new exporters is 40 percent
higher than non-exporters in the year of initial entry into export markets, 48 percent higher
in the rst year after entry and 23-34 percent higher in the second and third years after
entry. We provide further evidence on the degree to which these results are robust to length
of time after entry we study, the endogenous selection of rms in and out of export markets,
the initial rms size, initial capital holdings and the type of investment (e.g. machinery
investment vs. all physical capital) rm undertake, among other checks. In each case we
nd that new exporters are strongly increasing their capital holdings upon entry into export
markets.
Despite the large estimated impact of exporting on investment, our most striking
results pertain to the di¤erences across similar rms with di¤erent types of ownership. We
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exploit observed di¤erences in rm ownership to capture idiosyncratic variation in access
to foreign credit markets. We nd that foreign rms increase the capital holdings by much
larger amounts and over a much shorter time period relative to domestic rms. In the
year of initial entry, we nd that exporting increases investment 98 percent faster among
foreign rms, relative to domestic rms. Consistent with our interpretation, the estimated
di¤erences across foreign and domestic rms is largest during the period of the Asian -
nancial crisis when domestic lending was very tight in Indonesia. The rapid decline in
international trade during the 2007-2009 global nancial crisis has renewed interest in these
questions, and the Asian nancial crisis provides a useful window to study the e¤ects of
credit tightening on world trade.
There is near universal evidence that exporting rms are substantially more capital
intensive and productive than their non-exporting counterparts across a wide variety of
industries and countries.1 Likewise, there exists a rich literature suggesting that exporting
a¤ects numerous rm-level decisions over time.2 In particular, Bustos (2011) and Lileeva
and Treer (2011) suggest that new exporters have a strong incentive to invest as they
enter export markets though neither paper quanties the extent rm-level capital holdings
evolve with entry into export markets. We add to this literature by quantifying the extent
to which a¤ects the rate of within-rm capital growth and subsequent rm-level investment
decisions and outcomes.
1Early contributions include those from Aw and Hwang (1995), Aw and Batra (1998), Chen and Tang
(1987), Bernard and Jensen (1995), Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998),
Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) among others. Likewise, increasing the
scale of production has played a key role in infant-industry" arguments for tari¤ protection dating back to
Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List at the beginning of the 19th Century.
2Ekholm and Midelfart (2005), Yeaple (2005), and Bustos (2011) all highlight the link between rm-level
exporting and hiring decisions. Similarly, Atkeson and Burstein (2009), Ederington and McCalman (2008),
Costantini and Melitz (2008), Lileeva and Treer (2010) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2010) study the impact
of rm-level innovation on productivity evolution and exporting over time. Similarly, much attention has
been paid to the impact of productivity, nancial frictions, or institutional development on export growth.
See Nunn (2007), Helpman, Melitz and Rubenstein (2008) and Manova (2008) for examples.
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Rho and Rodrigue (2012) and Ahn and McQuoid (2012) argue that there exists
strong empirical evidence that many new exporters are subject to increasing marginal costs,
largely arising from a lack of physical capital upon entry. Further, Riano (2011) and Rho and
Rodrigue (2012) demonstrate this feature is important for capturing rm-level investment
behavior, survival and revenue growth in dynamic models of exporting and investment.
Likewise, a large number of recent papers have strongly argued that new exporters are
restricted from fully entering export markets because they are under-capitalized at the
time of desired entry. A number of studies have demonstrated that allowing for a xed
input, such as physical capital, has an important role in heterogeneous rm models of
international trade. In particular, Vannoorenberghe (2010), Blum, Claro and Horstmann
(2011), Nguyen and Schaur (2011) and Soderbury (2010) all study rm-level export decisions
in an environment where capital or production-capacity are xed over time. They nd that
the assumption of a xed production input (such as capital) or xed short-run capacity
allow their models to rationalize the correlation of domestic and export sales and/or the
volatility of sales among exporting rms. They do not document, however, the extent to
which these market trade-o¤s encourage rms to expand capital holdings as they grow into
export markets.
The degree to which capital-constraints a¤ect rm performance naturally depends
upon the degree to which rms need to upgrade capital holdings and on the length of
time required to accomplish these changes. Unfortunately, none of these papers present
broad evidence of the extent to which capital accumulation changes when rms enter export
markets. We contribute to this literature by quantifying the degree to which new Indonesian
exporters increase capital holdings at a faster rate upon entering export markets. If new
exporters are constrained by a lack of physical capital at the time of entry into export
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markets, we expect that this will encourage investment in new capital among those that
wish to grow into export markets. This naturally raises a number of questions. How much
investment is required for new exporters to adjust to serving multiple markets? Does the
investment occur entirely in one year or do new exporters adjust slowly over time? We aim
to complement the existing literature by providing an answer to these questions.3
Although few papers have studied capital accumulation and exporting in this con-
text, a number of recent related papers have emphasized the importance of nancial frictions
in determining export outcomes across rms, industries and countries. Manova (2010),
Manova, Wei and Zhang (2011), Aisen et al. (2011), Ahn and McQuoid (2012), Kohn,
Leibovici and Szkup (2012) and Manova and Yu (2012) all suggest that the presence of
rm-level nancial frictions a¤ect export decisions and the growth of export sales. We pro-
vide evidence that nancial frictions further inuence the rate at which capital stock grows,
further reinforcing the impact of nancial frictions on rm growth over time.
Similarly, Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2008) use observable di¤erences in owner-
ship structure to demonstrate that foreign owned rms in Indonesia are likely to invest at
a higher rate than similar domestic rms. They argue that a key reason for the observed
di¤erence in investment rate arises naturally since foreign owned rms are likely to have
much better access to foreign credit markets. Similarly, Manova, Wei and Zhang (2011) use
observable ownership di¤erences among Chinese exporters to study the impact of nancial
frictions on the growth of rm-level exports. They conclude that better access to credit
markets allows foreign owned rms to enter a larger number of markets, export a larger
number of products and grow export sales faster.
3We are not aware of any other paper studying the dynamics of capital accumulation as rms enter
export markets. In a companion piece Rho and Rodrigue (2012) structurally estimate a dynamic model of
exporting, rm survival in export markets and capital accumulation. While this paper studies the interactions
of investment and export costs on rm behavior, it does not provide direct evidence on rm-level investment
responses to trade liberalization or nancial frictions.
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This paper provides complementary evidence to these ndings. In particular,
we nd that foreign-owned exporters in Indonesia enter export markets very di¤erently
than domestic Indonesian rms. We document that foreign owned rms often increase
their capital holdings much faster rate than similar domestic rms in the year of entry.
Specically, while domestic rms grow capital holdings slowly over time, foreign rms tend
to invest heavily in one or, at most, two years after initial export entry. We nd that
the impact of exporting on investment among foreign rms is nearly double that of similar
domestic rms in the year of entry into export markets. However, we do not generally
nd statistically signicant di¤erences across foreign and domestic rms in any year around
entry other than the year of initial entry. Both of these results are consistent with foreign
owned rms having better access to nancing for exports. In particular, in the presence
of xed (non-convex) investment costs we expect that investment will tend to be lumpy.
As such, we would expect that unconstrained rms would choose to optimally adjust their
capital holdings by a relatively large amount in a small number of years, while credit-
constrained rms are more likely to have to self-nance investment over time. We conrm
that di¤erences across foreign and domestic rms are strongest during periods of tight
domestic credit in Indonesia and indicative of impact of credit market imperfections on
export behavior.
Our results are not simply of academic interest, but have key policy implications,
particularly in a developing country. Manova and Yu (2012) indicate that rm-level di¤er-
ences in capital structure strongly inuence the mode and nature of rm-level exporting.
Our ndings complement this result and strongly indicate that rms are actively changing
their capital structure as they enter export markets. Likewise, a large literature documents
that changes in rm-level investment behavior has important impacts on aggregate economic
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performance.4 Crucini and Kahn (1996, 2007) demonstrate that accounting for capital ac-
cumulation at an aggregate level is key to evaluating trade policy changes. We complement
this literature by documenting similar di¤erences in a developing country and studying the
interaction of rm-level investment with export decisions. Finally, understanding the role
of nancial frictions for rmsÕ export growth is of particular importance to developing
countries which often rely on extensive cross-border trade for economic growth. Given the
di¢ culties of associated with institutional and nancial reform, our results also shed light
on potential benets of better access to foreign credit markets arising from foreign direct
investment.
In the next section we provide a simple model of investment and exporting to
motivate our empirical approach. Section two describes our empirical strategy and section
three describes the Indonesian manufacturing sector and the data used to study rm-level
investment and export behavior. The fourth section presents our empirical model, while
section ve presents both our main results and robustness checks. Section six examines the
di¤erential investment behavior of new foreign and domestic exporters and the extent to
which this can be attributed to credit constraints. The last section concludes.
A Simple Model of Investment and Exporting
To facilitate our empirical analysis we present a simple model of investment and
exporting. Our objective here is to outline one particular channel through which exporting
may a¤ect investment over time and the impact of investment cost di¤erences on rm behav-
iour. A number of recent models argue that new exporters tend to be capacity constrained
(Ahn and McQuoid (2012), Soderbury (2010), Nguyen and Schaur (2012), Blum, Claro and
4For instance, Doms and Dunne (1998), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), Cooper, Haltiwanger
and Power (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000).
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Horstmann (2011)) . In most of these models capital stock or rm capacity is exogenous to
the decision to export. In contrast, we present a stylized model in which investment and
capital holdings endogenously depend on the rms export decisions over time. Further, we
explore the role of rm ownership and access to credit on investment and export outcomes.
Consider a set horizontally di¤erentiated manufacturings rm in a developing coun-
try which each produce one variety which can be sold at home in the domestic market or
abroad through export sales. Each rm produces according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function qjt = e!jtk
k
jt l
l
jt where q is the rms total production, ! is rm-specic productiv-
ity and k and l are rm js current holdings of capital and variable inputs, respectively. We
assume that variable inputs can be freely adjusted each period, but investment in physical
capital only becomes productive the year after the initial investment.
We can write rm js short-run marginal cost function as:
lnmcjt =   lnl   k
l
ln kjt   1
l
!jt + lnwt +
1  l
l
ln qjt (IV.1)
where wt is a set of relevant input prices used in production and qjt is the target, prot-
maximizing level of output. Equation (III.1) implies that rms with larger capital stocks
incur lower marginal costs, ceteris paribus. This will later imply that across two equally
productive rms, the rm with the larger capital stock will produce at a lower cost. As
such, more capital-intensive rms will be more likely to export. We assume that productivity
evolves according to a separate Markov process:
!jt = f(!jt 1; kjt) + jt (IV.2)
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where kjt captures the rms current holdings of capital. Likewise, we describe the evolution
of capital by
kjt = (1  )kjt 1 + ijt 1 (IV.3)
where ijt 1 is the rms total investment in physical capital in period t   1 and  is the
per-period depreciation rate on physical capital.
Firms also incur costs when they choose to invest or export. We write the rms
investment cost function, C(ijt; kjt; j), as
C(ijt; kjt; j) = c(ijt; kjt; j) + F (j)1[ijt > 0] (IV.4)
where j is an indicator variable capturing whether the rm is owned by foreign (j = 1)
or domestic (j = 0) investors.
5 We maintain standard assumptions on the nature of
convex investment costs, c(0; kjt; jt) = 0, c1 > 0, c2 < 0, c11 > 0, c22 > 0. However, we
allow foreign rms, which are commonly associated with better access to foreign credit (see
Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2008) and Manova, Wei and Zhang (2011)) to potentially have
lower convex, c3 < 0, and non-convex investment costs, 6 F (1)  F (0) < 0.
Similarly, we assume that entering foreign markets may require additional xed
entry costs, CX(djt; djt 1; j), which may depend on the rms export history:
CX(djt; djt 1; j) = FX(j)djtdjt 1 + SX(j)djt(1  djt 1)
where djt takes a value of 1 if rm j exports in year t and is zero otherwise. We write sunk
and xed export costs as an explicit function of ownership to highlight the fact that foreign
5We abstract from changes in ownership status since we observe relatively few ownership changes over
time in our sample data.
6Both convex and non-convex parameters have been found to be important for capturing rm-level
investment dynamics in the US (c.f. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis
(2010)) and Indonesia (c.f. Rho and Rodrigue (2012)).
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ownership will also likely a¤ect the costs of entry into export markets. If the initial entry
into export markets is more costly than subsequent entries into export markets we expect
that SX(j) > FX(j).
We maintain standard assumptions regarding the structure of domestic and export
markets (see Melitz (2003) for an example). Both markets are assumed to be monopolis-
tically competitive, but segmented from each other so that rms will not interact strategi-
cally across markets. The maximized prot function for rm j at time t (before investment
costs) is: jt = t(kit; !jt; djt; djt 1; A;A) where A and A capture market-specic demand
shifters (size, income, competitiveness) in the domestic and foreign market, respectively.
Denote the value of rm j in year t by Vjt:
Vjt(sjt) = max
djt;ijt
jt(sjt; djt)  C(ijt; kjt; j)  CX(djt; djt 1; j) + EtVjt+1(sjt+1)(IV.5)
where sjt = (kit; !jt; djt; j ; A;A
) is a vector of state variables and
EtVjt+1(sjt+1) =
Z
!0
Vjt+1(s
0)dF (!0j!jt) (IV.6)
If the rm does not choose to invest (ijt = 0), the rms capital stock will fall and
the rms marginal costs of production, for the same level of output, will rise next period.
Conversely, if the rm invests enough to increase its capital stock in period t+ 1 the rms
marginal costs will fall. The rst-order condition for the investment decisions for either
exporters and non-exporters can be written as
c1(ijt; kjt; j) + F (j) = Et
@Vjt+1(sjt+1)
@ijt
(IV.7)
The left side of (III.10) is the marginal cost of adjustment and is independent of the rms
export decision or history. The right side is the expected marginal gain and includes the
e¤ects on both the intensive (the amount of investment) and extensive margins (whether
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to invest or not).7
The expected marginal gain from investment depends upon the rms export de-
cision. First, if entering export markets lowers the costs of future exporting, through sunk
export costs for example, rms will expect to produce and sell in a larger number of mar-
kets and to a larger number of consumers. In our model this raises the marginal value of
capital and in turn encourages greater investment. Second, if the cost of investment is lower
for foreign owned rms then we expect that foreign rms will in turn respond by stronger
investment when entering export markets.
The net benet to exporting, conditional on the rms investment decision, can be
described by the value functions. We can write the marginal benet from exporting, MBE,
for any rm as:
MBEjt = jt(sjt; djt = 1)  jt(sjt; djt = 0)  CX(djt; djt 1; j)| {z }
Initial Gain/Loss
+Et[Vjt+1(~sjt+1; djt = 1)  Vjt+1(~sjt+1; djt = 0)]| {z }
Future Gain/Loss
(IV.8)
The marginal benet to exporting captures both the current prots from export-
ing and the expected future gains or losses from exporting. The initial gain captures the
di¤erence in operating prots associated with exporting and any direct export entry costs.
As emphasized in recent literature, capital constrained exporters are likely to have relatively
small gains in the initial period of exporting since expansions into the export market may
come at the cost of lost domestic sales. At the same time, however, these constraints create
a stronger incentive to invest in the early years of exporting; not only do rms want to
7The RHS of (III.10) ignores the e¤ects of ijt on the probability of adjustment since the e¤ect of capital
adjustment on the probability of adjustment is evaluated just at a point of indi¤erence between adjusting and
not adjusting. For each ijt there are values of !jt which bound adjustment and non-adjustment. Variation
in ijt does inuence these boundaries, but since the boundaries are points of indi¤erence between adjustment
and non-adjustment, there is no further e¤ect on the value of the objective function. See Cooper, Haltiwanger
and Willis (2010) for further discussion.
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expand into export markets, but they also want to be able to optimally serve the domestic
market. As such, capital constrained exporters may have large expected future gains from
exporting since growth in capital holdings may allow them to expand both at home and
abroad.
Model Predictions
Our model, though simple, presents a number of key, testable predictions. We
enumerate four predictions which we proceed to examine in our empirical model:
1. Exporting rms will increase investment upon entry into export markets.
2. The adjustment of capital stock to exporting occurs over time, particularly among
rms with poor access to credit markets.
3. Across similar foreign and domestic rms, new foreign exporters will invest more
heavily upon entry into export markets.
4. Di¤erences across foreign and domestic exporters are largest when the costs of acquir-
ing domestic credit are high.
We proceed by rst examining whether exporting has an impact on rm-level
investment among new Indonesian exporters. Once we have established the relationship
between exporting and rm-level investment we investigate the role of foreign investment
and the extent to which ownership di¤erences can be associated with credit constraints
across rms. The following section lays out our empirical strategy to test the validity of
our models predictions.
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Empirical Strategy
The aim of our empirical strategy is to identify the causal impact of exporting
on investment. As such, a primary concern is endogeneity of the decision to export on
the estimated impact on investment. As a rst step we choose to focus on rms which
enter export markets for the rst time during the 1990-2000 period. Specically, we elim-
inate all plants which export during 1990 and=or 1991 to focus on the sample of initial
non-exporters. Consequently, we greatly reduce the number of rms under consideration.
However, by focussing on rms which are entering export markets for the rst time we can
then use di¤erencing over time to eliminate the inuence of all observable and unobserv-
able elements of the export decision that are strongly persistent over time. Our strategy
is to use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence technique to compare the performance of new exporters
with that of similar rms who choose not to export. Naturally, the comparison is likely
to su¤er from non-random sample selection since exporting rms endogenously choose to
enter export markets. We use propensity score matching, in combination with di¤erence-
in-di¤erence methods, to address the selection issue. The matching procedure controls for
the selection of bias by restricting the comparison to di¤erences within carefully selected
pairs of rms of rms who possess similar observable characteristics. Specically, each pair
of rms consists of an exporting rm and a non-exporting rm with similar characteristics
in the year preceding entry into export markets.
Our objective is to measure the causal e¤ect of exporting on the physical invest-
ment rate, rt = itkt , where it captures the current net investment rate (new investment minus
capital sales) and kt is the rms stock of capital in year t. Letting d = 1 for a new exporter
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and 0 otherwise, this e¤ect is dened as
E[rt(d = 1)  rt(d = 0)jd = 1] = E[rt(d = 1)jd = 1]  E[rt(d = 0)jd = 1]
which captures the di¤erence between the performance paths of rms which started export-
ing (the rst term) and the performance paths of the same rms should they not have started
exporting (the second term). Clearly, we observe each rm as an exporter or non-exporter
in any year and never both, so that the second outcome is an unobserved counterfactual.
The objective of matching methods is to construct the missing counterfactual by drawing
comparisons conditional on a vector of observable characteristics, X. It has been shown
that as long as relevant di¤erences between two rms can be captured by the observable
(pre-treatment) variables, matching methods yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment
impact (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The key underlying assumption is that conditional on
the observable characteristics that are relevant for the export decision, potential outcomes
for exporting (treated) and non-exporting (untreated) are orthogonal to treatment status.
(rt(d = 1); rt(d = 0)) ? djX
The implication is that both rms of our matched pairs exhibit similar performance
under the same circumstances
E[rt(d = 1)  rt(d = 0)jd = 1] =
h
E[rt(d = 1)jX; d = 1]  E[rt(d = 0)jX; d = 0]
i
 
h
E[rt(d = 0)jX; d = 1]  E[rt(d = 0)jX; d = 0]
i
=
h
E[rt(d = 1)jX; d = 1]  E[rt(d = 0)jX; d = 0]
i
(IV.9)
The second di¤erence in equation (IV.9) captures the selection bias. The key assumption
in our method is that this term is assumed to be zero conditional on X. It represents
the di¤erence between the exporting rms, should they not have exported, and those that
did not export, in the same state (non-exporting). The rst di¤erence in equation (IV.9)
captures the causal e¤ect of exporting on physical investment. It follows that under the
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matching assumption the performance di¤erence between new exporters and non-exporting
control observations is an unbiased estimate of the causal e¤ect.
In our setting, the propensity score is the predicted probability of entry into ex-
port markets. Given the predicted probability of export entry we compare the performance
of rms matched on the basis of their propensity score. This technique is particularly at-
tractive in this context as there are a large number of observable variables with signicant
predictive power for determining whether a rm will enter into export markets. Speci-
cally, although our simple model provides an intuitive and concise description of the rms
investment and export decisions, we observe (and document) that a wide set of observable
rm-level characteristics have strong predictive power even after controlling for observed
rm-level productivity. Further, it is unclear how to condition on a large number of vari-
ables when a priori we do not have a strong guide on which dimensions rms should be
matched. As noted by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propensity score matching provides
a natural weighting scheme that yields unbiased estimates of the treatment impact. Con-
ditioning on the propensity score is equivalent to conditioning on all of the available infor-
mation, but reduces the dimensionality problem. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) highlight
the benets of combining matching with di¤erence-in-di¤erence methods for controlling ob-
servable and unobservable di¤erences between treatment and control units. In particular,
they emphasize that matching accounts for di¤erences in observable characteristics while
di¤erence-in-di¤erences methods allows for an unobserved determinant of participation as
long as it can be represented by separable individual and/or time-specic components of
the error term." In our case, examples would include a particular rm entering export mar-
kets because of its knowledge of foreign markets or the superior performance of the rm
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manager.
Data
The primary source of data is the Indonesian manufacturing census between 1990
and 2000. Collected annually by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Budan Pusat Statistik
(BPS), the survey covers the population of manufacturing plants in Indonesia with at least
20 employees. The data capture the formal manufacturing sector and record detailed plant-
level information covering industrial classication, revenues, capital stock, new investment
in physical capital, capital sales, intermediate inputs, exports, and foreign ownership. Data
on revenues and inputs are deated with wholesale price indices.8
Key to our analysis the data also include a measure of the market value of capital
holdings along with the value of new investment in each year except 1996. Specically, the
data contain annual observations on the estimated value of xed capital, new investment
and capital sales across ve type types of capital: land, buildings, vehicles, machinery and
equipment, and other capital not classied elsewhere. The capital stock and investment
series are created by aggregating data across types. Following Blalock and Gertler (2004)
we deate capital using a wholesale price indices for construction, imported electrical and
non-electrical equipment and imported transportation equipment. To construct the capital
stock deator we weight each price index by the average reported shares of buildings and
8Price deators are constructed as closely as possible to Blalock and Gertler (2004) and include separate
deators (1) output and domestic intermediates, (2) energy, (3) imported intermediates and (4) export sales.
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Table 38. Investment and Export Moments
All Non-Exporters New-Exporters
Average investment rate (I/K) 0.056 0.039 0.088
Inaction frequency 0.735 0.774 0.570
Fraction of observations with negative investment 0.002 0.002 0.003
Average export intensity 0.092 0 0.643
Export frequency 0.131 0 1
Correlation of export and investment status 0.168  
Correlation of log export sales and log investment   0.593
land, machinery and equipment and xed vehicle assets.9
Investment and Export Moments
The main features of the investment and export sales distributions are summarized
in Table 38. In 1990, there are 13,641 manufacturing plants that contain a full set of
information, while by 2000 the data covers 18,211 plants. We omit any rms for which
there is missing investment and capital information and choose to focus exclusively on rms
which are initially non-exporters in the rst year of the sample.
Few rms are actively investing in any year. Approximately, 73.5 percent of the
(rm-year) observations report no new investment or capital sales and only 0.2 percent
report any capital sales. This suggests that in only 26.3 percent of observations do we
observe positive net investment. Moreover, only 13.9 percent of rms report investment
rates greater than 11 percent, the average reported depreciation rate in the sample.
9Our measure of capital has several advantages. First, using a market value of capital the measure
accounts for variation in depreciation and changes in the productivity of the current capital stock across
rms. We observe that, like other data sets that provide direct estimates of depreciation (e.g. Schundeln,
2011), this value varies substantially in the cross-section, particularly in particularly in developing countries.
Second, we observe that across industries there is large cross-sectional variation in the degree to which rms
invest in physical capital that is not classied in one of the four main classes of capital. To the extent that
the nature of this capital varies across rms we might expect that the temporal variation in its productivity,
market value and depreciation to be an additional source of variation over time not otherwise captured.
Third, the data has excellent coverage across rms. It is often di¢ cult to get reliable estimates of rm-
level capital holdings in developing countries, particularly in cases where small rms do not have accurate
recording of the book value of capital. Alternatively, we also construct a capital series for each rm using
perpetual inventory methods. This results in a distribution of capital across rms which is nearly identical
to that from our preferred measure of capital. We do, however, have to drop numerous rms from the data
set because of missing investment data from year to year. As such, we present results from the rst measure
of capital here. We have checked our results using the measure of capital constructed by perpetual inventory
and nd very similar estimates.
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The investment rate and frequency documented in Table 38 are somewhat lower
than those reported in the US (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006), Norway (Nilsen and Schi-
antarelli, 2003) and even Columbia (Huggett and Ospina, 2001). This can largely be at-
tributed to the fact that in each of the above papers, the authors study a balanced panel of
manufacturing rms, whereas we keep all of the rms in our sample. Balancing our panel
of manufacturing rms results in signicant data loss during the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. If
we examine comparable moments for a balanced sample in the pre-crisis period (1990-1995)
we nd an average investment rate of 10.9 percent, an inaction frequency of 63.9, and a
positive investment frequency of 34.9 percent. Moreover, 17.4 percent of rms demonstrate
new investment greater than 11 percent. These gures are closer to those found elsewhere,
but continue to reect the more restrictive investment environment in Indonesia relative to
the US or Norway.
On average 13 percent of rms export in the sample while the average percentage
of sales from exports is just more than 9 percent. As is typical in many rm-level manufac-
turing data sets, export revenues are often small compared to the domestic market. The last
two rows examine the correlation between exporting and investment. We observe current
export and investment status are positively correlated, but the correlation coe¢ cient is just
below 0.17. If we restrict our attention to rms that are both investing and exporting in
the same year, we observe that the correlation coe¢ cient on the log of export sales and the
log of net investment rises to 0.59.
New exporters demonstrate much higher investment demonstrate markedly higher
investment rates then non-exporters. We observe that the investment rate among new
exporters is more than double that among non-exporters, while the inaction frequency is
over 20 percentage points smaller among new exporters. However, as our model highlighted,
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both of these may be driven by productivity di¤erences across exporting and non-exporting
rms. As such, we turn next to estimating productivity across rms in order to compare
similar exporting and non-exporting rms.
Estimating Productivity
As suggested by our model, total factor productivity is a key variable in our analy-
sis since rm-level export and investment decisions are typically strongly correlated with
measures of rm-level e¢ ciency. We measure total factor productivity using a multilateral
index developed by Caves et al. (1982) and Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001). The key advan-
tage of this index is that it allows for consistent comparisons of total factor productivity
(TFP) in rm-level panel data.10 The idea underlying the index is that each rms produc-
tivity is measured relative to a single reference point. Specically, the index compares rm
js inputs (capital, labor, materials, energy) and output in year t to a hypothetical reference
rm operating in the base time period (t = 0) with average input cost shares, average log
inputs and average log output:
lnTFPjt = (lnYjt   lnYt) +
tX
=2
(lnY   lnY 1)
 
"
nX
m=1
1
2
(Sjmt + Smt)(lnXjmt   lnXmt)
+
tX
=2
nX
m=1
1
2
(Sm   Sm 1)(lnXm   lnXm 1)
#
10Van Biesebroeck (2007) compares the robustness of ve commonly used measures of productivity (index
numbers, data envelopment, stochastic frontier, GMM and semi-parametric estimation). He nds that the
index number approach taken here tends to produce very robust results. Arnold and Javorcik (2011) similarly
compute rm-level productivity on a similar set of Indonesian rms and report that this measure is strongly
robust in their sample. Nonetheless, for robustness, we have also estimated a productivity series for each
rm following the methods described in Olley and Pakes (1996) and applied to this data set as in Amiti and
Konings (2007). We could not reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale in any industry. Since the
results from the matching exercise were very similar in all cases we have omitted them from the main text.
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where m indexes the type of input. As noted above output Y is measured in real terms
along with inputs, X: labor (the number of employees), materials (real value of materials
costs), energy (real value of electricity and fuel) and capital. S captures input shares for
each input other than capital. For example, the labor share is measured as the ratio of
the real wage bill to output. The capital share is obtained by assuming constant returns
to scale. Finally, X, Y and S are the inputs, output and input shares of the hypothetical
reference plant.
Export Premia
We document investment behavior across three di¤erent groups of rms: incum-
bent exporters, new exporters and non-exporters. We dene an incumbent exporter as a
rm which had positive export sales in years t   1 and t while new exporters, in contrast,
capture rms that did not export in t 1. Non-exporters capture the remaining rms which
did not export in the current year.
While table 39 suggests that exporting has a strong positive impact on investment
it is not clear that these di¤erences are signicant or causal. To approach these issues
we rst consider a simple regression of the rms investment rate on its export status. We
measure the investment rate, rjt = ijt=kjt, as the rm js net investment ijt, new investment
less capital sales, in year t divided by the existing capital stock, kjt.11
rjt = 0 + xxjtxjt 1 + nxjt(1  xjt 1) + jt (IV.10)
where xjt 2 f0; 1g is a binary variable which takes a value of one if the rm exports in
11Alternatively, we considered the log of new investment as our dependent variable. While it yielded
similar results, its use required dropping many rms in our sample because the rm chose not to invest or
was reducing its capital holdings. Moreover, we would be unable to perform analysis over time since only a
small portion of our sample invests continuously over time.
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year t and jt is an error term. While our specication is purposefully simple, the estimated
coe¢ cients are an easily interpretable measure of the size and signicance of the relationship
between exporting and investment.
The rst row of Table 39 presents OLS estimates of coe¢ cients from equation
(IV.10). In each case we include province, year and industry (ISIC 4-digit) dummies. The
rst column restricts the coe¢ cients across incumbent and new exporters to be identical and
suggests that the investment rate among exporters is 5.1 higher than non-exporting rms.
While this is a moderate increase in the investment rate, it represents a drastic change
in investment behavior. The average investment rate among exporting rms is 0.110. As
such, the export premium for exporters, 0.051, represents nearly half of new investment
among new exporters during the year of entry. Column (2) allows the export premium
to vary across new and existing exporters. We observe very similar results; the export
premium among new exporters is 4.7 percentage points, while it is 4.8 percentage points
among incumbent exporters.
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Columns (3)-(14) repeat the experiment for numerous subsamples and di¤erent
dimensions in our data. Specically, we separately examine the investment in machinery
(columns 3-4), investment among domestic (columns 5-6) and foreign rms (columns 7-8),
investment before (columns 9-10) and after the Asian crisis (columns 11-12), and among
small rms (columns 13-14). Remarkably, we observe nearly identical, strongly signicant
export premia in each case. Further, the OLS regressions reveal little discernible di¤erence
across new and incumbent exporters.
Although these initial results are striking, there are a number of alternative ex-
planations for the statistically signicant relationship between exporting and investment.
For instance, our estimates likely reect unobserved di¤erences across rms. As our model
suggests more productive rms are likely to invest at a higher rate. Similarly, we might
expect that new exporters may adjust capital holdings over numerous years and, as such,
our denitions of new and incumbent exporters may be misleading. We take a rst pass at
addressing these concerns in the bottom two panels.
In the second panel we re-estimate equation (IV.10) with rm-level xed e¤ects.
In this case the export premia coe¢ cients are identied solely by within-rm variation.
Moreover, to the extent that key rm-level di¤erences, such as productivity, are persistent
over time, we expect that the rm-level xed e¤ects will at least partially control for these
factors. Across all columns the export premia coe¢ cients are now estimated to be substan-
tially smaller, though in most cases strongly signicant. In the full sample, we nd that
exporters invest 1.5 percent faster than non-exporters overall. Although this coe¢ cient is
small, it represents 14 percent of overall investment among exporting rms.
The second panel also reveals small, but important di¤erences across new and
incumbent exporters. In particular, the point estimates of the export premia among new
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exporters tend to be larger and more strongly signicant than those among incumbent
exporters. This is to be expected since new exporters are likely to be smaller, more capital
constrained and likely have had less time to adjust capital holdings. In the last panel, we
redene a new exporter as an exporter which has begun exporting in the past 3 years while
an incumbent exporter is an exporter with at least 3 years of experience in export markets.
Again we observe that both new and incumbent exporters tend to invest at a higher rate
than non-exporting rms. However, we now observe larger di¤erences between new and
incumbent exporters.
A particularly striking result is that from foreign owned rms (column 8).12 We
observe that in each panel foreign-owned exporting rms tend to invest much more heavily
than other foreign -owned non-exporters. New investment in developing countries is often
plagued by numerous nancial frictions and, as such, new nancing can be di¢ cult to secure.
Di¤erences in access to credit markets may be reected in the observed investment rates;
better access to credit may allow foreign rms the ability to adjust capital holdings to new
export opportunities. In particular, if domestic rms have to nance a larger portion of
investment through internal saving we might expect that new domestic exporters adjust
by smaller amounts over a longer time period relative to foreign rms. Alternatively, the
di¤erence might simply reect large di¤erences in rm-level productivity, which are not
adequately controlled for in our simple regressions. We examine these issues, among others,
below.
An Empirical Model of Exporting and Investment
Our objective is to study the paths of investment before and after entry into export
12We dene a foreign rm as one where at least 10 percent of equity is held by foreign investors.
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markets. In order to implement propensity score matching we need an empirical model for
the entry of rms into export markets. We begin by estimating a probit model of the
binary decision to enter export markets. In general, the logarithm of observable plant-
level characteristics are lagged one year and pertain to the pre-entry period. We believe
that observable characteristics are a reasonable starting point since rm-level capabilities
in terms of productivity, size, employment, capital or skill-intensity are likely to inuence
the extent to which rms are able and willing to enter export markets. Further, we observe
detailed rm-level information which characterizes the degree to which non-exporting rms
are integrated in world markets, either through foreign ownership or imported intermediate
inputs. We choose to use variables which are lagged one year to control contemporaneous
productivity shocks which a¤ect both investment and exporting.
The results are presented in Table 40. We observe that the exporting rms di¤er
strongly from non-exporters. In particular, rms with greater TFP are more likely to
enter export markets; the coe¢ cient on TFP is signicant at standard levels. Further,
younger and more capital intensive rms are more likely to export. Firms which are already
internationally integrated, either by sourcing foreign inputs or having foreign ownership,
are also much more likely to enter export markets. We are particularly interested in the
large coe¢ cient on lagged foreign ownership. If entry into new markets requires costly
investments, we might expect that foreign owned rms - which are likely to benet from
access for foreign credit markets - may be better able to become successful exporters. We
have also included the lagged net investment rate to ensure that matches assigned on the
basis of propensity score will be homogeneous with respect to previous investment behavior.
This is particularly important in our case since this helps control for any plants which begin
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Table 40. Probit: Predicting Export Entry
TFPt 1 0.077**
(0.037)
Age -0.024***
(0.002)
Age2 0.0002***
(0.00002)
Capital per Workert 2 0.082***
(0.009)
Average Waget 1 0.002***
(0.001)
Skill Intensityt 1 0.044
(0.075)
Imported Input Sharet 1 0.338***
(0.044)
Foreign Ownershipt 1 0.600***
(0.047)
Investment Ratiot 1 0.540***
(0.047)
Time Trend 0.024***
(0.004)
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes
No. of obs. 71,375
Chi2 3,171.44
Prob > Chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.151
Notes: The table reports the coe¢ cients from a probit regression for the decision to export among rst time exporters
in Indonesia. Four-digit industry dummies, province dummies and year dummies are included but not reported.
  , ,  indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Squared variables, other than age, were
generally insignicantly di¤erent from zero and are dropped from this specication.
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accumulating capital in anticipation of future entry into export markets.
The only variable which is insignicant in Table 40 is our measure of rm-level skill-
intensity. Our hypothesis is that average wage, as suggested by Fox and Smeets (2011), is
strongly correlated with the average skill-level among employees. As such, after controlling
for the average rm-level wage there is little independent variation in skill-intesenity measure
which is not already captured by the other explanatory variables.
The predicted probability of exporting resulting from the model in Table 3 will
form the propensity score and act as the metric for our matching procedure. We use one-to-
one nearest neighbor matching.13 We restrict that any two matched rms must be chosen
from the same year and industry. To determine how successful our matching procedure is
we compare the di¤erence between the treated and control group in terms of each of the
above variables and compute t-statitics for each of the reported variables across 8 bands
of the propensity score. In no case do we nd statistically signicant di¤erences.14 In the
full sample, our matched pairs of rms are only one percentage point apart in terms of
propensity score. This suggests that our matches are very close along this measure and we
can have condence in the resulting comparisons.15 Finally, in all of the specications that
follow, our results consistently suggest that there are no statistically signicant di¤erences
in the investment rates across treated and control rms in the pre-entry year.
13We have repeated our experiment using alternative matching strategies such as increasing the number
of control matches (10), local linear regression matching, spline matching and full Mahalanobis matching.
Since the main results are very similar across matching strategies we do not present further results below.
14This exercise is often referred to as the balancing hypothesis (see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The results
of this exercise are presented in the Appendix.
15Recall, that the propensity score measure is bounded by 0 and 100.
176
Results
Full Sample
We rst examine the di¤erence-in-di¤erence results on the full sample of matched
rms. We observe in Table 41 that the matching procedure appears to work very well; in
the year before entry there is less than a 0.5 percentage point di¤erence in the estimated
investment rates between treated and control rms. Moreover, we observe that the di¤erence
in the propensity score is very small. However, although both treatment and control groups
begin with similar investment rates, they diverge quickly. In particular, we observe that
exporting rms maintain high investment rates during the entry period while investment
rates among the non-exporting control group decline sharply over the same period. This
pattern reects the lumpiness of investment. New exporters are likely to be rms which
are investing heavily before entry. Not surprisingly the matched control rms demonstrate
similar investment behavior in the initial period. However, among exporters it is reasonable
to expect that it will take several years to expand into export markets; in developing
countries where access to credit is relatively tight we might expect that capital accumulation
is stretched out over time since many rms have to nance capital expenditures internally.
As such, it is not surprising that investment rates remain high among the treated group
in all 3 years after initial entry. In contrast, among non-exporting rms, investment is
likely to capture the normal replacement of depreciated capital. Since these rms are not
expanding into new markets it is reasonable to expect that these investments would occur
over a much-shorter time period among non-exporting rms.
The estimated investment rates are plotted graphically in Figure 11. The di¤erence
in investment rates between the treated and control groups grows during the year of entry
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Table 41. Investment Rate and Exporting, Full Sample
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.120 0.105 0.087 0.083 0.073
Control Group: C 0.114 0.064 0.051 0.049 0.050
ATT 0.005 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
ATT/ T 0.400 0.481 0.410 0.315
No. of matched pairs 2,387 2,094 1,825 1,329 1,235
Mean di¤erence in 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.016
propensity score
Notes: The rst two lines present the outcomes observed in the given time period. The average treatment e¤ect on
the treated (ATT) is presented in the third row along with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   , , 
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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and then begins to shrink in the years that follow. The window immediately around entry
suggests that the di¤erence in investment rates rises with exporting. The average treatment
e¤ect on the treated (ATT) suggests that average investment rate spikes up by 4 percentage
points in the year of entry, remains 3 percentage points higher for two years after entry
and is 2 percentage points higher three years after entry among treated rms. These are
all strongly signicant at conventional levels and represent large increases in investment
behavior. ÄTo get a sense of the relative change in investment behavior, we calculate the
relative export e¤ect as the ratio of the average treatment e¤ect on the treated to mean
investment rate among the treated rms in each year. Relative to the average investment
rate among treated rms, the average treatment e¤ects on the treated rms suggests that
exporting accounts for a very large percentage of total investment; among treated rms
exporting roughly accounts for 32 to 48 percent of total investment between the year of
entry and three years afterwards.
Our results suggest that upon entry into export markets large rm-level changes,
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particularly in the physical composition and organization of the rms, are well underway.
Our results suggest that these constraints are likely to alleviated within a small number
of years since exporting rms are actively expanding capital stock. Further, physical cap-
ital constraints have been suggested as a mechanism through which export market shocks
are transmitted to the domestic market. Our results suggest that if rms are actively ac-
cumulating capital to optimally serve both home and export markets the severity of this
transmission mechanism should decline over time.
The reader will notice that the number of matched pairs varies over time. This
occurs for two reasons. First, the survey does not collect investment information in 1996.
This di¤erentially a¤ects the number of matches which are missing information in any two
years; that is, the number of rms missing information for year t =  1 is di¤erent than that
in year t = 0 and so on. Second, some rms endogenously exit our sample. To the extent
that smaller, non-exporting rms are more likely to exit and less likely to invest, we might
expect that the estimated ATT is downwards biased. Likewise, our main sample combines
the e¤ects across all types of ownership structure, size and time periods. This last e¤ect
is of particular concern in this context since it well known that Indonesia su¤ered a strong
contraction during and after the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997. We consider these issues
in our robustness checks.
Asian Crisis
One of the features of our sample is that it covers the period in which Indonesia
was subject to the Asian nancial crisis. The Asian nancial crisis began in the fall of
1997 and continued well into 1998. There are two features of the Asian which are of
particular interest in our study. First, the onset of the nancial crisis was widely reported
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to have sharply restricted access to credit during the crisis years. Moreover, although the
Indonesian economy had begun to recover by 1999, access to credit continued to be much
more restricted in comparison the pre-crisis period (Ito and Sato, 2006). Second, it is well
known that aggregate exports fell substantially during this period.
To the extent that the Asian crisis may have a¤ected rm-level exporting and
investment rates, we may expect that our estimates may be biased. What is less clear,
however, is the direction of the bias. On one hand, smaller export opportunities and tighter
investment regulation are likely to reduce investment and discourage large entries into export
markets. As such, we might expect that our estimates in the full sample could be biased
towards zero if the Asian crisis is not adequately controlled for in the full sample. On
the other hand, if only the strongest rms are able to export during the Asian crisis we
might expect that these exporting rms are very productive and have a particularly strong
incentive to invest.
We investigate this possibility by repeating our exercise before the Asian crisis pe-
riod (1990-1995) and on the period during and after the Asian crisis (1997-2000). Comparing
the top and bottom panels of Table 42 we immediately observe a number of key di¤erences
across time periods. The mean investment rates among both treated and control rms are
much higher before the crisis relative to the subsequent crisis period. We also observe that
during the crisis period exporting appears to have a stronger impact on investment rates
after entry. Exporting accounts for nearly twice as much of total investment after initial
entry into export markets during the crisis period; for example, the ATT= T  100  30%
in year of entry during the pre-crisis period, while this same calculation jumps to 62%
during the crisis period. Our results strongly suggest as the domestic market contracted
sharply during the Asian crisis, export markets were a particularly important determinant
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Table 42. Investment Rate and Exporting, Asian Financial Crisis
Pre-Crisis (1991-1995)
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.130 0.111 0.087 0.084 0.083
Control Group: C 0.114 0.078 0.065 0.060 0.060
ATT 0.016 0.033*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.023**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
ATT/ T 0.297 0.253 0.297 0.277
No. of matched pairs 1,787 1,494 1,195 894 621
Mean di¤erence in 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.019
propensity score
Crisis and Post-Crisis (1997-2000)
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.090 0.092 0.061 0.080 0.063
Control Group: C 0.099 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.035
ATT -0.009 0.057*** 0.021* 0.040*** 0.028***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
ATT/ T 0.620 0.344 0.500 0.444
No. of matched pairs 600 600 630 435 614
Mean di¤erence in 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012
propensity score
Notes: The rst two lines present the outcomes observed in the given time period. The average treatment e¤ect on
the treated (ATT) is presented in the third row along with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   , , 
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 43. Investment Rate Across Large and Small Firms (Capital)
Large Firms (K  K)
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.127 0.111 0.084 0.089 0.084
Control Group: C 0.112 0.064 0.060 0.058 0.055
ATT 0.015 0.046*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
ATT/ T 0.414 0.286 0.348 0.345
No. of matched pairs 1,714 1,505 1,329 1,001 963
Mean di¤erence in 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.011
propensity score
Small Firms (K < K)
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.100 0.089 0.066 0.064 0.046
Control Group: C 0.093 0.053 0.038 0.034 0.029
ATT 0.007 0.037*** 0.028** 0.030** 0.016
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
ATT/ T 0.415 0.424 0.469 0.348
No. of matched pairs 694 606 510 344 288
Mean di¤erence in 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005
propensity score
Notes: The rst two lines present the outcomes observed in the given time period. The average treatment e¤ect on
the treated (ATT) is presented in the third row along with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   , , 
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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of investment behavior among exporting rms.
Small vs. Large Firms
In this section we investigate di¤erences across rm size. We expect that we may
observe di¤erences across rm size for a number of reasons. On one hand, by virtue of
being small, small rms may have a greater need to increase capacity as they enter export
markets. On the other hand, large rms may have be able to secure cheaper nancing and,
as such, expand more rapidly into export markets.
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How to distinguish large rms with access to credit markets from smaller, less-
connected counterparts is unclear. We begin by calculating the median capital stock in
each 4-digit industry. Then we dene a large rmas any rm which has at least as much
capital as the median rm in the industry two years prior to rst entry into export markets.
We choose to use capital stock as our metric for rm size since existing capital is most
closely linked to a rms ability to secure further nancing.
The results are presented in Table 43. We nd that the percentage point increase in
investment rates are similar across samples, though the statistical signicance is somewhat
larger among large rms. This may reect better credit access or simply more regular
investment in order to maintain a larger capital stock. However, it is worth noting that the
average investment rate among treated rms is substantially lower among small exporters.
This implies that the ratio of the ATT to the average investment rate among small exporters
is consistently greater than that among large rms, or that exporting has a relatively larger
impact on capital expansion among small rms. In either case these di¤erences appear to
be modest.
Disaggregated Investment
Our data allows us to disaggregate each rms capital stock and investment into
a number of sub-categories. To get a sense of the nature of rm-level capital expansion
during entry into export markets we repeat our matching exercise for three groups of capital
holdings: machinery and equipment, buildings and land, and vehicles. Because the data
for the individual components of investment tends to be much more volatile than that of
total investment we trim the bottom and top one percent of each disaggregated investment
before performing our analysis.
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Among total capital holdings in our data set machinery and equipment, buildings
and land, and vehicles account for nearly 19, 41, and 8 percent of recorded holdings, respec-
tively. Likewise, among investing rms machinery and equipment, buildings and land, and
vehicles account for nearly 40, 26, and 18 percent of new investment, respectively.16 Our
expectation is that the increase in the rms productive capacity associated with entry into
export markets is most closely associated with the holdings of the physical machinery and
equipment necessary for production.
The results for machinery and equipment, buildings and land, and vehicles are
presented in Table 44. As expected we observe highly signicant results for investment
in machinery and equipment both in the year of initial entry and in the two rst years
after entry. The point estimates suggest that exporting causes the investment rate for
machinery and equipment to increase by 3.6 percentage points in the year of entry and 2.3-
5.1 percentage points in the two years after entry. Relative to the average investment rate
across rms, these estimates imply a 27-44 percent increase in machinery investment over
those 3 years. Somewhat surprisingly, we observe similar, signicant increases in vehicles,
and buildings and land in both the year of entry and for at least 2 years after entry into
export markets. In particular, the impact of exporting on investment relative to the average
investment rate among exporting rms would suggest that exporting has similar across all
types of capital holdings.
Discussion
Our results, thus far, have strongly indicated that exporting has a large impact
on rm-level investment. This result was found to be true for both large and small rms,
16The remaining investment, capital sales or capital stock is classied as other investment not classied
elsewhere."
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Table 44. Investment Rate and Exporting, Disaggregated Investment
Machinery and Equipment
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.115 0.116 0.116 0.084 0.080
Control Group: C 0.099 0.0.081 0.065 0.061 0.064
ATT 0.016 0.036** 0.051*** 0.023* 0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018)
ATT/ T 0.310 0.440 0.274 0.213
No. of matched pairs 809 575 604 493 360
Mean di¤erence in 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
propensity score
Buildings and Land
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.103 0.080 0.064 0.065 0.059
Control Group: C 0.087 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.046
ATT 0.016 0.031*** 0.017** 0.022*** 0.013
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
ATT/ T 0.388 0.266 0.338 0.220
No. of matched pairs 1,858 1,694 1,500 1,110 951
Mean di¤erence in 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.023
propensity score
Vehicles
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.164 0.151 0.124 0.137 0.125
Control Group: C 0.129 0.099 0.087 0.092 0.077
ATT 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.048***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
ATT/ T 0.344 0.298 0.328 0.384
No. of matched pairs 1,649 1,518 1,367 1,013 873
Mean di¤erence in 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.017 0.025
propensity score
Notes: The rst two lines present the outcomes observed in the given time period. The average treatment e¤ect on
the treated (ATT) is presented in the third row along with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   , , 
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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before and after the Asian crisis and across di¤erent types of capital. Likewise, in each case
we nd that rm-level capital holdings adjust to exporting slowly over time. We conclude
that our rst two model predictions are strongly supported by the data. Our ndings
are broadly consistent with the results in Soderbury (2010), Nguyen and Schaur (2011),
Ahn and McQuoid (2012) and Vannoorenberghe (2012) who suggest that new exporters
are often capital constrained. Our results indicate that new exporters are investing rapidly
upon entry to relax these constraints.
To reinforce this nding we nonetheless perform a number of additional checks to
verify the robustness of our results. Specically, we check the impact of sample attrition,
the impact of endogenous rm-level exit from export markets and the impact of varying our
denition of rm size on our ndings. In each case, we nd results which are very similar
both in magnitude and signicance to those already documented in Section 5. Because of
this we omit further discussion of these ndings from the main text, although the interested
reader can nd full results and associated discussion in our Appendix.
Instead, we now turn our attention to our second set of questions. That is, we study
the role of nancial frictions on rm-level investment rates upon entry into export markets.
Given the di¢ culty associated with institutional and nancial reform, understanding the
degree to which new exporters are constrained by nancial frictions is key for evaluating
the potential benets from trade from developing countries.
Credit Constrained Exporters
Although few papers have studied capital accumulation and exporting, a number
of recent related papers have emphasized the importance of nancial frictions in determin-
ing export outcomes across rms, industries and countries. Manova (2010), Aisen et al.
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(2011), Ahn and McQuoid (2012), Manova, Wei and Zhang (2011), Kohn, Leibovici and
Szkup (2012) and Manova and Yu (2012) all suggest that the presence of rm-level nancial
frictions a¤ect export decisions and growth. Naturally, nancial frictions will also a¤ect
investment. We are interested in identifying whether within-rms changes, namely invest-
ment behavior, are consistent with evidence that nancial frictions have a large impact on
export outcomes
A large number of papers argue that multinational corporations (MNCs) are able
to relax nancial constraints for a¢ liates located in developing countries. For example,
Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2008) use observable di¤erences in ownership structure to
demonstrate that foreign owned rms in Indonesia, certeris paribus, invested at a higher
rate than domestic rms as the domestic credit market tightened during the Asian crisis.17
They argue that a key reason for the observed di¤erence in the investment rate arises
naturally since foreign owned rms are likely to have much better access to foreign credit
markets.
We further expect that nancial frictions will a¤ect how rms invest over time.
In the presence of non-convex investment costs, we would expect that foreign rms, with
strong ties to credit markets, will be able to adjust to export markets faster than comparable
domestic rms. As noted in Bond, Tybout and Utar (2008), small rms in developing
countries are likely to have to nance investment from internal saving. If nancial frictions
impede export-associated investment we might expect to observe sizable di¤erences in our
context across ownership, time and lending regimes in Indonesia.
Of course, nancial access is not the only key di¤erence between foreign and do-
17Other supporting evidence includes Antràs, Desai and Foley (2009) and Carluccio and Fally (2010) who
the activities of US and French MNCs, respectively. Similarly, Bustos (2007) shows that Argentine rms
in sectors more reliant on external nance are more likely to be foreign owned and funded. Huang et al.
(2008), Héricourt and Poncet (2009) and Girma and Görg (2009) document that FDI helps private domestic
rms in China overcome credit constraints and accelerate innovation activities.
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mestic rms. Rather, we expect that foreign owned rms also benet from substantial
technological and e¢ ciency advantages relative to their domestic counterparts. Accounting
for these di¤erences across rms allows us to disentangle the benet from better access to
credit markets. We begin by repeating our matching and di¤erence-in-di¤erence exercise
for foreign and domestically owned rms separately. This will allow us to document system-
atic di¤erences across foreign and domestic rms. However, it will not identify the degree
to which access to foreign credit markets allows foreign owned rms to expand faster into
export markets. We then proceed to further investigate the interaction of ownership and
investment over time and lending regimes to quantify the impact of credit constraints on
rm-level investment decisions upon entry into export markets.
Foreign and Domestic Ownership
Here we reconsider our matching exercise to investigate whether there are system-
atic di¤erences in the investment behavior of foreign and domestic rms upon entry into
export markets. We begin by noting that we need to be careful in our denition of what
constitutes a foreign rm. As noted above, we rst consider any rm where at least 10
percent of rm equity is owned by foreign investors to be foreign owned. Second, we need
to be careful not to misinterpret the causal impact of becoming foreign with that from
exporting.18 To this end, we rst dene a new foreign exporter as a rm which has been
held by foreign investors for at least one year prior to starting to export. We choose this
denition of foreign rms so that our ndings cannot be attributed to MNCs choosing to
purchase Indonesian rms with larger capital holdings, better access to credit markets or
superior export potential. Likewise, we capture our domestic sample in a similar fashion;
18Arnold and Javorcik (2009) show that rms that receive foreign direct investment tend to experience
productivity increases in Indonesia.
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Table 45. Investment Rate and Exporting, Foreign vs. Domestic Firms
Foreign Firms
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.199 0.161 0.120 0.125 0.131
Control Group: C 0.271 0.105 0.083 0.076 0.062
ATT -0.071 0.055** 0.037 0.048* 0.069**
(0.040) (0.026) (0.034) (0.032) (0.029)
ATT/ T 0.341 0.308 0.384 0.527
No. of matched pairs 227 200 171 118 117
Mean di¤erence in 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
propensity score
Domestic Firms
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.116 0.097 0.074 0.080 0.071
Control Group: C 0.108 0.069 0.062 0.056 0.051
ATT 0.008 0.028*** 0.012* 0.025*** 0.020***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
ATT/ T 0.289 0.162 0.313 0.282
No. of matched pairs 2,080 1,829 1,597 1,181 1,088
Mean di¤erence in 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004
propensity score
Notes: The rst two lines present the outcomes observed in the given time period. The average treatment e¤ect on
the treated (ATT) is presented in the third row along with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   , , 
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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we dene a new domestic exporter as a rm which has been held by domestic owners for at
least one year prior to entry into export markets.
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 45. There are a number
of striking among foreign rms. First, the estimated average treatment e¤ects on the
treated are strongly signicant among foreign rms in the year of entry and three years
after entry. During the intervening years the ATTs are insignicantly di¤erent from zero
when evaluated at the 5 percent level of signicance. This pattern suggests a degree of
lumpiness in investment consistent with non-convex adjustment costs. Second, we observe
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a very large ATT among foreign exporters in the year they enter export markets. In this
year, the ATT captures a 5.5 percentage point increase in the investment rate among foreign
exporters and is strongly signicant. Moreover, when we compare the ATT in the year of
entry relative to the average investment rate among foreign exporters we nd that it explains
31-53% of total rm-level investment.
The results from the sample of domestic rms contrast sharply. First, we note that
we begin to observe signicant di¤erences between treated and control rms in the year of
initial entry and these continue during the years after entry. This result is consistent with
the idea that domestic rms may be constrained by nancial frictions and, as such, can only
adjust capital holdings slowly over time. We nd that the investment rate among domestic
exporters is 2.8 percentage points higher in the year of entry and 1.2-2.5 percentage points
higher in the years following entry. Collectively, these explain approximately 16-31% of
overall investment in each year.
The results from Table 45 are suggestive of nancial frictions a¤ecting rm-level
entry into export markets. In particular, they suggest that foreign rms invest more over
a shorter period of time when entering export markets, while domestic exporters increase
investment more modestly over a longer time period. However, our results require some
caution. In particular, the control rms are likely to di¤er substantially across subsam-
ples and, as such, it would be incorrect to draw conclusions by comparing the estimated
di¤erences between treated and control groups across experiments. Nonetheless, these nd-
ings motivate further inquiry into the impact of nancial frictions on rm-level export and
investment behavior. We study this issue in more detail next.
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Identifying Di¤erential Responses Foreign and Domestic Firms
Our matching exercise does not allow for a straightforward comparison of the
relative magnitude of impact of exporting across foreign and domestic rms for a number
of reasons. First, we also observe large di¤erences in the standard errors on the average
treatment e¤ects across experiments in Table 8. This is hardly surprising: our denition of
a foreign rm greatly reduces the number of foreign rms in our sample and, consequently,
inates the standard errors of that group of rms. Second, the average investment rate
across foreign and domestic rms also varies considerably among control rms.
To address this issue we consider a second experiment in the same spirit as our
preceding matching exercise. We rst regress the investment rate in year t + l on dummy
variables capturing the rm export and ownership status and a large set of control variables
where l = 0; 1; 2; 3. The idea is to capture di¤erences in rm-level investment rates across
foreign and domestic rms in comparison to a given set of control rms.
Specically, the variable xdjt takes a value of 1 if a domestic rm is a rst-time
exporter in year t and 0 otherwise. Likewise, the variable xfjt similarly takes a value of 1 if
the rm is simultaneously a rst time exporter in year t and owned by foreign investors.19
Finally, we also include a large number of controls for rm-level characteristics in the pre-
entry year, on the right-hand side. This leads us to consider the following regression
rj;t+l = 0 + dx
d
jt + fx
f
jt + Xj;t 1 + ujt (IV.11)
whereXj;t 1 includes rm-level measures of productivity, employment, age, capital-intensity,
average wages, imported input shares and the investment ratio in the pre-entry year. Im-
portantly, we also include the rms ownership status as an explanatory variable. This
19Our denition of a foreign rm is as before. For a rm to be considered foreign at least 10 percent of
equity must be held by foreign investors before entry into export markets
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implies that f will capture the impact of exporting on investment above and beyond any
investment premium that pertains to foreign rms in and of themselves.
This simple regression allows us to test a number of interesting results. First,
by testing the di¤erence between f and d, we can test whether there are signicant
di¤erences in the impact exporting has on the investment rate across similar foreign and
domestically-owned rms. Second, we are able to document evidence of the impact of
nancial frictions a¤ecting export behavior in Indonesia. Specically, our previous exercise
suggested a number of empirical patterns which would be consistent with the presence of
nancial frictions. We expect that the domestic export premium d will be positive and
signicant in numerous years after initial entry into export markets. To the extent that
domestic rms have to self-nance new investment we expect that they may not be able to
fully adjust capital holdings in one year if they face signicant nancial constraints. Since
foreign rms are likely to have better access to foreign credit markets we believe that they
will be better able to nance to new investment in a shorter-period of time and grow into
export markets quickly. As such, we expect that foreign exporters will have a positive
export premium f in only one or at most two years around export entry, while domestic
rms will have positive export premia in all years after export entry. Further, because we
are comparing rms with very similar rm-level characteristics we expect that in the years
immediately around entry into export markets we will observe a positive di¤erence between
the foreign and domestic export premia, f   d > 0. A positive and signicant di¤erence
would represent evidence of underinvestment by domestic rms.
As before we only include rms which enter our sample without previous export
experience. Table 46 documents the main results from our regression exercise.20 The
20Full results are available in the Appendix.
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Table 46. Foreign vs. Domestic Firms Revisted
Dependent Variable: Investment Rate
Export Year of One Year Two Years Three Years Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Premium Entry Later Later Later Entry Later Later Later
Full Sample, 1991-2000 Matched Sample, 1991-2000
d (Dom.) 0.035*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.016** 0.027*** 0.019**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
f (For.) 0.066*** 0.030*** 0.020** 0.018* 0.087*** 0.057*** 0.022 0.047**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
f   d 0.031*** 0.014 -0.003 0.000 0.056*** 0.041** 0.005 0.028
Wald Stat 11.28 1.89 0.10 0.00 12.15 5.98 0.06 1.65
p-value 0.001 0.169 0.754 0.984 0.001 0.015 0.812 0.199
Obs. 106,153 85,887 68,091 52,904 4,272 3,118 2,141 1,934
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.   , ,  indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
rst four columns of the top panel present the results of the regression of (??) on our
full sample of data. We repeat the exercise 4 times, once for each annual investment rate
around the window of entry into export markets. Consistent with our previous results, our
estimates suggest that domestic exporters increase their investment rate by 2-3 percent in
the years around entry into export markets. As expected, these coe¢ cients are signicant
at conventional levels from the year of entry all the way through three years after entry.
In contrast, the foreign exporters display signicant di¤erences only in the year
of entry and in the rst year after entry into export markets. The export premium among
foreign rms is nearly double that of domestic exporters in the year of entry indicating that
rms with better access to foreign credit are able to expand capital holdings nearly twice as
fast as those without access to foreign credit markets. This di¤erence is strongly signicant
in the year of entry. As noted above, the di¤erence between f and d does not reect
omitted di¤erences if rm-ownership alone or rm-level productivity; both productivity and
ownership are individually included as control variables.
After the rst year, however, there does not appear to be a statistically signicant
di¤erence between foreign and domestic rms. To the extent that credit constraints a¤ect
investment among domestic rms, our results would suggest that these are most acutely felt
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in the year of entry into export markets when foreign rms are able to expand capital stock
much more rapidly. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that domestic exporters
face more stringent credit constraints than their foreign counterparts in an environment
where investment in physical capital is subject to non-convex adjustment costs.
One potential problem with our analysis is that the control group in equation
(IV.11), all non-exporting plants in 1991-2000, may not be the most appropriate. Indeed,
one of the assumptions in the regression of equation (IV.11) is that there are no unobserved
shocks that a¤ect the treated and control groups di¤erently. In the spirit of our previous
matching exercise we repeat all of the same regressions on a sample of matched rms. Our
intention is to minimize the impact of unobserved which a¤ect the treated and control
groups di¤erently (Meyer, 1995). For each new exporter, foreign or domestic, we use our
previous propensity score matching technique to nd a similar control rm as a match and
present these ndings in the right panel of Table 9. Despite a drastic fall in sample size, we
nd even stronger results in terms magnitude, signicance and timing.
Credit Constraints, Foreign Firms and the Asian Crisis
While Table 46 documents substantial evidence for nancial frictions among do-
mestic exporters, our data allows us to consider a particularly interesting robustness check
to this specic hypothesis. It is well-known that the domestic credit market contracted
substantially during the Asian crisis. We expect that rms which do not have access to
alternative sources of credit will be particularly a¤ected by the crisis, whereas those with
access to alternative sources of credit markets will be less a¤ected. Specically, we expect
that contracting domestic credit markets was more constraining to domestic rms during the
Asian crisis who, unlike their foreign counterparts, are unlikely to be able to access foreign
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Table 47. Foreign Firms, Domestic Firms and the Asian Crisis
Dependent Variable: Investment Rate
Export Year of One Year Two Years Three Years Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Premium Entry Later Later Later Entry Later Later Later
Full Sample Matched Sample
Pre-Asian Crisis: 1991-1995
d (Dom.) 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.015* 0.028*** 0.027**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
f (For.) 0.057*** 0.033** -0.001 -0.009 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.032 0.004
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029)
f   d 0.022* 0.013 -0.027* -0.040** 0.035 0.048** 0.004 -0.023
Wald Stat 2.91 0.79 2.78 4.62 2.63 4.71 0.02 0.57
p-value 0.088 0.373 0.096 0.032 0.105 0.030 0.875 0.450
Obs. 52,746 37,664 25,259 14,997 3,052 2,383 1,767 1,216
Asian Crisis and Post-Crisis: 1997-2000
d (Dom.) 0.031*** 0.009* 0.021*** 0.009* 0.061*** 0.016 0.013 0.015
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.017)
f (For.) 0.068*** 0.022* 0.034** 0.030** 0.112*** 0.036* 0.006 0.115
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.040) (0.033)
f   d 0.037*** 0.013 0.012 0.021 0.051** 0.020 -0.007 0.082***
Wald Stat 7.53 0.97 0.77 2.50 5.16 0.85 0.02 7.96
p-value 0.006 0.324 0.381 0.114 0.023 0.358 0.880 0.005
Obs. 53,407 48,223 42,832 37,907 1,220 735 374 718
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.   , ,  indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Investment data is not collected in 1996.
credit markets. As such, the estimated di¤erences across foreign and domestic rms should
be stronger during the crisis period than during the pre-crisis years. To test this hypothesis
we repeat our experiment on the period before the crisis, 1991-1995, when credit was rela-
tively loose in Indonesia and compare it the period during the crisis and that immediately
afterwards, 1997-2000, when credit was relatively restricted.
The top panel of Table 47 documents the estimated regression coe¢ cients in both
the full and matched samples before the Asian crisis, while the bottom panel presents the
same results for the period afterwards when credit was relatively tight. In the pre-crisis
period we observe coe¢ cients of similar magnitude to those in the full-sample. Further, we
observe fewer statistically signicant di¤erences across foreign and domestic rms. Although
the coe¢ cients on the foreign exporter dummy are generally larger than their domestic
counterparts, these di¤erences are relatively small and are only strongly di¤erent from zero
in the year after entry among the matched sample of rms.
195
We contrast these results with those from the bottom panel. The magnitude of
the coe¢ cients on the export dummies increase among both domestic and foreign exporters
in the year of entry. This potentially reects the growing importance of the export market
in a period when the domestic market is contracting. Further, the di¤erence between the
foreign exporter e¤ect f and the domestic exporter e¤ect d grows substantially in the
year of entry into export markets, but remains largely una¤ected in all other years.21 In
the full sample, the investment rate among foreign rms is 3.7 percent higher than that of
similar domestic rms, while the foreign investment rate is 5.1 percent higher in the matched
sample. For the average Indonesian rm, our results suggest that credit constraints reduce
investment of new exporters by as much as 53 percent.
Conclusion
This paper documents that exporting has a large impact on rm-level investment.
We nd that exporting increases rm-level investment by 40 percent in the initial year of
entry into export and that rm-level capital stock continues adjust to exporting for at least
3 years after initial entry. The estimates are strongly signicant for both large and small
rms, before and after the Asian crisis and across all types of capital holdings, among other
robustness checks. Our ndings are strongly consistent with the notion that many new
exporters are constrained upon initial entry into export markets.
We further show that access to foreign credit markets has a large impact on rm-
level investment patterns upon entry into export markets. We document that new domestic
exporters, with relatively poor access to credit markets, accumulate capital slowly over
time. In contrast, foreign-owned rms tend to make larger changes in a smaller number of
21In the matched sample, we also nd a signicant di¤erence three years after initial entry. This likely
reects di¤erences in the lumpiness of exporting across rms with di¤erential access to credit markets.
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years. In fact, in the year of entry new foreign exporters expand capital holdings nearly
twice as fast as similar domestic exporters. These results are particularly strong in periods
when domestic credit access in Indonesia was relatively restricted. Our results suggest that
while new exporters actively increase capital stock upon entry into export markets, poor or
costly access to credit markets are likely to dampen rm-level growth into export markets.
In particular, nancial frictions may be particularly damaging to export promotion, a key
objective in many developing country contexts.
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Appendix
Additional Robustness Checks
Sample Selection
A potential concern is that our main estimates (Section 5) will be broadly a¤ected
by sample attrition. We examine this issue by studying samples of rms which are in our
sample for at least T years where T = 6; 7; 8. Specically, the treated sample includes rms
which exist for at least one year before entering export markets and T   2 years after entry
(not including the year of entry). The group of control rms include rms which exist T
years but never export. The results from the matching exercise are presented in Table 48.
Naturally, as we impose stronger requirements on the length of time a rm must
be present, our overall sample size falls. Despite the reduction in sample size in all cases
we nd very similar results to those found in the full sample both in size and signicance.
Specically, we nd average treatment e¤ects on the treated of 2-4 percentage points, all of
which are strongly signicant. In the bottom panel of Table A1 we report the results for our
strictest time requirement; we required that rms produce for at least 8 consecutive years.
We again nd nearly identical results during the initial year of entry and our estimates lose
little of their statistical signicance even six years after initial entry. Our ndings suggest
that exporting may create long-lived di¤erences across rms.
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Table 49. Investment Rate and Exporting,  2 Years of Consecutive Exporting
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group 0.140 0.111 0.086 0.098 0.087
Control Group 0.141 0.076 0.061 0.060 0.057
ATT -0.002 0.035*** 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.030***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
ATT/ T 0.315 0.291 0.378 0.345
No. of matched pairs 1,269 1,171 1,132 787 748
Mean di¤erence in 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012
propensity score
Notes: The rst two lines present the outcomes observed in the given time period. The average treatment e¤ect on
the treated (ATT) is presented in the third row along with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   , , 
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Endogenous Exit from Export Markets
A potential concern in our context is that new exporters which exit export markets
shortly after initial entry may have a smaller incentive to invest and, as such, bias our main
estimates.22 We examine this issue by repeating our experiment on subsamples of rms
which have di¤erent export histories. Specically, we restrict the treated sample to new
exporting rms which export for at least 2 consecutive years.
As expected our restriction results in a substantial reduction in sample size. How-
ever, we again observe nearly identical results. In Table 49 we consider the set of new
exporters which export for at least two years in a row. The average treatment e¤ect on the
treated estimates suggest that the investment rate is 2-4 percentage points higher in the
years immediately around initial entry. Relative to the full sample we nd that the export
e¤ect accounts for a slightly smaller percentage of total investment. This is can largely be
attributed to the fact that the average investment among our continuing exporters is higher
than the average investment rate in the full sample both before and after entry. This is not
22See Eaton et al. (2009), Arkolakis (2010) and Rho and Rodrigue (2012) for examples.
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surprising given that the continuing exporters are generally among the largest and most
productive rms in each industry.
Small vs. Large Firms Revisited
In this section we revisit our investigation of di¤erences across rm size. Here
we consider a second, common metric of rm size: employment. We dene a large rm
in the Indonesian manufacturing sector as one with more than 100 employees in the year
before initial entry into export markets.23 This roughly divides the sample in two equally
sized groups in Table 50. We observe that exporting again appears to have an impact on
investment among both groups of rms, though the ATT suggests that it may be moderately
stronger among smaller rms.
23This denition is similar to that in Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2008), who study a similar set of
Indonesian manufacturing rms.
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Table 50. Investment Rate Across Large and Small Firms (Employment)
Large Firms (Employment  100)
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.155 0.127 0.092 0.100 0.088
Control Group: C 0.145 0.100 0.086 0.068 0.069
ATT 0.010 0.026** 0.006 0.032** 0.019*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
ATT/ T 0.205 0.065 0.320 0.216
No. of matched pairs 1,222 1,028 974 757 501
Mean di¤erence in 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.030
propensity score
Small Firms (Employment < 100)
One Year Year of One Year Two Years Three Years
Before Entry Entry(a) Later(b) Later(c) Later(d)
Treatment Group: T 0.090 0.087 0.064 0.060 0.055
Control Group: C 0.089 0.045 0.035 0.033 0.047
ATT 0.002 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.008
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
ATT/ T 0.483 0.453 0.450 0.145
No. of matched pairs 1,201 1,098 876 591 518
Mean di¤erence in 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.014
propensity score
Notes: The rst two lines present the outcomes observed in the given time period. The average treatment e¤ect on
the treated (ATT) is presented in the third row along with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   , , 
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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